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T H È S E
pour l’obtention du titre de Docteur en Sciences Économiques
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Directeurs
Lise Rochaix Professeur, Université Paris 1-Panthéon Sorbonne
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cialement en économie de la santé, qui m’auront beaucoup appris et souvent conseillée.
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main anglophones, à Toch et Bé pour les relectures francophones, et à Chvi d’avoir joué
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Reading note / Note de lecture
This thesis has been written entirely in English in order to ease the discussion and the
diffusion of its results. For French readers, a substantial summary in French is proposed
at the beggining of the manuscript. The thesis is made of four independent chapters,
each one contributing to the analysis of home care arrangements for the disabled elderly
in France. In order to make each chapter readable independently from the others, some
elements are to be found in several chapters, especially those relating to the economic
literature and the institutional context. As much as possible, though, redundancies have
been avoided. The general conclusion holds the results together in order to bring to light
the main contributions of the thesis.
� � � � �
Cette thèse a été rédigée intégralement en anglais pour faciliter la discussion et la dif-
fusion de ses résultats. Un résumé substantiel en français est toutefois proposé au lecteur
au début du manuscrit. La thèse se compose de quatre chapitres autonomes, qui visent
chacun à éclairer une question spécifique en lien avec l’étude des configurations d’aide
autour des personnes âgées en incapacité. Pour permettre la lecture de chaque chapitre
indépendamment des autres, certains éléments sont mentionnés dans plusieurs chapitres,
notamment parmi ceux ayant trait à la littérature économique ou à la compréhension du
contexte institutionnel français. Les redondances ont été évitées tant que possible. La
conclusion générale met en relation les résultats de chaque chapitre pour souligner les
principales contributions de la thèse.
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Summary in French / Présentation de la
thèse en français
Le 17 mai 2018, le Comité Consultatif National d’Ethique pour les sciences de la vie
et de la santé rendait public son avis sur les enjeux éthiques du vieillissement, visant à
contribuer au“soubassement éthique d’une politique d’accompagnement du vieillissement”
(Comité Consultatif National d’Ethique, 2018). Il interrogeait en particulier les logiques
et les conditions d’institutionnalisation des personnes âgées, en présentant l’institution-
nalisation comme une forme potentielle d’exclusion, qui découlerait d’une dénégation col-
lective de la vieillesse et de la fin de vie. Ce rapport mettait ainsi en exergue deux réalités
françaises, l’une démographique et l’autre politique.
Comme la plupart des pays membres de l’OCDE, la France fait face au vieillissement
rapide de sa population (Gaymu, 2017). La part des personnes âgées de soixante ans et
plus représente aujourd’hui quasiment un quart de la population, contre un cinquième il
y a 50 ans (Graphique 1). Renforcée par la relative stabilité des taux de fertilité, cette
modification de la pyramide des âges tend à se confirmer pour les prochaines décennies,
notamment avec l’arrivée massive des “baby-boomers” au grand âge pour la période allant
de 2025 à 2060 (Monnier, 2007). Les personnes âgées d’au moins 60 ans devraient ainsi
représenter quasiment un tiers de la population en 2060. Le vieillissement démographique
s’accompagne d’une forte prévalence des incapacités, que l’on peut comprendre, selon la
définition de l’Organisation Mondiale de la Santé, comme l’ensemble des déficiences et
des limitations d’activités auxquels font face les individus, ainsi que les limites à leur
implication dans les situations concrètes vécues (restrictions de participation). L’évolu-
tion des comportements de santé et les avancées technologiques pourraient permettre la
stabilisation de la prévalence des incapacités à âge donné (Cutler, 2001), mais cette sta-
bilisation ne permettra pas de compenser l’augmentation en nombre des personnes âgées.
On s’attend ainsi à une augmentation massive du nombre de personnes en situation de
perte d’autonomie dans les décennies à venir (Marbot and Roy, 2015).
Face à ce défi démographique, la volonté des politiques publiques françaises s’est his-
toriquement affirmée vers le “maintien à domicile”. En 1960, le rapport Laroque, souvent
présenté comme une étape importante de la construction des politiques publiques fran-
çaises en matière d’accompagnement de la dépendance, affirmait que l’entrée en institution
devait demeurer une situation exceptionnelle, expliquée par l’absence de famille ou un état
de santé trop dégradé pour permettre de vivre à domicile (Ennuyer, 2007). Les politiques
tournées vers les personnes âgées dépendantes dans la deuxième moitié du vingtième siècle
ont ainsi proposé un ensemble de mesures visant à rendre possible la vie à domicile des
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personnes âgées dépendantes, notamment en encourageant le recours à l’aide à domicile
professionnelle. S’il semble moins coûteux qu’un accompagnement en institution, le main-
tien à domicile demande toutefois une organisation spécifique du quotidien des personnes
âgées, mobilisant généralement, pour la production d’aide, l’entourage et éventuellement
des aidants professionnels.
C’est dans ce contexte démographique et politique que s’inscrit cette thèse, en étu-
diant les déterminants des configurations d’aides familiales et professionnelles autour des
personnes âgées dépendantes résidant à domicile. Elle se rattache ainsi aux travaux éco-
nomiques qui ont cherché à comprendre les mécanismes de décision des individus en perte
d’autonomie et de leurs proches. Le présent résumé propose un aperçu de la littérature
économique sur les configurations d’aides autour des personnes âgées en perte d’autono-
mie, afin de mettre en évidence les contributions de cette thèse à la littérature. Il propose
ensuite une présentation des politiques publiques françaises tournées vers les personnes
âgées dépendantes, qui constituent à la fois le cadre et l’objet d’étude de la thèse, avant
de présenter de manière détaillée les chapitres de la thèse et leurs résultats.
Figure 1 – Volume et structure de la population française entre 1900 et 2060
Source : INSEE, Estimations et projections de population
(2007-2016 ; 2020-2060).
Notes : scénario central de projection de population 2007-2060.
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Approches économiques de l’aide formelle et infor-
melle auprès des personnes âgées en perte d’autonomie
La littérature économique s’est d’abord intéressée à l’aide informelle, définie comme
l’aide non rémunérée apportée par les proches. L’aide reçue par les personnes âgées dé-
pendantes provient en effet encore majoritairement de leurs proches. Avec la mise en
place des politiques publiques visant à subventionner le recours à l’aide professionnelle,
la littérature s’est penchée sur la relation entre ces deux types d’aide, ainsi que sur les
déterminants et les effets de la consommation d’aide professionnelle. Ces analyses sont
centrées sur les personnes âgées résidant à domicile : un troisième pan de la littérature
centrée sur les déterminants de l’entrée en institution permet de voir en quoi en quoi cette
population se distingue de celle résidant en institution.
L’importance et l’organisation de l’aide informelle
La littérature économique s’est tout d’abord intéressée à l’aide familiale, qui constitue
la forme historique et encore prépondérante de l’accompagnement des personnes âgées
dépendantes. Désignée comme aide informelle pour souligner son caractère le plus sou-
vent peu qualifié et non rémunéré, cette aide est à la fois plus importante en volume
et en fréquence que l’aide dite formelle (professionnelle et rémunérée). D’après l’enquête
Handicap Santé Ménages de 2008, parmi les 3,6 millions de personnes âgées bénéficiant
régulièrement d’une aide, 80 % déclarent être aidés par un proche, éventuellement en
consommant également de l’aide professionnelle (48 %) (Soullier and Weber, 2011). Le
temps d’aide médian apporté par les aidants informels atteint 1h40 par jour contre 0h35
pour les aidants professionnels. Cette aide est également plus variée : les aidants informels
interviennent en moyenne dans quatre activités de la vie quotidienne, contre deux pour
les aidants professionnels (Fontaine, 2011).
On peut distinguer trois courants d’analyse de l’aide informelle dans la littérature
économique. Le premier courant s’est intéressé à la relation entre l’aide informelle et
l’aide formelle. Il s’agissait notamment d’anticiper l’effet d’une subvention publique en-
courageant la consommation d’aide professionnelle sur l’aide des proches. La majorité des
études concluent à une forme d’éviction de l’aide informelle par l’aide formelle (Ettner,
1994; Pezzin et al., 1996; Stabile et al., 2006; Viitanen, 2007; Rapp et al., 2011; Fontaine,
2012; Arnault, 2015). Considérant la relation inverse, d’autres travaux ont montré que la
présence d’aide informelle conduit à une faible demande d’aide professionnelle (Van Hout-
ven and Norton, 2004; Pezzin and Schone, 1999; Bolin et al., 2008a; Bonsang, 2009), bien
que cet effet de substitution disparaisse pour les niveaux de dépendance les plus sévères
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(Bonsang, 2009).
Un autre pan de littérature s’est concentré sur l’effet de l’aide informelle sur les aidants,
notamment sur leur offre de travail (Ettner, 1995, 1996; Pezzin and Schone, 1999; Bolin
et al., 2008b; Fontaine, 2009; Van Houtven et al., 2013), leur santé physique et mentale
(Savage and Bailey, 2004; Coe and Van Houtven, 2009; Do et al., 2015) ou leurs relations
sociales (Miller and Montgomery, 1990).
Le troisième courant de la littérature met enfin l’accent sur la genèse des configurations
d’aide et cherche à expliquer les processus de désignation des aidants (Stern, 1994; Sloan
et al., 1997; Pezzin and Schone, 1999; Hiedemann and Stern, 1999; Engers and Stern,
2002). Ces travaux visent à étudier l’effet des caractéristiques individuelles et parentales
sur les configurations d’aide, et, plus récemment, l’effet des interactions endogènes au
sens de Manski (2000), c’est-à-dire la manière dont le comportement d’aide d’un aidant
influence celui des autres (Fontaine et al., 2009). Le premier chapitre de la thèse s’inscrit
essentiellement dans ce troisième courant, en proposant une analyse de la genèse des
configurations d’aide dans les familles d’un parent âgé dépendant dans le contexte français.
Comprendre la demande et les effets de l’aide formelle
La littérature économique s’est également penchée sur les comportements de consom-
mation d’aide formelle, comme forme d’accompagnement le plus souvent valorisée et en-
couragée par les politiques publiques (Muir, 2017).
Un premier champ de la littérature s’est ainsi intéressé à la relation entre la consomma-
tion d’aide professionnelle à domicile et l’entrée en institution. Ces travaux montrent que
la consommation d’aide professionnelle à domicile permet de retarder l’entrée en maison
de retraite (Ettner, 1994; Pezzin et al., 1996; Guo et al., 2015). Ce caractère “protecteur”
de l’aide formelle par rapport à l’institution semble avoir un effet ambigu sur les coûts
privés et publics liés à l’accompagnement de la dépendance : la baisse des coûts liés à l’ins-
titution ne compense pas les coûts additionnels liés à l’aide formelle (Guo et al., 2015),
ou bien ne les compense qu’à condition de mobiliser largement l’aide informelle (Wübker
et al., 2015). L’effet préventif de la consommation d’aide formelle s’observe en outre direc-
tement sur les indicateurs de santé des personnes âgées : la consommation d’aide formelle
à domicile est associée à une amélioration de la santé mentale (Barnay and Juin, 2016),
ainsi qu’à une diminution des hospitalisations et du recours aux urgences (Rapp et al.,
2015; Costa-Font et al., 2018).
Les déterminants du recours à l’aide formelle et de l’importance de la consommation
ont également fait l’objet de travaux, qui visaient notamment à analyser l’effet des poli-
tiques publiques subventionnant le recours à l’aide formelle. Outre les limitations d’activi-
tés et la disponibilité de l’aide informelle qui sont, de manière récurrente, des déterminants
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de la consommation d’aide formelle (voir Bakx, Meijer, Schut and Doorslaer (2015) pour
une revue de littérature), le prix de l’aide apparâıt comme un facteur expliquant les com-
portements de consommation d’aide formelle. Plusieurs travaux ont ainsi montré que la
probabilité de recourir à l’aide formelle et le volume consommé sont plus importants en
présence de dispositifs publics diminuant le prix de l’aide (Coughlin et al., 1992; Ettner,
1994; Pezzin et al., 1996; Stabile et al., 2006; Rapp et al., 2011; Fontaine, 2012). Tou-
tefois, faute de données appropriées, ces travaux n’ont pas pu quantifier l’élasticité-prix
de la demande d’aide professionnelle pour les personnes âgées dépendantes. C’est à cette
lacune que tente de répondre le Chapitre 2 de la thèse, réalisé dans le cadre du projet
Modapa étudiant la demande d’aide à domicile des personnes âgées, en estimant l’effet
d’une variation du prix sur la quantité d’aide formelle consommée.
Le domicile ou l’institution
De nombreux travaux économiques se sont enfin intéressés aux déterminants de l’entrée
en institution, opposée aux solutions de maintien à domicile, et ce d’autant plus que les
institutions ont longtemps été considérées comme le lieu exclusif de l’accompagnement
professionnel des personnes âgées (Norton, 2016). Ils ont montré que l’entrée en institution
s’explique le plus souvent par un état de santé (physique ou cognitif) particulièrement
dégradé et par la moindre disponibilité de l’aide informelle, en particulier de la part du
conjoint ou des enfants (Freedman, 1996; Lo Sasso and Johnson, 2002; Van Houtven and
Norton, 2004; Charles and Sevak, 2005; Gaugler et al., 2007; Arnault, 2015). Des travaux
récents se sont en outre penchés sur la question de la sensibilité au prix des institutions.
Grabowski and Gruber (2007) ont montré que la demande était relativement inélastique,
tandis que Mommaerts (2018) a confirmé ce résultat en le nuançant : les personnes âgées
seules ont une plus grande probabilité d’entrer en institution lorsque le prix associé est
faible plutôt que de co-résider.
Cette thèse est centrée sur les personnes âgées résidant à domicile, et ne traite pas
des personnes résidant en institution. La population étudiée dans la thèse présente donc,
en moyenne, un meilleur état de santé et de plus grandes ressources en aide informelle
comparé à l’ensemble des personnes âgées.
Le financement et la régulation de l’aide à domicile en
France
La thèse s’inscrit dans le contexte français : cette section propose donc de décrire
l’organisation décentralisée et les caractéristiques des politiques publiques visant à ac-
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compagner la perte d’autonomie, du point de vue du financement de la demande d’aide
professionnelle et de la régulation du secteur de l’aide à domicile.
La décentralisation au niveau des conseils départementaux
L’une des caractéristiques du système d’accompagnement de la perte d’autonomie
français est la décentralisation des politiques de financement et de régulation de l’aide à
domicile au niveau des conseils départementaux. Reconnus comme “chefs de file de l’ac-
tion sociale” en 2004, ce sont eux qui sont en charge de la mise en oeuvre de l’Allocation
personnalisée d’autonomie (APA), principal programme destiné aux personnes âgées dé-
pendantes. Ils sont également chargés de la régulation des producteurs d’aide à domicile
professionnels intervenant auprès de publics fragiles. Si le cadre légal est apparemment
contraignant sur ces deux volets — financement de la demande et régulation de l’offre —,
l’observation des pratiques départementales montre qu’il existe une marge de manœuvre
considérable dont se saisissent les départements et qui résulte en une réelle disparité des
pratiques d’un département à un autre.
La décentralisation de l’APA et la variété des pratiques départementales dans sa mise
en oeuvre sont structurantes pour cette thèse. En effet, d’une part, elles expliquent qu’il
soit nécessaire de travailler au niveau d’un département donné pour récolter des données
précises permettant le calcul du reste-à-charge exact et du volume d’aide consommé dans
le cadre de la politique : l’un des chapitres visant à l’estimation de l’élasticité-prix s’ap-
puie sur les données administratives de l’APA récoltées auprès d’un conseil départemental
(Chapitre 2). D’autre part, elles constituent également un objet d’étude en soi : le Cha-
pitre 3 s’intéresse à l’effet des différentes pratiques départementales sur le recours à l’aide
professionnelle.
L’Allocation personnalisée d’autonomie
Mise en place en 2002, l’Allocation personnalisée d’autonomie (APA) vise principa-
lement à aider au financement de l’aide professionnelle pour les bénéficiaires résidant à
domicile1. L’APA est ouverte à toute personne âgée d’au moins 60 ans, résidant en France
de manière stable et régulière, et en situation de perte d’autonomie2. Il s’agit donc d’une
allocation universelle, puisque l’éligibilité ne dépend pas du niveau de revenu des per-
1L’APA est également versée aux personnes en établissement et couvre alors une partie du tarif
“dépendance” facturé aux usagers. Ce volet de la politique n’est pas considéré dans la thèse, centrée sur
les personnes résidant à domicile.
2“ Toute personne âgée résidant en France qui se trouve dans l’incapacité d’assumer les conséquences
du manque ou de la perte d’autonomie liés à son état physique ou mental a droit à une allocation
personnalisée d’autonomie permettant une prise en charge adaptée à ses besoins.” Article L232-1 du
Code de l’Action Sociale et des Familles (CASF).
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sonnes. Elle se distingue par là des formes antérieures du financement public de l’aide
à domicile professionnelle, notamment l’Allocation compensatrice pour tierce personne
(ACTP), mise en place en 1975, et la Prestation Spécifique Dépendance (PSD) qui l’a
remplacée en 1997, toutes deux sous condition de ressources.
L’évaluation du niveau de dépendance se fait au domicile du demandeur par une
équipe médico-sociale du conseil départemental, qui évalue les limitations d’activités et
restrictions fonctionnelles de l’individu au moyen de la grille “Autonomie, Gérontologie,
Groupes Iso-Ressources” (AGGIR). Basée sur le système de “case-mix classification sys-
tem” , qui vise à regrouper au sein d’une catégorie homogène les individus qui nécessitent
les mêmes ressources ou génèrent des coûts similaires (Fries, 1990; Coutton, 2001), cette
grille permet de déterminer le groupes iso-ressources (GIR) de l’individu parmi les six
groupes qu’elle délimite. Seuls les individus évalués entre le GIR 1 (correspondant au ni-
veau de perte d’autonomie le plus élevé) et le GIR 4 (niveau intermédiaire) sont éligibles
à l’APA3. Lorsque l’individu est jugé éligible, l’équipe médico-sociale établit le nombre
d’heures d’aide qui pourront être subventionnées pour ce bénéficiaire, que l’on appelle le
plan d’aide individualisé. L’équivalent monétaire du plan d’aide doit être inférieur à un
plafond national, spécifique à chaque GIR et actualisé chaque année. Le bénéficiaire de
l’APA est ensuite libre du nombre d’heures d’aide qu’il consomme effectivement ; tant
qu’il n’a pas consommé l’intégralité de son plan d’aide, il reçoit une subvention horaire
diminuant le prix de l’aide. Le montant de cette subvention dépend de son taux de parti-
cipation, fonction croissante de son revenu. Le bénéficiaire de l’APA peut consommer des
heures d’aide au-delà du plan d’aide, mais en assumant alors l’intégralité du coût. La loi
relative à l’adaptation de la société au vieillissement de 2015 a augmenté la générosité de
la politique de l’APA, en modifiant la formule de calcul du taux de participation pour le
rendre plus faible, à revenu donné, pour les individus les plus dépendants. Elle a également
relevé les plafonds nationaux sur lesquels butaient potentiellement les plans d’aide.
Explicitement, les conseils départementaux ne sont chargés que des procédures d’infor-
mation et d’attribution de l’allocation. Mais l’observation de leurs pratiques montre que
cette mise en œuvre dépasse la simple application d’une politique nationale au niveau local.
La diversité des pratiques porte ainsi d’abord sur la manière de gérer les missions qui leur
sont explicitement confiées (mise en oeuvre de l’évaluation par l’équipe médico-sociale,
décisions d’éligibilité, prescription de l’aide). Elle est également visible sur la gestion des
“zones d’incertitude” que crée le cadre légal sur certains paramètres essentiels au calcul de
l’APA. La mise en œuvre du dispositif implique en effet que les conseils départementaux
tranchent sur un certain nombre de paramètres déterminants dans le calcul de l’allocation.
3Le lecteur pourra se référer, entre autres, à Eghbal-Téhérani and Makdessi (2011) pour une présen-
tation détaillée du contenu de chaque GIR (page 8).
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Ils choisissent en particulier le mode de valorisation des heures du plan d’aide, c’est-à-
dire la manière dont est calculé l’équivalent monétaire du plan d’aide pour s’assurer qu’il
est inférieur au plafond national, paramètre qui influence la générosité de la politique.
Ils fixent également la formule de calcul de la subvention horaire, c’est-à-dire la manière
dont le taux de participation interagit avec le prix pour former le reste-à-charge horaire
effectif. Ce sont les variations de pratiques d’un département à l’autre sur ce dernier point
qu’étudie le Chapitre 3 de la thèse.
La régulation des producteurs d’aide à domicile
Les conseils départementaux sont également chargés de la régulation de l’offre dans
le secteur de l’aide à domicile. Définir “le” secteur de l’aide à domicile est délicat dans
la mesure où les producteurs de l’aide à domicile professionnelle sont variés, en termes
d’ancienneté, de statuts juridiques et de modes de régulation. Cette section récapitule la
construction des différents modes de régulation des producteurs intervenant auprès des
personnes âgées dépendantes.
L’emploi direct (ou gré-à-gré) est un premier mode d’intervention en matière d’aide
à domicile. Forme historique de l’intervenant à domicile, l’employé est embauché direc-
tement par la personne qui reçoit le service. Le niveau de régulation, dans ce cas, est
très faible : ce sont uniquement les dispositions du Code du travail qui s’appliquent. Avec
ce mode d’intervention, les niveaux des prix et de qualification des intervenants sont gé-
néralement très faibles. Une forme alternative à l’emploi direct, toutefois équivalente en
matière de régulation, est le recours à une structure mandataire, qui assiste l’employeur
dans les procédures de recrutement.
On trouve par ailleurs sur le marché des structures prestataires d’aide à domicile, em-
ployant directement des aidants professionnels qui interviennent au domicile des personnes
aidées au nom de la structure. La majorité des services prestataires qui interviennent au-
près des bénéficiaires de l’APA à domicile sont des structures “autorisées” par le conseil
départemental. Ce mode de régulation, instauré en 2002, est associé à plusieurs niveaux
de contrôle par le Conseil départemental. L’entrée sur le marché, la transformation et
l’extension de ces services sont d’abord conditionnées à l’obtention d’une autorisation
par le président du conseil départemental. Les structures autorisées doivent répondre aux
exigences de certification et d’évaluation externes, visant à garantir un certain niveau de
qualité. En outre, la zone géographique au sein de laquelle chaque service autorisé inter-
vient fait l’objet d’un accord avec le conseil départemental. Enfin, chaque service autorisé
est tarifé par le conseil départemental : un tarif unique est fixé au niveau de la structure,
théoriquement en fonction du coût de revient moyen précédemment observé, mais aussi
selon des considérations administratives et politiques (Gramain and Xing, 2012).
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L’autre mode de régulation des services prestataires existant sur le secteur, mis en
place dans le cadre du plan Borloo en 2005, relâche les contraintes de régulation associées
à l’autorisation. Il permet ainsi aux services d’aide à domicile d’intervenir auprès des pu-
blics fragiles avec l’obtention d’un “agrément qualité” dont les exigences sont moindres
comparées à celles de l’autorisation. Les “services agréés” sont ainsi libres d’entrer sur le
marché sans autorisation et de fixer leurs prix, sous réserve de respecter un taux d’évo-
lution annuel maximal. La création de ce statut visait à ouvrir le secteur aux entreprises
pour stimuler l’emploi par l’accroissement et la diversification de l’offre de service.
Entre 2005 et 2015, en dépit de la stabilité législative du secteur, et malgré l’augmen-
tation de la demande, de nombreux rapports publics font état des difficultés réelles et
croissantes du secteur (Aube-Martin et al., 2010; Poletti, 2012; Cour des Comptes, 2014;
Branchu et al., 2015). Ces rapports soulignent notamment les contraintes que représentent
les coûts de transports et leur poids inégal selon l’importance et les caractéristiques des
zones desservies (Aube-Martin et al., 2010; Blondel et al., 2013; Garabige et al., 2015;
Branchu et al., 2015). Cette question est considérée spécifiquement dans le Chapitre 4 de
cette thèse. De plus, outre le manque d’attractivité des professions de l’aide à domicile
et l’insuffisance des niveaux de tarification, ces rapports ont déploré la complexité de la
superposition des cadres réglementaires, question qu’adresse partiellement la loi relative
à l’adaptation de la société au vieillissement de 2015.
L’article 47 de la loi met en effet en place les conditions d’un régime unique pour les
services prestataires d’aide à domicile intervenant auprès des personnes âgées à domicile.
Il prévoit d’unifier les cadres réglementaires des services en faisant prévaloir celui de
l’autorisation, pour tous les services intervenants auprès de publics fragiles. Ceci implique
donc que l’ensemble des services seront soumis aux dispositions du droit commun liées au
régime de l’autorisation. La loi prévoit en outre un cahier des charges national qui soumet
tous les services (autorisés) à des règles organisationnelles et fonctionnelles. Ce nouveau
régime oriente donc explicitement la régulation du secteur vers la simplification et vers
la logique de protection des publics fragiles (Labazée, 2017). L’homogénéité du secteur
ainsi régulé rencontre toutefois un obstacle majeur dans le fait que toutes les structures
prestataires ne seront pas tarifées. En effet, la tarification administrée n’est pas présentée
comme une obligation pour tous les services, étant données les réticences des services
anciennement agréés et la charge additionnelle que cette obligation représenterait pour
les conseils départementaux (Direction générale de la cohésion sociale, 2016). Le secteur
reste ainsi marqué par la dichotomie entre les services tarifés d’une part et les services
non tarifés de l’autre, qui implique des différences majeures dans la gestion des services
et la solvabilisation des bénéficiaires de l’aide sociale4.
4Concernant le mode de financement des services déjà tarifés avant la loi et dont le prix reste admi-
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Présentation de la thèse
Cette thèse porte sur les déterminants des configurations d’aide autour des personnes
âgées dépendantes résidant à domicile. La majeure partie de la thèse analyse les déter-
minants de l’aide formelle, en particulier ceux qui dépendent des décisions de politiques
publiques. Sous quelles conditions les individus ont-ils recours à l’aide professionnelle, et
comment se détermine leur niveau de consommation ? Comment les producteurs d’aide
familiale et professionnelle s’adaptent-t-ils aux contraintes de production qui leur sont
propres ? La thèse se propose, d’une part, d’étudier les déterminants de la demande d’aide
formelle. Elle s’intéresse à ces déterminants à la marge extensive de l’aide (la décision de
consommer de l’aide professionnelle, ou non) et à sa marge intensive (le volume consommé,
parmi les individus consommant de l’aide professionnelle). La thèse contribue également
à l’analyse de l’organisation de la production d’aide, formelle et informelle. Elle étudie,
d’une part, les déterminants des configurations d’aide familiale, en particulier les interac-
tions entre les décisions d’aide des enfants au sein d’une fratrie. De l’autre, elle s’intéresse
aux coûts de transport comme contrainte de production pour les services d’aide à domicile
professionnels.
Chapitre 1
Le premier Chapitre, écrit avec Roméo Fontaine et Agnès Gramain, porte sur les confi-
gurations d’aide familiale autour d’un parent âgé dépendant. Il étudie les déterminants de
l’aide informelle apportée par les enfants d’un parent âgé dépendant : comment l’implica-
tion des enfants s’ajuste-t-elle aux caractéristiques individuelles et familiales ? Comment
s’articulent les décisions de chacun ? Existe-t-il des logiques d’implication différentes se-
lon le rang des enfants dans la fratrie, et selon le type d’aide considéré ? Pour prendre
en compte la potentielle interdépendance des comportements d’aide au sein des fratries,
plusieurs travaux ont déjà proposé des modèles inspirés de la théorie des jeux, qui incluent
les anticipations que forment les agents sur les décisions d’aide des autres enfants (Hiede-
mann and Stern, 1999; Checkovich and Stern, 2002; Engers and Stern, 2002; Pezzin et al.,
2007; Byrne et al., 2009). A partir des données européennes de l’enquête Survey, Health,
Aging and Retirement in Europe (SHARE), Fontaine et al. (2009) a cherché à étudier
directement les “interactions endogènes” au sens de Manski (Manski, 2000), c’est-à-dire
l’effet de la décision d’un membre d’un groupe sur la décision des autres. L’identification
de ces interactions est délicate, puisqu’elles peuvent se confondre avec les “effets contex-
nistré, peu de modifications sont apportées. L’article 47 prévoit un travail sur des tarifs nationaux de
référence non opposables prenant en compte la nature des activités, la qualification du personnel et la
couverture territoriale.
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tuels”, désignant l’effet des caractéristiques d’un membre sur la décision des autres, et les
“effets corrélés”, renvoyant à l’existence d’un contexte commun aux individus d’un même
groupe. Fontaine et al. (2009) développent une modélisation semi-structurelle, reprise dans
ce chapitre, qui permet de distinguer ces différents effets.
Le Chapitre se propose ainsi d’étudier les configurations d’aide familiale, et plus spéci-
fiquement les interactions endogènes, dans le contexte français. Il s’appuie sur les données
françaises de l’enquête Handicap Santé Ménages (DREES and INSEE, 2008). Cette en-
quête représentative de la population française porte spécifiquement sur l’état de santé et
les restrictions d’activités des enquêtés. On sélectionne un échantillon de personnes âgées
de soixante ans ou plus, qui déclarent avoir besoin d’aide humaine pour la réalisation des
activités de la vie quotidienne. L’intégralité de l’information disponible dépend de la décla-
ration de l’enquêté, notamment pour le repérage des limitations d’activité et des aidants.
Ceci implique donc des biais de déclaration potentiellement liées aux caractéristiques de
l’individu et à son environnement (Merrill et al., 1997; Brink et al., 2003).
Une première étape descriptive montre que l’aide apportée par les enfants — toutes
tailles de fratrie confondues — est affectée par le statut conjugal du parent, la taille
de la fratrie et le rang dans la fratrie. L’analyse se tourne ensuite vers les interactions,
définies comme la réaction de la décision d’aide d’un enfant à la décision d’aide des autres
enfants. Elle se concentre sur les familles de deux enfants. Si ce choix restreint la portée
de l’analyse, il permet non seulement d’étudier les familles les plus fréquentes dans notre
échantillon et en population générale, mais aussi d’adopter une modélisation relativement
simple, sans hypothèses fortes sur le mode d’agrégation des comportements des enfants.
La modélisation reprise de Fontaine et al. (2009) fait l’hypothèse que les décisions des
enfants au sein d’une fratrie sont non-coopératives et simultanées. Outre les interactions,
les déterminants étudiés relèvent des caractéristiques individuelles des enfants (âge, statut
familial, statut d’emploi), des variables de famille, incluant à la fois les caractéristiques
du parent (sexe, âge, niveau de dépendance, ressources, éducation) et celles de la fratrie
(composition sexuée, écart d’âge). Ces déterminants sont étudiés pour deux définitions
différentes de l’aide. La première, définition large de l’aide, considère comme aidants tous
les enfants qui apportent une aide aux tâches de la vie quotidienne, de l’aide matérielle ou
du soutien moral. La seconde définition restreint le statut d’aidant aux enfants déclarés
aidants pour les tâches de la vie quotidienne, ce type d’aide étant potentiellement plus
contraignant que l’aide matérielle ou le soutien moral.
Avec la définition large de l’aide, les écarts de mobilisation observés selon le rang dans
la fratrie découlent de trois sources : les caractéristiques individuelles de chaque enfant,
l’effet de ces caractéristiques sur la décision d’aide, et l’ajustement de l’un au comporte-
ment de l’autre (interactions endogènes). Comparé à celui de l’âıné, le comportement du
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cadet est plus sensible à ses contraintes personnelles, faisant apparâıtre un arbitrage entre
coûts et utilité de l’aide. Les caractéristiques familiales ont un effet relativement similaire
quelque soit le rang, en particulier la forte assignation au rôle d’aidant des femmes ayant
un frère. On observe en outre une asymétrie dans les interactions des décisions d’aide :
l’âıné a une plus forte probabilité d’être aidant lorsque le cadet est déclaré aidant, tandis
que le cadet ne semble pas réagir significativement à l’implication de son âıné. Lorsqu’on
étudie les déterminants de la définition restreinte de l’aide, centrée sur les tâches de la
vie quotidienne, une seule explication majeure des différences demeure : l’asymétrie, entre
âınés et cadets, dans l’ajustement au comportement de l’autre enfant, à caractéristiques
individuelles et familiales données.
Les limites de ce travail tiennent d’abord aux hypothèses fortes mobilisées pour la
modélisation des configurations d’aide. Discutée dans le Chapitre, les hypothèses de non
coopération et de simultanéité des décisions imposent en effet un cadre relativement rigide
aux décisions d’aide. Elles ne prennent pas en compte les possibilités d’un ajustement
coopératif entre les enfants, ni la potentielle séquentialité des décisions, où un enfant
prendrait sa décision avant l’autre. Ce chapitre se restreint également à la marge extensive
de l’aide (être aidant ou ne pas être aidant). Être déclaré aidant peut cependant renvoyer
à une large variété de situations, quant aux volumes apportés ou aux types de tâches
accomplies. Enfin, étudier uniquement les fratries de deux enfants restreint la portée de
l’analyse par rapport à l’ambition initiale. Des développements futurs sont ainsi nécessaires
pour modéliser les interactions dans un cadre plus large. Ce travail constitue toutefois la
première étude des interactions au sein des fratries autour d’un parent âgé dépendant
dans un contexte français. Il confirme les résultats obtenus sur les données européennes,
notamment concernant l’effet d’une fratrie mixte et l’asymétrie des interactions.
Chapitre 2
Le second Chapitre est centré sur la sensibilité au prix de la demande d’aide profes-
sionnelle : dans quelle mesure le volume d’aide professionnelle consommé par les personnes
âgées dépendantes dépend-il du prix qu’ils payent pour cette aide ? Malgré l’importance
des politiques publiques subventionnant le recours à l’aide à domicile professionnelle, la
question de la sensibilité au prix de la demande d’aide professionnelle a encore été relative-
ment peu étudiée dans la littérature économique. Plusieurs travaux, mentionnés ci-dessus,
ont montré que la demande était effectivement sensible au coût de l’aide professionnelle,
sans pouvoir toutefois, faute de données adéquates, quantifier l’élasticité-prix de cette
demande. C’est ce que vise à faire ce chapitre, coécrit avec Marianne Tenand et réalisé
dans le cadre du projet Modapa5, dont l’objectif est justement d’estimer la sensibilité de
5Pour plus d’information, voir www.modapa.cnrs.fr.
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la demande d’aide au reste-à-charge et ses implications pour les politiques publiques.
Etudier cette question demande de disposer de données permettant d’observer précisé-
ment à la fois le reste-à-charge et la consommation des personnes âgées dépendantes. Or,
dans le contexte français, il n’existe pas, à ce jour, de données vérifiant une telle condition
parmi les enquêtes et fichiers administratifs nationales. Nous avons donc récolté, auprès
d’un Conseil départemental français, les données administratives du programme de l’APA
dans le département entre 2012 et 2014. Ces données permettent de connâıtre le taux
de participation et la consommation d’aide professionnelle des bénéficiaires de l’APA. La
consommation observée est toutefois limitée aux heures subventionnées dans le cadre de la
politique (le plan d’aide) et, pour les individus qui consomment l’intégralité de leur plan
d’aide, on ignore si la consommation totale est supérieure ou égale à ce plan d’aide (cen-
sure à droite). Nous estimons donc un modèle de censure, expliquant le volume consommé
par le reste-à-charge et un ensemble de caractéristiques individuelles. L’échantillon sé-
lectionné comprend les individus consommant auprès d’un service d’aide autorisé, pour
lesquels le prix facturé est observable puisqu’il est fixé par le Conseil départemental. A
revenu donné, le reste-à-charge supporté par les individus dépend en effet directement du
prix du producteur qui leur fournit l’aide. Nous exploitons principalement les variations
dans le prix des producteurs d’un individu à l’autre pour identifier l’élasticité-prix. Une
stratégie de variable instrumentale est mobilisée pour s’assurer de l’exogénéité de ce prix,
qui s’appuie sur les différences de couverture territoriale entre les producteurs : le prix est
instrumenté par le nombre de communes servies par le producteur.
Nos résultats font apparâıtre une élasticité-prix de -0.4, significativement différente
de 0 et de -1. Les tests d’hétérogénéité montrent que l’élasticité-prix n’est pas significa-
tivement différente lorsqu’on distingue les individus par leur niveau de dépendance ou
leur statut matrimonial. En revanche, la sensibilité au prix est plus importante pour les
individus aux revenus les plus élevés. Ces résultats confirment les premières estimations
obtenues dans le cadre du projet Modapa. En utilisant les données nationales de l’enquête
Handicap Santé Ménages et en faisant des hypothèses sur les restes-à-charge espérés, Hege
(2016) estime une élasticité-prix de -0.1, significativement différente de 0. Utilisant des
fichiers administratifs de l’APA provenant d’un autre département que celui étudié dans
ce chapitre et une stratégie d’identification alternative, Bourreau-Dubois et al. (2014)
trouvent une élasticité-prix de -0.55.
Deux limites de ce travail tiennent aux données utilisées. D’une part, ces données
administratives ne présentent qu’une information limitée sur les caractéristiques sociodé-
mographiques de l’individu et sur son entourage. On ignore notamment si les bénéficiaires
étudiés reçoivent de l’aide de la part d’un proche, ce qui serait susceptible de diminuer
leur demande d’aide informelle. Outre le fait que cette lacune limite le pouvoir explicatif
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de notre modèle, elle pourrait également biaiser notre estimation de l’élasticité-prix si le
recours à l’aide informelle s’avère être corrélé au prix du producteur. Plusieurs tests sont
menés dans le chapitre. Ils suggèrent que l’élasticité-prix n’est pas affectée par la présence
d’un conjoint, ni par la consommation durant le week-end dimanche, caractéristique po-
tentiellement liée à de moindres ressources en aide informelle. Nos estimations semblent
donc robustes à la prise en compte de l’aide informelle.
La seconde limite porte sur la possible généralisation de l’élasticité-prix obtenue. Nous
travaillons sur un échantillon sélectionné à plusieurs niveaux : d’une part, des personnes
âgées dépendantes sélectionnées par rapport à l’ensemble des personnes dépendantes, de
l’autre, des personnes résidant dans un département français particulier. Le premier point
renvoie au fait que l’élasticité-prix est estimée sur une population résidant à domicile,
ayant fait une demande d’APA et servie par un producteur prestataire. Cette population
est donc en meilleure santé et en relation fréquente avec leur entourage, par rapport
aux personnes résidant en institutions. Dans la mesure où le non-recours à l’APA est
souvent observé chez les individus disposant des plus hauts revenus, ces individus ont
également un revenu plus faible que la moyenne des personnes âgées dépendantes résidant
à domicile. Enfin, la comparaison des individus servis par un producteur prestataire et ceux
consommant auprès d’un producteur agréé ou en gré-à-gré montre que les revenus et le
niveau de dépendance des premiers sont légèrement moins élevés en moyenne. La deuxième
source de sélection tient au fait que nous travaillons sur les données d’un département
français en particulier. Si la plupart des indicateurs socio-démographiques y sont proches
des moyennes nationales, le niveau de richesse du département est toutefois légèrement
plus élevé qu’en moyenne.
Nos estimations confirment les résultats déjà obtenus à partir de données ou de stra-
tégies d’identification alternatives, à savoir une élasticité-prix non nulle mais faible (si-
gnificativement inférieure à 1 en valeur absolue). Une élasticité-prix non nulle implique
que les paramètres des politiques publiques influençant le prix de l’aide à domicile ont
des effets sur l’efficacité allocative de ces programmes. Etant donnée la faible sensibilité
de la demande, ces paramètres ont en outre des propriétés redistributives et modulent
l’importance de la redistribution des contribuables vers les personnes âgées dépendantes.
Chapitre 3
Le troisième chapitre, coécrit avec Rémi Kaboré et Jérôme Wittwer, porte sur les
déterminants du recours à l’aide professionnelle des personnes âgées, en particulier ceux
qui dépendent des politiques départementales. L’organisation des politiques sociales fran-
çaises confiant aux conseils départementaux la mise en œuvre de l’APA et la régulation du
secteur de l’aide à domicile, on se demande dans quelle mesure les décisions départemen-
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tales sont susceptibles d’influencer le recours à l’aide professionnelle sur le territoire du
département. Deux dimensions de la décision départementale sont étudiées : d’une part, le
choix de la règle de calcul pour la subvention de l’APA, donnant lieu à différents niveaux
de générosité pour les départements (indicateur de demande) ; de l’autre, l’importance
des producteurs autorisés dans le secteur départemental, impliquant un accès différencié
à une qualité et un prix régulé (indicateur d’offre). La question de l’effet de la générosité
des politiques de subvention de l’aide formelle a déjà été étudiée en mobilisant, à l’ins-
tar de notre démarche, les variations territoriales. Stabile et al. (2006) montrent que la
générosité des provinces au Canada, mesurée par le niveau de dépenses locales, influence
le recours à l’aide formelle et informelle, tandis qu’Arrighi et al. (2015) montrent que la
probabilité de faire une demande d’APA augmente avec la générosité des départements à
la marge extensive (part des bénéficiaires APA dans la population de 60 ans et plus) et à
la marge intensive (montant moyen de la subvention).
Nous exploitons une enquête départementale originale, l’enquête Territoire (LEDa-
LEGOS and CES, 2012). Menée en 2012, cette enquête visait à comprendre et documenter
la variété des pratiques départementales en matière d’accompagnement des personnes
âgées. Elle s’est déroulée en deux temps. Dans une première partie, des enquêtes de terrain
ont été menées dans huit conseils départementaux afin de comprendre l’organisation et
les paramètres d’intérêt pour la politique. Puis, un questionnaire standardisé a été diffusé
auprès de l’ensemble des conseils départementaux métropolitains, questionnaire retourné
par 71 conseils départementaux6. Ces informations départementales sont appariées, sur la
base du département de résidence, avec un échantillon de personnes âgées qui déclarent
des restrictions dans la réalisation des activités de la vie quotidienne, issu de l’enquête
Handicap santé Ménages.
Une première partie documente la variété des pratiques départementales reflétées par
les indicateurs d’offre et de demande, et les met en lien avec les caractéristiques socio-
démographiques des départements. Il apparâıt ainsi que le choix d’une règle généreuse
pour la subvention APA n’est pas corrélé aux caractéristiques démographiques ou sociales
des populations départementales, alors qu’un plus faible niveau de régulation est observé
dans des départements peu vieillissants et avec un plus faible taux de bénéficiaires de
l’APA parmi les personnes âgées. Les deux indicateurs d’offre et de demande sont ensuite
intégrés dans un modèle de choix discret expliquant le recours à l’aide à domicile profes-
sionnelle. Ce recours est expliqué à la fois par des variables individuelles et des variables
départementales. Outre les indicateurs d’offre et de demande, ces dernières incluent des
contrôles pour les caractéristiques sociodémographiques des départements. L’estimation
de ce modèle montre qu’une règle de calcul généreuse pour la subvention APA n’est pas
6Le questionnaire est disponible ici : http://modapa.cnrs.fr/questionnaire.pdf.
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associée à un recours à l’aide à domicile plus systématique que dans les autres départe-
ments. En revanche, les individus résidant dans un département pour lesquels le niveau
de régulation est faible ont une plus faible probabilité de consommer de l’aide à domicile
professionnelle. Ce plus faible recours à l’aide professionnelle dans les départements où la
régulation est faible pourrait s’expliquer par un effet prix (effet désincitatif des prix non
régulés) ou un effet qualité (effet désincitatif de la qualité non régulée). Un faible niveau
de régulation pourrait en outre signaler une politique départementale peu orientée sur le
maintien à domicile par le recours à l’aide professionnelle (peu de diffusion de l’informa-
tion, procédures d’accès complexes), entrâınant une plus faible demande. La comparaison
de différents modèles de choix discrets — sans variables départementales, avec effets fixes
ou avec les indicateurs d’offre et de demande — montre que l’usage des indicateurs d’offre
et de demande permet d’augmenter le pouvoir explicatif des modèles.
Ce chapitre ne permet pas de conclure quant à l’effet causal du niveau de régulation
sur le recours à l’aide professionnelle, dans la mesure où une causalité inverse (où le niveau
de la demande locale détermine les politiques de régulation) ou un biais de variable omise
(influençant à la fois la demande et la politique de régulation) sont possibles. Il permet
toutefois d’éclairer des dimensions peu connues et étudiées de la décentralisation des
politiques tournées vers les personnes en perte d’autonomie en France. Il permet également
de discuter des effets attendus de la réforme de 2016 modifiant à la fois la règle de calcul
du taux de participation et le mode de régulation du secteur.
Chapitre 4
Le dernier chapitre s’intéresse plus spécifiquement à la production de l’aide profession-
nelle et aux contraintes qui lui sont associées, notamment celle du déplacement à domicile.
De nombreux rapports publics ont fait le constat que les coûts de transport, comprenant
à la fois les indemnisations pour les frais liés aux déplacements des aidants professionnels
et le temps improductif qu’ils passent dans les transports, représentent une contrainte
non négligeable pour les services d’aide à domicile. Cette contrainte pèse inégalement sur
les services, selon le type de zones qu’ils desservent, et affecte potentiellement leur prix
(Chevreul, 2009; Aube-Martin et al., 2010; Garabige et al., 2015). En outre, l’organisation
de la régulation du secteur par un tarif unique propre à chaque structure d’aide engendre
de fait une péréquation territoriale entre les résidents des zones coûteuses à desservir et
ceux résidant en zones peu coûteuses. Ce chapitre propose donc d’étudier empiriquement
l’importance, les sources de variation et l’effet des coûts de transport dans le secteur de
l’aide à domicile. Dans quelle mesure les coûts de transport supportés par les services
d’aide à domicile dépendent-ils des caractéristiques des zones desservies ? Sont-ils suscep-
tibles d’affecter la consommation d’aide professionnelle des personnes résidant dans les
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zones les plus coûteuses ?
Ce chapitre mobilise des données originales récoltées auprès d’un producteur d’aide à
domicile, autorisé et associatif, desservant plus de 10 000 consommateurs dans un départe-
ment français. Ces consommateurs peuvent être des bénéficiaires de l’APA ou des individus
non subventionnés par l’aide publique, consommant des services de confort. Ces données
permettent d’observer les tournées des aidants professionnels pendant le mois d’octobre
2015. Grâce aux informations géographiques contenues dans les données, il est possible, en
mobilisant des outils dédiés, de reconstruire les temps et distances de trajet pour chaque
tournée. Ces informations permettent de quantifier les coûts de transport associés aux
tournées journalières de chaque intervenant et de les comparer au nombre d’interventions
ou au temps d’intervention dans la journée. Grâce aux fichiers de facturation et de paye
disponibles par ailleurs, il est possible d’associer ces coûts aux caractéristiques du client
et de l’aidant professionnel.
On montre que ces coûts sont plus élevés pour les tournées servant les zones rurales ou
les petites unités urbaines, du fait des contraintes géographiques associées à ces espaces :
les temps et distances de trajet pour aller d’une intervention à une autre sont plus impor-
tants dans ces zones. Mais l’importance des coûts de transport observés dans ces zones
tient aussi aux caractéristiques de la demande qui réside dans ces espaces. En effet, les bé-
néficiaires de l’APA, et parmi eux, les individus les plus dépendants, sont sur-représentés
dans les zones rurales ou petites zones urbaines. Or, leur profil de consommation est frag-
menté : ces bénéficiaires reçoivent des interventions plus courtes, mais plus souvent, ce
qui génère mécaniquement des temps et distances de transport plus importants. En outre,
ces bénéficiaires reçoivent plus souvent de l’aide de la part d’aidants professionnels très
qualifiés, dont le taux de salaire horaire est plus élevé : le coût du temps passé en transport
est donc plus élevé pour ces aidants. Ainsi, les contraintes physiques des territoires mais
également la structure de la demande qui y réside expliquent la variation des coûts de
transport d’une zone à l’autre.
Ce chapitre constitue un cas d’étude permettant l’approche des coûts de transport
d’une manière particulièrement précise. L’intérêt des données du point de vue géogra-
phique a toutefois un coût quant à l’information disponible sur les consommateurs : on
dispose de très peu d’éléments sur les caractéristiques sociodémographiques des consom-
mateurs ainsi que l’aide informelle qu’ils reçoivent. En outre, dans la mesure où l’analyse
est centrée sur un producteur particulier dans un département donné, il est nécessaire
d’être prudent dans la généralisation des résultats, qui sont observés conditionnellement à
l’organisation des tournées dans ce territoire. Ces résultats permettent toutefois de mettre
en évidence, outre la dimension géographique de la distribution de la demande dans les
différents types de zones (rurale, petite zone urbaine, grande zone urbaine. . . ) l’effet de la
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structure de la demande sur les coûts de transport. Cet effet est potentiellement généra-
lisable, dans la mesure où la fragmentation des interventions pour les plus hauts niveaux
de dépendance est susceptible de ne pas être spécifique au mode d’organisation du service
étudié. D’autres travaux ont ainsi montré que l’augmentation du niveau de dépendance
est associée à une fragmentation des interventions (Chevreul, 2009).
Contributions
Ces quatre chapitres se proposent d’éclairer les mécanismes expliquant les configura-
tions d’aide fournie aux personnes âgées en incapacité vivant à domicile. Leurs contribu-
tions portent à la fois sur les déterminants de la demande d’aide formelle et sur les modes
d’organisation de la production d’aide formelle et informelle. La mise en perspective des
résultats permet de dégager trois principales contributions de la thèse. Tout d’abord, cette
thèse permet de documenter les sources de variation des coûts que supportent les produc-
teurs d’aide formelle et informelle. Elle permet en outre de montrer que la demande d’aide
formelle est relativement peu sensible au prix, à la marge intensive et extensive. Enfin, elle
permet d’analyser les effets notables, pour les consommateurs, de la régulation du secteur
de l’aide à domicile. Ces contributions permettent finalement de discuter des effets de la
récente loi relative à l’adaptation de la société au vieillissement.
Source de variation des coûts des producteurs d’aide formelle et
informelle
Le premier et le dernier chapitre contribuent à la compréhension de l’organisation des
aidants formels et informels. Le premier chapitre s’attache à décrire les déterminants de
l’aide pour les enfants d’une personne âgée lorsqu’elle a déclaré avoir besoin d’aide humaine
pour la réalisation des activités de la vie quotidienne. On peut ainsi identifier les variables
augmentant le bénéfice de l’aide et celles la diminuant, selon le rang de l’individu et
avec deux définitions de l’aide. Les résultats font apparâıtre qu’avec une définition large
de l’aide, les cadets sont significativement plus sensibles aux coûts de l’aide que leurs
âınés. On observe en outre, quelle que soit la définition de l’aide mobilisée, une plus forte
assignation à l’aide des femmes avec un frère. Les interactions des décisions d’aide sont
enfin systématiquement asymétriques, ce qui implique un effet différencié de l’aide fournie
par un membre de la fratrie sur les coûts et bénéfices de l’aide fournie par l’autre.
Le Chapitre 4 analyse les coûts de transport d’un producteur d’aide formelle, dimen-
sion encore peu étudiée de leur fonction de coût. Il montre que ces coûts varient selon
le type de zone géographique où résident les consommateurs, avec des plus forts coûts
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de transport en zone rurale et dans les petites unités urbaines. L’importance des coûts
de transport dans ces zones s’explique par les contraintes géographiques qui leurs sont
associées (distances de transport), mais aussi par les caractéristiques de la demande : on
trouve plus fréquemment dans ces zones des bénéficiaires lourdement dépendants dont la
consommation est fragmentée.
Ces deux chapitres contribuent ainsi à documenter les sources de variation dans les
coûts des producteurs d’aide, en étudiant plus spécifiquement un aspect peu documenté
de l’organisation de la production : les interactions endogènes pour l’aide informelle, et
les coûts de transport pour l’aide formelle. Dans les deux cas, de manière attendue, les
caractéristiques de l’aidé pèsent notablement sur la décision d’aide des enfants d’une part
et sur l’organisation des tournées d’autre part.
La demande d’aide formelle relativement peu sensible au prix
Les deux autres chapitres s’intéressent à la demande d’aide formelle, à la marge in-
tensive (Chapitre 2) ou extensive (Chapitre 3). A la marge extensive, le recours à l’aide
formelle semble peu affecté par la générosité publique, mesurée par la formule de calcul
pour la subvention APA utilisée par le conseil départemental. A la marge intensive, on
trouve une élasticité-prix de la demande d’aide non nulle, ce qui interroge l’efficience des
programmes finançant la consommation d’aide formelle. Cette élasticité-prix est toute-
fois significativement inférieure à 1 en valeur absolue : il s’agit donc d’une élasticité-prix
relativement faible selon la théorie micro-économique standard.
On peut ainsi conclure que la sensibilité au prix de la demande d’aide formelle, à
la marge intensive et extensive, est relativement limitée. Dans les deux chapitres, cette
demande semble en revanche largement influencée par la gravité des limitations fonc-
tionnelles et la présence d’aidants informels potentiels. Ceci suggère que les déterminants
majeurs dans la genèse des configurations d’aide sont l’état de santé et la disponibilité
de l’aide informelle. Les variations du prix de l’aide formelle, quant à elles, entrâıneraient
des ajustements essentiellement à la marge. Un tel résultat fait écho à la littérature sur
l’entrée en institution, présentée précédemment : cette littérature a montré l’importance
de l’état de santé et des ressources en aide informelle comme déterminants de l’entrée en
institution, tout en mettant en évidence la faible sensibilité de la demande au prix des
établissements.
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Les effets notables de la régulation du secteur de l’aide à domicile
pour les consommateurs
Les résultats de la thèse contribuent également à éclairer les implications de la régu-
lation du secteur de l’aide à domicile pour les consommateurs. Cette régulation implique
tout d’abord une dimension d’équité géographique. La régulation des zones d’intervention
des services autorisés permet de garantir la couverture territoriale du département en ma-
tière d’aide à domicile. En présence de coûts de transport, étudiés dans le Chapitre 4, une
moindre régulation des zones de desserte pourrait conduire les services d’aide à domicile
à négliger les zones pour lesquels le gain attendu est inférieur au coût de desserte. Le
Chapitre 4 montre en outre que ces zones potentiellement rationnées en l’absence de régu-
lation correspondent aux zones rurales et petites unités urbaines, où sont sur-représentés
les bénéficiaires de l’APA et parmi eux, les plus dépendants. En outre, l’existence d’un ta-
rif unique pour tous les bénéficiaires d’un même service organise de fait une redistribution,
en provenance des consommateurs pour lesquels le coût de production horaire est faible
vers ceux pour lesquels il est plus élevé. Selon le Chapitre 4, cette redistribution tend en
moyenne à bénéficier aux individus les plus dépendants. Cette redistribution, en revanche,
n’est effective que parmi les usagers d’un même service d’aide. En effet, la tarification au
prix unique pour chaque service génère potentiellement une forte disparité des prix entre
les services selon le type et l’importance de la zone géographique qu’ils desservent. Cette
variation est documentée et utilisée comme source d’identification dans le Chapitre 2.
La deuxième dimension de régulation discutée dans la thèse a trait au caractère mixte
du marché, entre structures régulées et structures ou travailleurs non régulés. Le Cha-
pitre 3 fait apparâıtre une corrélation entre le faible poids des structures régulées sur le
marché et un moindre recours des personnes âgées à l’aide formelle. Si cette corrélation
est interprétée comme causale, cela signifierait qu’un moindre niveau de régulation dimi-
nuerait les incitations à la consommation de l’aide formelle, potentiellement via un effet
prix ou qualité. Si, à l’inverse, une faible régulation s’explique par le faible niveau de la
demande départementale, alors les départements où la demande d’aide formelle est faible
investiraient moins dans la régulation du secteur que les autres. Dans cette configuration,
les personnes âgées dépendantes en demande d’aide formelle vivant dans un département
où la demande est faible dans l’ensemble auraient un moindre accès aux services dont le
prix et la qualité sont régulés.
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Quels effets de la loi relative à l’adaptation de la société au vieillis-
sement ?
Ces résultats peuvent enfin être mobilisés pour discuter des effets attendus de la loi re-
lative à l’adaptation de la société au vieillissement. Du côté de la demande d’aide formelle,
cette réforme a entrâıné la modification de la formule de calcul du taux de participation
des bénéficiaires de l’APA, de manière à augmenter la générosité du programme pour les
individus les plus dépendants. Etant donné la faible sensibilité au prix de la demande,
cette modification devrait avoir un effet volume limité. Elle devrait en revanche renforcer
la redistribution opérée par la subvention APA des contribuables vers les personnes âgées
dépendantes.
Concernant la régulation de l’offre, la réforme a organisé le passage de tous les presta-
taires sous le régime de l’autorisation. Une telle mesure pourrait encourager le recours à
l’aide formelle dans les départements où les prestataires non régulés dominent le marché.
L’effet dépendra toutefois des mécanismes expliquant l’association entre faible niveau de
régulation et non-recours à l’aide formelle (effet prix ou effet qualité), et à l’importance
des prestataires face à l’emploi en gré-à-gré.
Cette thèse éclaire ainsi les mécanismes expliquant la formation des configurations
d’aides formelles et informelles autour des personnes âgées en incapacité en France. Cette
analyse appelle évidemment des extensions. La première a trait à l’exploitation de nou-
velles sources de données pour actualiser et approfondir les analyses. Ainsi, l’enquête
Capacités, aides et ressources des seniors (CARE), récoltée en 2015 et représentative de
la population française âgée d’au moins 60 ans, présente un intérêt certain à plusieurs
titres. D’une part, grâce aux informations précises récoltées sur le reste-à-charge et le
volume d’aide professionnelle consommé, il sera possible d’estimer une élasticité-prix en
prenant en compte l’aide informelle et sans problèmes relatifs à la censure. D’un point
de vue méthodologique, il sera utile de comparer le résultat obtenu sur ces données très
précises, mais coûteuses à produire, et les estimations alternatives sur des données moins
appropriées, mais plus facilement disponibles. En outre, grâce à l’enquête départementale
SolvAPA récoltée en parallèle, dont le questionnaire rejoint partiellement celui de l’enquête
Territoire, il sera possible d’actualiser l’analyse de l’effet des pratiques départementales
sur le recours à l’aide formelle.
Les futures analyses pourraient en outre se pencher sur le caractère dynamique des
configurations d’aide. Comment les configurations d’aide évoluent-elles avec le temps, no-
tamment selon le niveau d’ancienneté et de sévérité de la perte d’autonomie d’un individu ?
Puisqu’elles s’appuient essentiellement sur des données en coupe, les contributions propo-
sées par la thèse apportent peu d’éléments sur cette question. Seul le deuxième chapitre
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mobilise des données longitudinales, dont l’usage permet essentiellement l’amélioration
de la précision des estimations et non la mise en évidence de mécanismes dynamiques.
L’usage de données longitudinales sur les personnes âgées, à l’instar de l’enquête SHARE,
pourrait permettre de mettre en évidence les dynamiques d’évolution des configurations
d’aide.
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1 An increasing demand for long-term care
1.1 Aging populations
For the past 50 years, the OECD countries have been experiencing the ageing of their
population. Due to structural declines in fertility levels and in mortality rates in old-age,
the number of the elderly in the population is increasing; for the period between 2025 and
2060, this trend will be additionally stimulated by the advance in age of baby-boomers
(Monnier, 2007). The population pyramids, presenting the share of the population in each
age group, illustrate this phenomenon. Figure 2 compares the population pyramids of the
European population in 1990 (left-hand side of the Figure) and in 2017 (right-hand side).
With the rise of life expectancy, the number of older people is increasing: individuals aged
80 or more represented 3% of the population in 1990 while this figure increased to 5.5% in
2017. The top of the age pyramid is thus becoming broader: this is what is called “aging
at the top” (European Commission et al., 2015). Simultaneously, the mechanical decrease
in the proportion of young people is reinforced by the decline in fertility rates: the share
of the European population aged 30 or less has decreased by 9 percentage points during
the period (42% to 33%), leading to a narrower base for the 2017 population pyramid
(“aging at the bottom”).
Whatever the hypothesis made in demographic projections, populations are expected
to continue aging in the coming decades (Gaymu, 2017). From 1% in 1950 to 4% in 2010,
individuals aged 80 are expected to represent more than 9% of the OECD population
in 2050 (Colombo et al., 2011). According to the 2015-based population projections of
Eurostat, the share of this age group in the European population will more than double
between 2016 and 2070 (6% to 13%), with an equivalent trend in France (6% to 11 %)
(European Commission et al., 2017). These projections rest on the following conjectures
regarding the key demographic determinants: fertility rates and life expectancy are assu-
med to rise and converge across European countries, while the expected migration flows
in each country depend on past trends, latest empirical evidence and long-term partial
convergence. Though it has long been regarded as a policy issue specific to the indus-
trialized countries of Europe and North America, aging is also becoming a major issue
in developing countries, whose older populations are growing more rapidly than those of
industrialized countries (Shrestha, 2000).
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Figure 2 – Population pyramids in European countries - 1990 and 2017
Source: Eurostat (1990-2017).
Notes: European Union before the entry of Croatia.
1.2 Disability in old-age: definitions and measures
Population ageing is associated with the higher prevalence of disabilities. According to
the International Classification of Functioning, Disability and Health of the World Health
Organization (WHO), the term “disability” refers to “impairments, activity limitations,
and participation restrictions” that are met by individuals. As is underlined by the WHO,
the notion of disability does not only identify an individual health problem but it also
results from the characteristics of the environment the person lives in.
Measuring the life expectancy is not enough to take the limitations associated with
old-age into account. The disability-free life expectancy has thus been proposed as a
complementary measure. While life expectancy focuses on the expected years of life,
the disability-free life expectancy measures the average number of years an individual
is expected to live free of disability, provided that current patterns of mortality and
disability keep on being relevant. The corresponding indicator of “healthy life years” has
been included in the European Community Health Indicators (ECHI) and is monitored
every year. It is computed on the basis of the Global Activity Limitation Indicator
(GALI) present in the European statistics on income and living conditions. Individuals
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declare if they have encountered limitations for more than six months, because of a health
problem, in daily living activities defined as “activities people usually do”. This indicator
is generally analyzed separately for men and women, because of noticeable differences in
health and survival rates according to sex (Oksuzyan et al., 2010).7 In Europe, in 2014,
the life expectancy of a woman aged 50 was around 35 years; 51% of these years (17.8
years) were healthy life years (Cambois and Robine, 2017). The life expectancy of men at
50 was of 30 years, among which 58% (17.4) are free of disabilities. These mean values at
the European level cover a substantial heterogeneity across countries. The French values
in 2014 were slightly higher than the European means, with a life expectancy for women
and men aged 50 of respectively 37.5 years and 31.7 years, among which 55% and 68%
(20.6 and 19.7 years) are healthy years.
The GALI has been shown to be consistent with other measures of functional limita-
tions, in particular with the subjective declaration of activity daily living scores (Jagger
et al., 2010). The classification of activities of daily living has been proposed in the epi-
demiological literature as a tool to help to the assessment of functional limitations for
the elderly (Lawton and Brody, 1969). It distinguishes between two types of activities of
daily living, the (essential) Activities of daily living (ADL) and the Instrumental activi-
ties of daily living (IADL). In the first group, activities related to personal care (bathing
and showering, personal hygiene and grooming, dressing, toilet hygiene, self-feeding) or
functional mobility (transferring) are to be found. They are highly correlated with phy-
sical self-maintenance. In the second group, activities are more demanding in terms of
cognitive capacities. They are related to housework (cleaning and maintaining the house),
basic logistics (managing budget, shopping for groceries and necessities, preparing meals,
taking prescribed medications, using the telephone or other form of communication) or
extended mobility (going out of the house). The Katz Index builds on this classification to
differentiate disability levels according to the number and the type of activity restrictions
(Katz et al., 1970; Katz, 1983). This index proposes eight categories. Group A refers
to the fully independent individuals. Activity limitations increase in other groups, up to
Group G that gathers together individuals requiring assistance for six activities of daily
living (personal hygiene, dressing, toileting, transferring, eating and drinking, and con-
tinence). Finally, Group H corresponds to persons requiring assistance for at least two
activities but not falling into previous categories.
The indicators of functional limitations — ADL and IADL in particular — have been
frequently used to construct the administrative tools that aim at assessing individuals’
7The so-called “male-female health-survival paradox” refers to the existing discrepancy between men
and women, with these last experiencing greater longevity but higher rates of disability and poor health.
It is likely to be due to biological, behavioral, and social differences between men and women, as well as
methodological points — relative to health problem reporting especially — (Oksuzyan et al., 2008).
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disability level in long-term care policies. Administrative measures of disability levels
often builds on the principle of case-mix classification systems (Coutton, 2001): they aim
at regrouping in the same group individuals with similar relative needs for resources,
called “resource utilization group” (Fries and Cooney, 1985; Fries, 1990). In France, a
specific grid, the grid Autonomie, Gérontologie, Groupes Iso-Ressources (AGGIR), was
proposed in 1994 and has become the main tool for the evaluation of the disability levels
of the elderly in the French long-term care policy. It combines variables on physical
autonomy and mental health to establish six disability groups, the Groupes iso-ressources
(GIR) (Eghbal-Téhérani and Makdessi, 2011). GIR 1, corresponding to the most severe
disability level, gathers invalid individuals (bedridden persons) with important cognitive
troubles, who need to be constantly taken care of. Individuals in GIR 2 either are invalid
but have their cognitive functions less deteriorated than individuals in GIR 1, or are not
invalid but have important cognitive troubles. In GIR 3, individuals need every-day help
for personal care but they do not have any important mental troubles. In GIR 4 are
individuals who need some help, either for getting out of bed, or for meal preparation,
dressing or undressing. In GIR 5, there are individuals who sometimes need help for
activities of daily living but not on a regular basis. Finally, in GIR 6, the individuals have
no daily activity limitations.
The rate of prevalence of disabilities in the elderly population is expected to decline
with technological medical improvements and behavioral changes (Cutler, 2001). Accor-
ding to the first results of the national survey Capacités, Aide et Ressources des seniors
(CARE), 3% of French individuals aged 60 or more in 2015 were disabled in the sens of the
Katz Index, while 4% were in GIR 1 to 48 (Brunel and Carrère, 2017). It is slightly lower
than the prevalence that was computed in 2008 with the Handicap Santé Ménages (HSM)
survey. The decrease in activity limitations at a given age, however, will not compensate
for the increase in the number of elderly people. Marbot and Roy (2015) estimate that
the number of old disabled individuals will increase by 71%9 between 2010 and 2040. It is
simliar to the trend expected in other European countries (Scherbov and Weber, 2017).
Finally, not directly referring to disabilities, the concept of frailty borrowed from me-
8The rate reported here is obtained by reconstructing the estimated GIR of individuals on the basis
of the declaration of their activity limitations. It builds on a restricted definition of the GIR, not taking
into account individuals having some difficulties in the accomplishment of activities. With the broad
definition, which includes them, 10% of the elderly are regarded as disabled.
9This rate corresponds to the intermediate scenario proposed by Marbot and Roy (2015), which rests on
the hypothesis that the share of healthy years in the life expectancy at 65 will remain stable. Marbot and
Roy (2015) also compute demographic projections based either on an optimistic prevision (the increase in
the life expectancy is entirely due to the increasing number of healthy years) or a pessimistic assumption
(the prevalence of disabilities remains stable at each age). The number of disabled elderly is expected
to increase by less than 50% in the optimistic scenario while with the pessimistic scenario, the increase
would almost reach 90%.
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dical sciences is increasingly used in the economic literature. In the widely used definition
proposed by Fried et al. (2001), “frailty” refers to the state in which individuals are not
disabled but have a low physiologic reserve and high vulnerability, characterized by weight
loss, poor endurance and energy, slowness and low physical activity level.10 This concept
makes it possible to refine the analysis of old-age limitations and the way individuals turn
disabled.
1.3 Demand for long-term care
The increase in the number of disabled elderly results in a growing demand for long-
term care. Long-term care covers the relatively large range of services provided to indi-
viduals with functional limitations. Needed in the long-run, it differs from acute medical
care and is more related to chronic illness (Norton, 2000). Long-term care first includes
personal care, which is defined as a “range of services required by persons with a reduced
degree of functional capacity, physical or cognitive, and who are consequently dependent
for an extended period of time on help with basic activities of daily living” (OECD and
European Commission, 2013). Personal care typically refers to bathing, dressing, groom-
ing, using the toilet or eating. Long-term care also includes domestic help, which relates
to housekeeping tasks (cleaning, shopping), or help with the IADL. Finally, long-term
care also includes to the nursing care, including pain management, health monitoring or
medication.
Being in need for long-term care because of functional, physical and cognitive limi-
tation is a risk whose realization generates a considerable and potentially costly reorga-
nization of the way of living. Studying nine European countries,11 Juin (2016) shows
that 57% of individuals aged 65 or more will experience at least one period of disability,
suffering from at least two ADL limitations. The probability is higher for low-income
individuals and poorly educated people. In OECD countries, the cost of long-term care is
systematically high compared to typical incomes (Muir, 2017) and few individuals would
be able to cover the costs of long-term care on the sole basis of their own resources.
Additional sources of long-term care financing or provision are thus needed. The
economic analysis usually distinguishes between three sources of risk coverage (Genier,
1996): family, social protection and market-based solutions. According to the opinon
barameter of the Direction de la recherche, des études, de l’évaluation et des statistiques
(DREES) (Leroux, 2017), 61% of the French population in 2015 declare that the State
should be the main source of financial support for the disabled elderly, while 27% believe
it should be handed to children or relatives, and 12% declare that it should rest on the
10See Sirven and Rapp (2017) for a discussion of other concepts of frailty.
11Austria, Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands, Spain, Italy, France, Denmark and Belgium.
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individual responsability (savings or private insurance).
Family (or more broadly, relatives) is an historical actor of the care provision and is
still nowadays the major provider of care to the elderly. The entourage, mostly the family,
most often directly provides personal care or domestic help, the so-called “informal care”,
corresponding to the unpaid care provided by relatives. In France, 80% of the elderly
received care from their relatives in 2008, either together with professional care (48%)
or as the exclusive source of human care (32%) (Soullier and Weber, 2011). The care
provided by relatives is thus more frequent, but also more intensive than professional
care. The median daily volume of informal care received by these disabled elderly was
three times higher than the volume of professional care received and informal caregivers
performed four activities on average, whereas formal caregivers executed two activities
(Fontaine, 2011). Other types of care can be provided by relatives. Relatives may provide
financial support, to help financing professional care or covering the cost of a nursing
home. It is, though, fairly rare in European countries (Bonsang, 2007). A third dimension
of the support provided by relatives is the moral support. 84% of caregiver children
of their disabled parent are providing moral support in the HSM survey (Chapitre 1,
below). The future evolution of informal care provision is uncertain. Ongoing changes
in the demographic structures of the population, such as declining family size, increased
geographic mobility and female participation to the labour market, could diminish the
direct provision of care by relatives.
Social protection is playing an increasing role in the long-term care. It generally takes
the form of financial support to long-term care and commonly fosters formal care utili-
zation (Muir, 2017). There is a large variety of existing policies in OECD and European
countries. Public schemes can be compared through several points:12 eligibility criteria
(universal or means-tested), targeted population (all disabled individuals or older people),
types of benefits provided (in-kind and/or cash) and the source(s) of financing (taxation,
social security contributions). Muir (2017) provides a classification distinguishing between
(i) universal, tax-funded social care systems (found in Nordic countries), (ii) dedicated
social insurance schemes (Netherlands, Japan, Korea, Germany), (iii) systems based on
cash benefits (Austria, Czech Republic, Italy) and (iv) means-tested, safety net programs
(United-Kingdom, United-States). These different systems, together with national vari-
ations in the characteristics of the elderly population and in the cost of long-term care,
result in substantial differences in the long-term care expenditures across countries, as
shown in Figure 3.
Finally, market-based solutions refer mainly to the private long-term care insurance.
12See Colombo et al. (2011), p.216, for an overview of public long-term care scheme in the OECD
countries.
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Figure 3 – Public expenditure on long-term care as a share of GDP
Source: OECD Health data 2016, in Muir (2017) (p.12).
Notes: Refers to total expenditure reported as either “health” or “social” long-term care
expenditures under the System of Health Accounts definitions used by by OECD, WHO and
the European Commission. Includes spending on LTC for people of all ages. Data for the
United States and Israel refer to institutional care only. GDP from 2014 or nearest year.
Such a scheme provides an annuity or ensures the reimbursement of long-term care expen-
ses to insured individuals when they turn disabled. This market is fairly little developed.
It is partly due from supply shortcomings (Fontaine et al., 2014): adverse selection is
likely, transaction costs are high while competition is low, overall leading to high prices
(Brown and Finkelstein, 2009). Moreover, there is a strong uncertainty on future disa-
bility prevalence. This argument additionally explains the low demand for the insurance
coverage, along with the limited available information on the market, the orientation of
time preferences towards present and the potential taste for informal care.
Overall, social protection and market-based solutions essentially support the care pro-
vision of formal or insitutional care, while relatives are bringing substantial in-kind sup-
port. The financing and the provision of long-term care by these actors participate to
elaborate the care arrangements, defined as the way individuals and their environnement
get organized for long-term care provision when they face activity limitations and functi-
onal restrictions.
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2 The economic approach of care arrangements
2.1 Institutional care
Institutional care, referring to the care provided in nursing homes, has long been
regarded as the main potential provider of professional care for disabled elderly (Norton,
2016). The economic literature has first been interested in the determinants of nursing
home entry. It has identified recurrent predictors, in particular health status and potential
informal care provision.13 A deteriorated health status (functional or cognitive) is a strong
predictor of admission to a nursing home, as many elderly enter a nursing home when
they are no longer able to live independently because of activity limitations (Gaugler
et al., 2007; Laferrère et al., 2013; Arnault, 2015). Potential informal care also has a
strong predictive power: the probability to enter a nursing home is higher for individuals
living alone, and it decreases with the number of children (Freedman, 1996; Lo Sasso and
Johnson, 2002; Van Houtven and Norton, 2004; Charles and Sevak, 2005; Gaugler et al.,
2007; Laferrère et al., 2013; Arnault, 2015). Yet, the protective effect of the spouse has
been found to vanish in the presence of cognitive impairments (Arnault, 2015).
Some papers have dealt with in the price elasticity of the demand for institutional
care. Grabowski and Gruber (2007) finds that the demand for nursing homes is relatively
inelastic, not reacting much to the variations in Medicaid reimbursement rules for insti-
tutional care. More recently, Mommaerts (2018) has confirmed these broad results, but
has also provided evidence of the heterogeneity of the sensitivity according to the marital
status. Single individuals are more likely to enter a nursing home, and less likely to co-
reside with relatives, when the cost of nursing homes is lower. A form of price sensitivity
is however observed in the choice of a nursing home. Stroka and Schmitz (2015) point out
that the probability to choose a nursing home decreases with price and distance,14 while
it is not sensitive to its quality, as measured by quality report cards.
2.2 Aging in place: the importance of informal care
In OECD countries, most elderly keep on living in the community: 70% of long-term
care users receive services at home (Colombo et al., 2011).15 In France, in 2016, 58% of
beneficiaries of the long-term care policy, the Allocation Personnalisé d’autonomie (APA)
13See Arnault (2015) for a detailed literature review.
14Regarding the effect of distance, Ramos-Gorand (2013) has shown that migrations for institutio-
nalization are rare in France: 15% of nursing residents have moved from their previous deparmtent of
residence to enter a nursing home. Migrations are mainly explained by individual determinants (previous
place of living, family status, legal protection status).
15In a selected sample of 23 countries for which data were available
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program presented below, were living in the community rather than in institutions.16
The economic literature has been prolific on the relationship existing between formal care
and informal care for community-dweller elderly.17 This literature has to cope with the
endogeneity existing in a model studying the relationship between both types of care.
Indeed, consumption decisions can be jointly determined or affected by unobserved cha-
racteristics such as health status or preferences. Once this endogeneity bias is dealt with,
this literature finds strong evidence of informal care resources affecting the decision to
consume formal care: when elderly are provided with informal care, they have a lower
probability to consume formal care (Van Houtven and Norton, 2004; Pezzin and Schone,
1999; Bolin et al., 2008a; Bonsang, 2009). This substitution effect is more relevant for
unskilled formal care (domestic help) than for skilled care (nursing or personal care) and
tends to vanish when the disability level increases (Bonsang, 2009). On the reverse side,
the effect of formal care use on informal care consumption seems more ambiguous. Most
studies have analyzed the effect of a public scheme financing formal care use on privately
and publicly funded formal care use as well as informal care consumption. Many of them
point out that the increase of formal care partially crowds out informal care (Ettner, 1994;
Pezzin et al., 1996; Stabile et al., 2006; Viitanen, 2007; Rapp et al., 2011; Fontaine, 2012;
Arnault, 2015). But still, others find no evidence of a significant relationship (Christian-
son, 1988; Motel-Klingebiel et al., 2005). Beyond the volumes provided, using publicly
financed home care affects the organization of informal care, with a lower number of tasks
performed by caregivers (Fontaine, 2012). The relationship between formal and informal
care has finally been shown to depend on countries through cultural and institutional
differences (Motel-Klingebiel et al., 2005; Bolin et al., 2008a; Bakx, Meijer, Schut and
Doorslaer, 2015).
Another strand of the literature on informal care has focused on the consequences of
care provision on careers. Informal care provision has been found to negatively affect the
labor supply of caregivers, both at the intensive and extensive margins (Ettner, 1995, 1996;
Pezzin and Schone, 1999; Bolin et al., 2008b; Van Houtven et al., 2013). This effect is
stronger only in countries where long-term care public support is more limited (Fontaine,
2009). Care provision also affects the physical and mental health of relatives (Savage and
Bailey, 2004; Coe and Van Houtven, 2009; Do et al., 2015). These effects, however, fade
out in the medium-run, after care provision has ended (Schmitz and Westphal, 2015).
The magnitude of such effects has also been found to depend on the geographical area
16Source: DREES (2016).
17Informal care usually refers to the care provided for elderly individuals living in the community. Still,
families usually remain involved when an elderly enters a nursing home. This aspect of informal care has
been little investigated in the economic literature. Gaugler (2005) provides a synthesis of the existing
literature.
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when comparing different countries in Europe (Novi et al., 2015). Finally, the social
life of caregiving relatives is also affected (Miller and Montgomery, 1990), though this
field has been under-investigated (Bauer and Sousa-Poza, 2015). Most studies in this
literature distinguish between the effect of care provision on men and women. They study
women exclusively (daughters or daughters-in-law), or they provide subgroup analyses
that generally reveal larger effects for women.
Drawing near to the economics of the family, the literature has also examined the
organization of care arrangements and the determinants of care decisions of the family.
When they have a (non-disabled) spouse, individuals are primarily provided care by their
partner; then, children are the principal source of informal care (Weber, 2011; Soullier
and Weber, 2011). The literature has first highlighted the effects of parent and children
characteristics on the care decisions. It shows that care decisions relate to the opportunity
cost of care (i.e. job status and family situation). Moreover, care provision is unequally
distributed according to the sex of the children, with women being systematically more
involved into care provision. Within sibling, the decision of one child is also likely to be
affected by the characteristics of other children and their own care decision. It raises the
question of potential interactions existing among family members (Fontaine et al., 2009),
thus relating to the economic analysis of social interactions (Manski, 1993, 2000).
2.3 Formal care use
In a context of public policies fostering home care, the determinants of formal care use
have received an increasing attention in the economic literature. Need-related characteris-
tics and availability of informal care have been show to be strong predictors of formal care
use (see Bakx, Meijer, Schut and Doorslaer (2015) for a review). Regarding public policy
parameters, the demand for formal care has been shown to be price-sensitive: existing
studies have tested the effect of benefiting from subsidies on the utilization of paid home
care (Coughlin et al., 1992; Ettner, 1994; Pezzin et al., 1996; Stabile et al., 2006; Rapp
et al., 2011; Fontaine, 2012) .
Formal care has been found to have a beneficial effect for the elderly and their informal
caregivers. Formal care has a preventive effect on the health for the elderly: it positively
affects mental health (Barnay and Juin, 2016) and decreases hospitalization (Costa-Font
et al., 2018) as well as emergency care use (Rapp et al., 2015). It also diminishes the
indirect costs of informal care, by limiting the negative effect of informal care on perceived
health (Juin, 2016). More broadly, consuming formal home care has been shown to
help postponing the entry in institutions (Ettner, 1994; Pezzin et al., 1996; Guo et al.,
2015).18 With the aging population and existing pressure on public spending, there is
18See Guo et al. (2015) for a detailed literature review.
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thus a growing interest in quantifying how much providing home-based formal care saves
money compared to institutional care. The distribution of disability levels between the
community and nursing homes is substantially different (Bozio et al., 2016), such that
it hard to directly compare the price of a nursing home and the cost of living in the
community.19 For severe disability levels, living in institutions might theoretically be more
cost effective through economic of scales.20 Evidence on this point is limited and mixed.
Wübker et al. (2015) compare individuals suffering from dementia receving professional
home care, and being at risk of institutionalization, with individuals recently admitted
to institutional nursing care, in eight European countries. They include the monetary
valuation of informal care and find that overall costs in the home formal care setting are
much lower than those of institutional care. Guo et al. (2015) points out that increasing
Medicaid home care expenditure reduces the use of nursing home facilities, but the gain
in costs is not sufficient to fully offset home care expenditures. Beyond monetary costs
and valuation of informal care, the comparison home-based formal care and institutional
care could additionnally valuate the preferences of individuals for home-based care. The
quality of life in institutions is indeed perceived to be poor, such that institutionalization
is often regarded a non-desirable alternative solutions to aging in place. Mattimore et al.
(2015) report that 30% of the 9105 patients they study “would rather die” than living
permanently in a nursing home, while 26% were“very unwilling”. The principle of people’s
preference for living at home is relatively common in OECD countries and it has shaped
the old-age policies in France.
3 Old-age policies in France
3.1 Construction of policies supporting home care
The French long-term policies have historically been constructed around a clear di-
vision between institutionalization and aging in place. In the aftermath of the French
Revolution, a draft order presented institutionalization as a second-best option, when
individuals are not taken care of by their families or when their health status requires
specific care (Ennuyer, 2007). The idea that institutionalization should be implemented
only because of a shortcoming in family resources or extreme health disabilities remained
important in the first part of the 20st century. Hospices represent the typical figure of
the institution devoted to the elderly during this period: Feller (2005), quoted by En-
19In France, the median price in nursing homes (public benefits not taken into account) was of e1,949
in 2016 (Caisse Nationale de Solidarité pour l’Autonomie, 2017).
20Following this idea, many long-term systems limit the number of care hours that can be covered at
home to ensure that institutional care is used when it is the cheaper option Muir (2017).
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nuyer (2007), analyses how they have been associated with a very low quality of life and
a symbol of social relegation.21
The report Politiques de la vieillesse (“Old-age policies”) directed by Pierre Laroque
in 1962, mainly known as the “Laroque Report”, is usually regarded as a cornerstone in
the construction of the French old-age policies and its strong stay-at-home orientation.
This report kept on affirming that “institutionalization must remain an exception” (Haut
Comité Consultatif de la population et de la famille (1962), quoted by Ennuyer (2007))
and it encouraged the use of home care services to promote the integration of the elderly
in the society.22 Public support for home care was reaffirmed a few years later, through
the reform of the assistance laws (1953, 1954),23 implementing an allowance to finance
home care for deprived elderly. The means-tested property was preserved in the following
forms of the home-care support policy. The Allocation compensatrice pour tierce personne
(ACTP) was created in 1975 and was open to any disabled adult, whatever her age: old-age
disabilities were then regarded as a sub-category in the larger field of disabilities (Capuano
andWeber, 2015). A specific allowance devoted to the disabled elderly was created in 1997,
the Prestation spécifique dépendance (PSD). It changed the legal approach to disabilities
and created an age barrier: all disabled individuals aged 60 and more were eligible for
the old-age allowance, whatever the cause of their disability and they were explicitly
distinguished from the handicap policies (Capuano and Weber, 2015). This distinction
according to age, which is close to be a French exception in the European landscape,24 has
been widely debated (Tenand, 2016) but it has remained the basis of the French long-term
care system up to now.
The creation, in 2002, of the APA program, which is still in force nowadays, represented
a shift in the French long-term care policies as it is a universal (not means-tested) benefit.25
Any individual aged 60 or more, who has been living in France for more than three months,
can apply to the program. When she lives in the community, she receives an evaluation of
her needs performed by a socio-medical team at home. It aims at defining her disability
21See Cribier (2008) for an overview of Feller (2005)’s contribution.
22“Cette solution doit demeurer exceptionnelle. L’accent doit être mis, par priorité, sur la nécessité
d’intégrer les personnes âgées dans la société, tout en leur fournissant les moyens de continuer le plus
longtemps possible à mener une vie indépendante par la construction de logements adaptés, par la généra-
lisation de l’aide ménagère à domicile, par la création de services sociaux de toute nature qui leur sont
nécessaires (. . . ) Ainsi tout en évitant de faire nâıtre chez les vieillards un sentiment de dépendance,
pourra-t-on respecter le besoin qu’ils éprouvent de conserver leur place dans une société normale, d’être
constamment mêlés à des adultes et à des enfants ” Haut Comité Consultatif de la population et de la
famille (1962), quoted by Ennuyer (2007).
23Décret 53-1186 du 29 novembre 1953, décret 54-611 du 11 juin 1954.
24Greece and the United-Kingdom also have an age-barrier in the definition of their long-term care
policies.
25In addition, and contrary to the PSD, the funds received by an individual in the APA program cannot
be recovered on her inheritance.
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level using the GIR classification. Individuals whose disability level is evaluated from GIR
4 to GIR 1 are eligible for the APA program. The evaluation team sets up a personalized
care plan, corresponding to the maximum number of hours of professional care26 that will
be open to subsidies, given the activity limitations encountered by the applicant. The
monetary equivalent of the care plan volume should be below national thresholds that
are specific to each disability group and yearly reevaluated. Once the care plan volume
is set, the APA beneficiary is free to consume the number of hours she wants; for each
hour consumed within the care plan volume, her out-of-pocket (OOP) price is reduced
by the APA subsidy. The OOP price depends on the participation rate of the individual,
which is an increasing function of her income. In 2015, the APA program counted 748,000
community-dwelling beneficiaries and amounted to an overall public spending of e3,2
billions (0.15% of GDP).27 The APA benefit is also open to individuals living in nursing
homes: in this case, it pays for the part of the price covering expenses for care provision.28
As is the case for all social policies in France,29 the implementation of the APA program
is decentralized to local authorities, the departmental councils (Conseils départementaux ).
These sub-regional authorities have been recognized to be the “leaders of social action”
(Chefs de file de l’action sociale) in 2004,30 thus confirming the decentralization process
initiated in 1982-1983 (Lafore, 2004). Departmental councils manage the eligibility proce-
dure in the APA program as well as the computation and payment of the allowance. They
have been shown to have a considerable latitude in the implementation of the program
(Billaud et al., 2012). In addition, they play a major role in the regulation of the home
care sector. Overall, the practices of each departmental council substantially participate
to define the long-term policy at the local level.
3.2 The French home care sector
Studying “the” home care sector in France, as one consistent unit, is a thorny point,
as the professional care provision has actually been developed and structured by a large
variety of operators. It is often regarded as an heterogeneous group of providers, with
different motives, regulatory frameworks and juridical status, such that the home care
26The APA program can alternatively be used to finance informal care provided by relatives (except
the spouse). This solution is relatively limited (8% of APA beneficiaries in 2003) (Petite and Weber,
2006).
27Source: DREES (2015b).
28The price paid in nursing homes comprises three components: one part is related to the medical care,
one is related to care provided for the activities of daily living and the last is devoted to accommodation
fees. The APA subsidy in institutions lowers the second part of the price.
29Up to now, the long-term care policy in France has remained explicitly regarded as a social po-
licy, definitively independent from the health policies. Recent reforms, though, have tried to encourage
integrated forms of care.
30Loi du 13 août 2004 relative aux libertés et responsabilités locales.
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sector would be hard to approach globally and would finally be “statistically indefinable”
(Aldeghi and Loones, 2010). I will consider here the home care providers that have been
involved in the care of the elderly individuals, and, as such, have been submitted to some
public regulation.
The home care services to the elderly population have historically been developed by
benevolent initiatives to provide assistance to deprived individuals. On the eve of the 20th
century the juridical status of the non-profit organization was defined, thus offering an
institutionalized form for the charitable operators. According to Lafore (2010), this status
has allowed the central government to regulate the private operators of social action. It
created a clear delimitation between these private operators and the public regulation;
the first being the key actors of social action, while the second was intervening mainly at
the administrative level and as a regulatory entity.31 This delimitation between private
operate and public regulation remained stable in the first half of the 20th century. It
also remained globally unchanged after the Second World War, despite the increasing
involvement of the central government in social action. In 1953, the reform of assistance
laws stated that municipalities could create their own operators of social action and thus
opened the sector to public actors. In 1975, all private or public organizations operating
in home care were designated as social or medico-social institutions (Institutions sociales
ou médico-sociales).32
With the creation of the APA program and the widening of the policy financing home
care, the regulation of home care was increased with the so-called law renovating the social
and medico-social action of 2002;33 it created a specific status of regulation for the home
care structures, the “regulated status” (autorisation), which still exists today. Under this
status, home care structures have to be granted an authorization from the departmental
council to enter the market. The departmental councils manage the provision of home care
by regulated providers through several channels. Firstly, regulated structures have to meet
quality standards, including certification processes and external evaluations. Secondly, the
geographical area they serve is negotiated with the Departmental council. Thirdly, the
price of each regulated structure is fixed by the Departmental council. This regulated price
is supposedly based on the average production cost of the structure of two years earlier; it
actually largely depends on administrative and political considerations. It can therefore
be regarded as an additional tool in the hands of departmental councils to regulate the
home care provision (Gramain and Xing, 2012). Regulated prices substantially vary both
within one department and among departments, due to different provision characteristics
31It strongly differs from what was happening at the same period regarding the education policy, where
the republican government was becoming itself a provider.
32Loi 75-535 du 30 juin 1975 relative aux institutions sociales et médico-sociale.
33Loi 2002-2 du 2 janvier 2002 rénovant l’action sociale et médico-sociale.
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and pricing practices (Hege et al., 2014; Labazée, 2017).
This regulation orientation was challenged by the 2005 plan for social cohesion, also
referred to as the “Borloo law”. It aimed at encouraging for-profit enterprises to enter the
market in order to foster job creations.34 To do so, it loosened the constraints established
in 2002 and created a new status (agrément qualité), associated with a lower level of
regulation. Under this status, non-regulated structures could enter the home care sector
with a quality certification whose requirements were lower than those needed for the
authorization. Non-regulated structures were free to choose their geographical area of
intervention and to set their price provided they respected restrictions on yearly price
evolution that were enacted at the national level.
With for-profit enterprises being increasingly present on the home care sector, three
juridical status are distinguished among structures providing home care: non-profit orga-
nizations, public structures and for-profit enterprises. In 2016, non-profit organizations
represented the majority of the home care operators. Among hours provided by struc-
tures in 2016, 54.3% were from non-profit organizations, and only 35.2% and 9.5% from
for-profit enterprises and public structures (Dares, 2016). The importance of for-profit
enterprises is growing: they provided 8.5% more hours in 2016 than in 2015. Differences
in juridical status partially correspond to differences in the regulatory status: for-profit
enterprises are generally non-regulated while public and non-profit organizations are more
frequently regulated. A differentiation in the activities performed is also observed: non-
profit and public organizations are more oriented towards the assistance to the disabled
elderly (60% of the hours they provide in 2016) and housekeeping (25%), while hours
provided by for-profit enterprises are more diversified: they more frequently provide child
care or gardening.
In parallel to the development of structures devoted to the provision of home care, the
model of the housekeeper directly employed by individuals consuming professional care
(over-the-counter workers, emploi gré-à-gré) has been another key figure of the home care
provision in the 20th century and remains important nowadays. According to Lefebvre
(2012), over-the-counter workers strongly differ from the caregivers employed in structures
regarding the construction and the recognition of the profession. The status of over-the-
counter worker is inherited from the historical form of the domestic servant. Remaining
mostly at the margins of the labor market legislation in the first half of the 20th, the
domestic workers were considered in the labor law for the first time in 1973, though the
definition of such workers remained unclear. Since 1991, consumers of care services have
also been able to employ a professional worker but with the intermediate of an agent
34According to Cour des Comptes (2014), the effect of this measure on job creations has however been
limited.
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company (service mandaire), which assists her in the recruitment and administrative
procedure. Table 1 recapitulates the different types of providers. According to the data
Remontées individuelles (DREES, 2011), which consisted in APA administrative files
extracted from 66 departments, two thirds of APA beneficiaries in respondent departments
were served by a structure (either regulated or non regulated) in 2011, while one quarter
were provided care by over-the-counter workers (7% with the help of an agent company).35
Despite the increasing demand and the relative stability in the regulatory framework
in the home care sector between 2005 and 2016, numerous public reports have underlined
the difficulties encountered by home care providers (Aube-Martin et al., 2010; Poletti,
2012; Cour des Comptes, 2014; Branchu et al., 2015). Along with the low attractiveness
of home care professions and the insufficient level of the departmental pricings, they have
recurrently underlined the complexity of the regulation scheme in the home care sector.
It has been partly addressed in the 2016 law on adapting society to the aging of the
population.
Table 1 – Home care providers in France
Intervention mode Employer of Regulatory Creation Juridical status
the caregiver framework
Over-the-counter
the consumer Labor law
Historical form –
Agent company 1991
Structures the structure
Regulated 2002
Non-profit/public/for-profit
Non-regulated 2005
3.3 The 2016 reform: adapting society to the aging of the po-
pulation
The law on the adaptation of society to the aging of the population, which came into
effect on the 1st of January, 2016,36 has reformed the French old-age policy in several
respects. It has first modified several parameters of the APA program. The national
thresholds binding the care plan volumes have been reevaluated upwards. The formula
determining the copayment of APA beneficiaries has also been substantially reformed.
Before 2015, the copayment rate only depended on the income of the individual. With
the reform, it now depends on both the income and the disability level, taking into account
the value of the care plan volume. At a given income level, the copayment rate decreases
with the disability level.
35For the remaining 9%, the source of home care provision is not filled in.
36Loi 2015-1776 du 28 décembre 2015 relative à l’adaptation de la société au vieillissement. In the
thesis, I will refer to this law as the 2016 reform.
54
On the supply side, this reform has tended to gather home care structures under the
regulated status. Home care structures serving APA beneficiaries have to be regulated.37
The underlying orientation of such a reform is to protect the fragile population by streng-
thening the public control over home care structures (Labazée, 2017). The pricing of
these structures by departmental councils, however, was not presented as compulsory,
due to the opposition of previously non-regulated structures and the additional workload
it would generate for departmental councils (Direction générale de la cohésion sociale,
2016). Thus, if the reform has organized the conditions of an harmonization regarding
quality certifications and evaluations, it has not addressed the dichotomy existing in the
pricing of structures.
The reform has also addressed issues regarding informal care and institutional care.
Regarding informal care, the reform has created the legal status of the caregiving relative
(proche aidant), defined as someone, non-professional, who is regularly providing care to
a disabled elderly for some activities of daily living. Caregiving relatives are said to have a
right to respite, which can be publicly financed. The law has finally planned the increase
in the transparency regarding the price of institutional care and it had encouraged the
creation of intermediate solutions, between home and institutions, through the so-called
“autonomy-residences”.
4 Research questions and overview of chapters
This thesis aims at improving the understanding of home care arrangements for the
disabled elderly in the context of France. What are the determinants of formal care
consumption, at both the extensive and intensive margins? How do formal and informal
care providers adjust to their provision constraints? The thesis focuses on personal care
and domestic help, which can be provided either by professional caregivers or informally.
I investigate several determinants of formal care use that have little been studied in the
literature. I particularly focus on the effect of the price of formal care and its regulation:
how do individuals adjust the volume they consume to the price they pay for professional
home care? Is their demand affected by the local regulation regarding the APA program
and the regulation of providers? The thesis additionally analyzes the organization of
the care provision, from both informal and formal providers. Regarding informal care, I
analyze the way families are organized for home care provision, with a specific focus on
the interactions of the care decisions among siblings. How do families get organized to
take care of an elderly parent? Is the decision of other siblings likely to affect the decision
37The transition for previously non-regulated structures has been organized as follows: from the be-
ginning of 2016, all non-regulated structures were to be regarded as regulated and they were to apply to
get the authorization at the end of their current agreement.
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of others? With respect to formal care provision, I focus on the costs borne by home care
providers and study the travel costs generated by their rounds. What are the sources of
their variations? What are the implications of varying travel costs for the consumers?
4.1 Chapter 1
The first chapter38 deals specifically with the genesis of informal care. It studies
the determinants of the care provided by children to their disabled elderly parent. It
is particularly centered on endogenous interactions, corresponding to the way children
take the care behavior of others into account for their own decision. We use a French
national survey implemented in 2008, the HSM survey — presented below —, to provide
general descriptive statistics on the family care arrangements. They are found to be
sensitive to the size of the family, the rank in the sibling and the parent’s matrimonial
status. The analysis of the determinants of care behavior is then centered on two-child
families. We implement a semi-structural model explaning the decision to provide care,
in a non-cooperative framework. Determinants are children characteristics as well as
family (including parent and sibling) variables. They are estimated with two alternative
definitions of caregiving.
With a broad definition of care including domestic care, financial help and moral sup-
port, we find that the elder child reacts mainly to family variables while the younger child
is additionally sensitive to her personal characteristics. When restricting the definition
to domestic care, sibling behaviors are more similar. In both cases, we observe asym-
metric interactions coefficients and a systematic assignment to care for daughters with a
brother. Even though the scope of this work is limited to the two-child families and only
highlights the extensive margin of care provision (being caregiver or not), this is the first
contribution on the interactions among siblings for informal care in the French context.
Results confirm the previous findings obtained on European data regarding interactions
and the systematic assignement to care provision of daughters with a brother (Fontaine
et al., 2009).
4.2 Chapter 2
The second chapter39 focuses on the price elasticity of formal home care for the disabled
elderly. Previous works have shown that the consumption of formal care is price-sensitive,
but, because of data limitations, they have not been able to quantify the magnitude of
this effect. We estimate how the volume consumed by individuals depends on the OOP
38Co-authored with Roméo Fontaine and Agnès Gramain.
39Co-authored with Marianne Tenand.
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price they pay, while controlling for a set of individual characteristics. To get appropriate
data, we have collected administrative files of the APA program from one Departmental
Council. They makes it possible to observed both the consumption and the OOP price
of the APA beneficaries. The consumption observed in these data, however, is limited
to the hours subsidized within the APA framework (at the care plan volume), such that
our data are right-censored. At a given income level, the main source of variations in the
OOP price is the inter-individual variations in prices. We make sure that provider price
variations are exogenous by exploiting the unequal spatial coverage by providers in the
department: the provider price is instrumented by the number of municipalities served by
the provider.
Our results indicate a negative price elasticity of −0.4, with point estimates ranging
from −0.5 to −0.1, significantly different from 0 and −1. This research was carried out
within a research project, the Modapa project,40, whose objective is to quantify the sen-
sitivity of the demand for care among the disabled elderly living at home. Our results
are in line with the alternative estimations of the price-elasticity obtained in the rese-
arch team (Bourreau-Dubois et al., 2014; Hege, 2016). With the disabled elderly being
sensitive to the price of care, the copayment rates in home care subsidy programs thus
entail allocative and dynamic efficiency issues. Given the low value of the price elasticity,
however, the generosity of home care subsidies also has substantial redistributive effects,
from taxpayers to the disabled elderly.
4.3 Chapter 3
Chapter 341 focuses on the extensive margin of formal care and the decision to consume
formal care. It studies how formal care use is affected by the decisions of departmental
councils, regarding of the APA policy and the regulation of home care providers. We
use an original survey on departmental practices, the Territoire survey, to describe the
departmental variations.. We focus on the generosity of the APA allowance, measured by
the way the department council computes the hourly subsidy, and the market share of re-
gulated providers compared to the non-regulated ones. We discuss the exogeneity of these
practices and study how they relate to departmental socioeconomic characteristics. These
departmental data are matched with a sample of disabled elderly from the HSM survey.
A discrete choice model is estimated to show how departmental variations contribute to
explain the use of formal home care.
Our results show that departmental generosity in the APA policy, measured by the
formula used to compute the APA subsidy, does not correlate to formal care use. On the
40More details on the Modapa project can be found at www.modapa.cnrs.fr
41Co-authored with Rémi Kaboré and Jérôme Wittwer.
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supply side, the dominance of non-regulated providers — whose quality is uncertain and
price is little regulated — decreases the probability to consume formal care, potentially
due to a price effect or a quality effect. Such an interpretation needs to be cautious,
however, since we additionnaly observe that the absence of any regulated providers does
not correlate with low use. These results can be used to discuss both the questions raised
by the decentralization of a national program and the recent reform of the home care
sector.
4.4 Chapter 4
The last Chapter turns to the examination of the supply of professional care. It sheds
light on one specific provision constraints for home care services, namely the travel costs
borne to reach consumers. The provider indeed bears the costs generated by the travels
of caregivers to the consumers’ location. Many public reports have underlinded that this
feature of care provision is likely to influence the costs and the organization of home
care providers. It might be unequally binding to providers, depending on the spatial
distribution of their consumers. Moreover, the regulation of the sector is such that the
unique price per structure organizes a redistribution from non costly to serve consumers
to the others. This work aims at documenting the importance and the variations of travel
costs for home care providers, and their effect on home care provision. Are travel costs
negligible? How do they vary? How do they influence the organization of the home
care provision? I use a very detailed database collected from one home care provider
serving thousands of consumers spread over a French department. Using information on
consumers’ location and caregiver rounds and building upon a micro-costing approach, I
compute the travels costs borne by the provider and study the sources of their variations.
Travel costs are shown to be higher in rural municipalities and decreases with the size
of urban units. It first comes from geographical constraints associated with these areas,
namely longer travel distances. But it also relates to the characteristics of the elderly
residing in these areas. Indeed, severely disabled individuals are over-represented in these
areas and they generate more costly rounds, due to fragmentation of the interventions
they receive and the higher wage rate of caregivers they receive care from. In this context,
severly disabled individuals — and especially those living in rural areas or small urban
units — benefits from the redistribution organized by the uniform price. I finally test if
travel costs affect the length of interventions and find no evidence of such an effect.
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5 Methodological guidelines
5.1 Sample selections
This thesis focuses on the disabled elderly living in the community. Compared to
the whole population of the disabled elderly, community-dwellers are less severely disa-
bled level, on average, and are potentially provided with more informal care than those
entering in institutions. These characteristics are expected to influence the parameters
of interest of the thesis, especially the price sensitivity of the demand for care. Results
are then essentially relevant for this (major) subgroup of the population of disabled el-
derly. Additional sample selections are performed in some Chapters. Chapter 2 and 4
study consumers of formal care and Chapter 2 additionally focuses, among them, on the
APA beneficiaries served by a regulated provider. The reasons and implications of such
selections are discussed in the Chapters.
5.2 Data
The HSM survey is used in the first and last chapter.42 This national survey is the
most recent French one focusing on health, though the CARE survey, conducted in 2015,
will be available soon. Collected in 2008, this representative national survey focuses on
the disabilities and health limitations encountered by the French population. It has three
sections: one is focused on individuals living in the community, one focuses on individual
living in institutions and the third section concentrated on caregivers. We use the part
on individuals living in the community, which counts almost 30,000 individuals. In both
Chapters, it is used for the precise information it offers on elderly individuals, their activity
restrictions and their socioeconomic characteristics. Chapter 1 additionnally exploits the
information obtained on the care provided by children and the detailed data on all children,
whatever their caregiver status. Chapter 4 focuses on the available information on the
formal care received by the elderly. In both cases, an important issue lies in the fact
that available information is self-reported. It implies risks of bias in the identification
of disabilities and caregivers that are discussed in the next subsection. The information
obtained could also have been influenced by the choices made by the person in charge of
filling the questionnaire (Beliard et al., 2013).43
42Data have been obtained through the Réseau Quetelet. References: Handicap-Santé, volet ménages
- 2008 - (2008), INSEE, Centre Maurice Halbwachs (CMH).
43Individuals filling the questionnaire have to understand the situation of the disabled individuals
so as to make sure it appropriatly respond to the questionnaire. For instance, she has to make sure
that caregivers declared as such by the individual fit with the definition of caregiving established in
the questionnaire. The perception of these individuals has been shown to be influenced by their social
characteristics.
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In Chapter 4, a sample of disabled elderly from HSM is matched with an original de-
partmental survey, the survey Territoire (LEDa-LEGOS and CES, 2012).44 This survey
has been implemented by a team of researchers in social sciences, with the aim of docu-
menting variations existing in the implementation of the long-term care policies by the
departmental councils. It provides original information on the departmental practices,
though it is available only for volontary respondents (71 departmental councils over the
96 metropolitan survey).
The second type of data used are datasets collected from one departmental council
or one home care provider, in order to study questions that could not have been addres-
sed through available survey or administrative data. In Chapter 2, administrative files
extracted from the APA program in one Departmental Council make it possible to get
precise information on both the volume of formal care consumed by the APA benefici-
aries and the OOP payments they pay. In Chapter 3, original data from a professional
home care provider have been collected to study the travel costs generated by the care
provision. It offers a very rich set of information on the rounds of caregivers as well as
details on caregivers and consumers characteristics. This type of data, though, suffers
from several limitations. First, they offer poor sociodemographic information, compared
to survey data. They are centered on the consumption in a restricted framework, either
the consumption subsidized in the APA program (Chapter 2) or the consumption served
the provider (Chapter 3). We have no information on potential other care or medical
provision; in particular, these data do not offer any information on the care provided by
relatives. Finally, they cannot be publicly released and imply anonymity constraints. But
still, these data provide original highlights on fairly little explored questions.
5.3 Disability measures
Centered on the disabled elderly, the thesis makes use of several definitions of disability,
which depend on the data used. A first indicator of disability help delimiting the sample
studied. A second one distinguishes, within the sample, between different degrees of
severity. With survey data (Chapter 1 and Chapter 4), I use definitions based on the
self-declared restrictions encountered by individuals in the accomplishment of daily living
activities, either essential or instrumental. As they are self-reported, they are likely to be
influenced by the characteristics of individuals and their environment (Merrill et al., 1997;
Brink et al., 2003). Chapter 1 is centered on the provision of informal care: the sample
definition is specifically based on the declared need for human care for the accomplishment
of the activities of daily living. Among the individuals identified as disabled with this
definition, I distinguish in my study two different disability levels: individuals who declare
44The questionnaire is available (in French) here: http://modapa.cnrs.fr/questionnaire.pdf.
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they need human help for the ADL on the one hand, and those declaring they need such
a help exclusively for the IADL on the other hand. In Chapter 4, the sample is larger
and comprises all elderly declaring they have restrictions in the accomplishment of ADL
or IADL.
When administrative or management data are used (Chapter 2 and 3), I do not select
samples on the basis of disability. I direct observe a sample of APA beneficiaries or
formal care consumers. Within samples, indicators of disabilities considered are those
administratively used (GIR). The relevance of these measures is highly dependent on the
practices of the socio-medical team establishing the disability level. It might be threatened
if the evaluation process is not frequently actualized: in this case, observed disability levels
would tend to be lower than actual disability levels.
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My baby just cares for me
Informal care arrangements and interactions
in France
This chapter was co-authored with
Roméo Fontaine and Agnès Gramain.
Summary of the chapter
Despite increasing professional home care utilization, the dependent elderly are still pre-
dominantly provided care by their relatives. Our paper studies the determinants of the
family care arrangements in the French context. How do care provided by children de-
pend on child or family characteristics? Among siblings, do the care decisions of each
child depend on the decision of others? Do the effects of these determinants vary with
the rank? Using the HSM survey (2008), we describe care arrangements and show that
they are sensitive to the parent’s marital status and the size of the siblings. Focusing
on two-child families, we then identify the determinants of care arrangements according
to the rank. Determinants are child or family variables, and the model also highlights
potential interaction effects among siblings, namely the way a child reacts to the care
decision of her sibling. With a broad definition of care including domestic care, financial
help and moral support, we find that the elder child reacts mainly to family variables
while the younger child is additionally sensitive to her personal characteristics. When re-
stricting the definition to domestic care, sibling behaviors are more similar. In both cases,
we observe asymmetric interactions coefficients and a systematic assignment to care for
daughters with a brother.
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1 Introduction
With the ageing of the population and the advance in age of baby-boomers, there is
an increasing demand for provision of home care to the disabled elderly. Although the
utilization of professional home care is increasing, the dependent elderly are still predo-
minantly provided care by their relatives: in France, in 2008, 50% of the disabled elderly
received care from their relatives only, while 32 % were provided care both by their relati-
ves and professionals (Soullier and Weber, 2011). Informal care — defined as the unpaid
home care provided to the disabled elderly by their relatives, mainly family members —
is thus a key issue for long-term public policies. Despite the importance of informal care
provision, little is known about the mechanisms explaining care arrangements. The litera-
ture on informal care has mainly focused on the relationship between formal and informal
care (Ettner, 1994; Hoerger et al., 1996; Pezzin et al., 1996; Byrne et al., 2009). Other
studies have been interested in the effect of informal care on caregivers’ health, labor
supply or social life (Miller and Montgomery, 1990; Ettner, 1995; Pezzin and Schone,
1999; Coe and Van Houtven, 2009). In a third axis, papers have addressed the genesis of
care arrangements. It first focused on the determinants of care provision, first assuming
there is only one caregiver child (Stern, 1994; Sloan et al., 1997; Pezzin and Schone, 1999;
Hiedemann and Stern, 1999), before taking into account shared care provision that is em-
pirically more frequent (Hiedemann and Stern, 1999; Checkovich and Stern, 2002; Engers
and Stern, 2002; Pezzin et al., 2007; Byrne et al., 2009; Fontaine et al., 2009).
Our paper analyzes the determinants of the family care arrangements in the French
context. We shed light on several issues: how do care arrangements depend on child or
family characteristics? Among siblings, are the care decisions independent one from the
others? Do the effects of determinants vary with the rank among siblings? We use the
HSM survey (DREES and INSEE, 2008) and focus on the decision to be — or not to
be — a caregiver (extensive margin of informal care). In a first step, we describe care
arrangements and show that they are sensitive to the marital status of the parent and
the size of the siblings. In the second step, we focus on two-child families; we implement
a semi-structural model that makes it possible to identify separately the determinants of
care arrangements. We study the effects of the child characteristics as well as those of
the parent and sibling (family variables). Interestingly, our model also identifies potential
interaction effects among siblings, that is to say the way a child reacts to the care decision
of her sibling. The effects of determinants are estimated separately according to the rank
in the sibling, with two definitions of care. With a broad definition including several
types of care, we find that the elder child reacts mainly to family determinants while the
younger child is additionally sensitive to her individual characteristics. When restricting
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the definition to domestic care, children behaviors are more similar. In both cases, we
observe asymmetric interactions and a systematic assignment to care for daughters with
a brother. This work has several limitations. In particular, it studies exclusively the ex-
tensive margin and the analysis of interactions is centered on two-child families. Though,
it draws interesting results with strong policy implications. Care provided by children
is found to be sensitive to family characteristics, and asymmetricly distributed within
sibling. In this context, a public policy that would encourage informal care as a major
source of care provision could potentially generate inequalities within sibling, especially
with respect to the sex and the rank.
2 Modeling interactions among siblings
The economic literature on informal care arrangements has first assumed that a sin-
gle child was found to be caregiver. It aimed at understanding the effect of child and
parent variables on the decision to provide care (Stern, 1994; Sloan et al., 1997; Pezzin
and Schone, 1999; Hiedemann and Stern, 1999). However, this approach is questioned
by empirical evidence, as informal care is frequently provided by several children simul-
taneously. In Europe, in 2004, one over five disabled elderly living alone and having two
children did receive care from several children at the same time (Fontaine et al., 2009).
The same proportion is found in 2008 in France according to the HSM Survey (see infra).
The genesis of care arrangements is thus more complex than one single care decision.
Are care decisions independent one from each other when care provision is shared?
Addressing this question, many studies have used game theory models to take into account
the anticipations of agents in the care decision of others (Hiedemann and Stern, 1999;
Checkovich and Stern, 2002; Engers and Stern, 2002; Pezzin et al., 2007; Byrne et al.,
2009). The potential link between care decisions raises two issues: is the care provided by
one child a complement or a substitute to the care provided by other children? According
to qualitative studies, shared care provision are observed but withdrawals of sibling when
one child is caregiver are also likely (Pennec, 2007). Secondly, are children reacting the
same way to the care decision of others, whatever their rank in the sibling? Fontaine et al.
(2009) use a model allowing asymmetric interactions: children can react differently to the
care decision of siblings according to their rank. Making use of the Survey of Health,
Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) and focusing on two-child families with a
disabled parent living alone, they find that the elder child is more likely to be caregiver
when her sibling is caregiver, while it is the reverse for the younger child.
To identify these interactions, one needs to isolate their effect from other mechanisms
that might explain the correlation of care behaviors. According to Manski (2000), the
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behaviors of group members can be correlated for three reasons. The first corresponds
to “endogenous interactions” and refers to the direct interdependence of behaviors within
the group. It corresponds to the interactions we want to study within the family: how
is the care decision of one child affected when the other is caregiver ? But correlation of
behaviors can also be observed because of “contextual interactions”, referring to the effect
of one group member’s characteristics to the behavior of others. Within a family, if one
child is unemployed, her siblings could consider she has to be caregiver for the parent.
They might not be involved in the care provision for this reason, even if the unemployed
child is not actually providing care. The third mechanism corresponds to the “correlated
effects” and refers to the existence of a shared context for the group members. In a family,
the care provision of children can be simultaneously influenced by the marital status of
the parent, her disability level or by unobserved family norms.
Isolating endogenous interactions is needed to analyze the mechanisms of shared care
provision. With endogenous interactions, modifying the care provided by one child will
affect the care provision of all children. It should be taken into account when forecasting
the effect of long-term care policies. For instance, a policy targeting children providing
informal care while being employed could also have effects for retired children through
endogenous interactions. Identifying the effect of endogenous interactions is also needed to
predict the evolution of informal care resources. Within a family, the lower care provision
of some children could be compensated by an increase in the provision by others. Overall,
it would leave the amount of provided care unchanged, modifying the quasi-consensus on
the forthcoming decrease of informal care.
3 Informal care in the HSM survey
3.1 Sample of disabled elderly living in the community
Implemented in France in 2008-2009, the HSM survey is centered on the disability and
health limitations encountered by the French population. We use the household section
of the survey. For each person, we know her individual sociodemographic characteristics
and have information on the formal and informal care she receives. The survey also
provides information on the family of the person: for each of her children, we get a set of
sociodemographic characteristics (sex, age, employment situation, cohabitation with the
parent, geographical proximity to the parent). Having such information for each child,
whether a caregiver or not, is essential to study the determinants of the observed care
behavior.
Our analysis considers care arrangements for the disabled elderly living in the com-
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munity and having one child at least. Focusing on the disabled elderly living in the
community creates a selection compared to the whole population of the disabled elderly.
Even though they represent the majority of the disabled elderly, individuals living in the
community are more frequently women, moderately disabled, and have more relations-
hips with their relatives than individuals living in institutions (Désesquelles and Brouard,
2003; Duée and Rebillard, 2006). Our analysis is thus conditional on the residence in
the community. We focus on the elderly, considering individuals aged 60 and more. This
threshold has been chosen in reference to the French legislation. In France, any individual
aged 60 or more can be eligible for long-term care benefits if she is disabled (Tenand,
2016).1 We define as “disabled” an individual if she declares she needs help from someone
else to perform at least one ADL ( bathing and showering, personal hygiene and groom-
ing, dressing, toilet hygiene, functional mobility and self-feeding) or one ADL (cleaning
and maintaining the house, managing money, moving within the community, preparing
meals, shopping for groceries and necessities, taking prescribed medications, using the
telephone or other form of communication). With this relatively broad definition, 10.6%
of the elderly (2,226 individuals) are disabled in the HSM survey in 2008.2
Table 1.1 presents the distribution of disabled elderly according to their marital status
and their number of children. The description of care arrangements is based on the 1,883
disabled elderly having one child at least. Then, the analysis of care determinants rests
on a restricted sample of 479 disabled elderly having two children, excluding twins.3
3.2 Definition of caregiver children
In the HSM survey, informal care corresponds to a regular care provided by relatives
in response to the individual’s limitations. Individuals answer the following question:
“Are there persons (family, friends), non professional, who help you on a regular basis
to perform some tasks of daily living, or who help you financially or materially, or who
provide you with moral support, because of a health problem or a disability, including
persons living with you?”. If it is the case, the individual is invited to list ten informal
1This threshold implies to differentiate between the disabled elderly and the disabled adults getting
old. In the last case, care arrangements are probably older and might be specific to the characteristics
of the disabilities (not old-age related). Using information of the benefits received by individuals, we
identified and suppressed from our sample 13 individuals aged 60 or more whose disabilities are not
(only) old-age related.
223.8% of them declare needing help from someone to perform one ADL at least. Among other disabled
elderly, 79.1% have at least two IADL limitations.
3492 disabled elderly parents have two children (Tables 1.1, 1.2, 1.3). When analyzing children care
behaviors according to the rank, we exclude the 13 disabled elderly having twins and end up with a
sample of 479 parents (Tables 1.8, 1.9, 1.5, 1.4). We are not able to use twins in our estimation strategy
as they are not numerous enought in our sample (13 disabled elderly parents have only twins).
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Table 1.1 – Disabled elderly according to their marital status and the number of children
Whole sample Single With a spouse
Observations Frequency Observations Frequency Observations Frequency
No children 307 14.9 218 19.1 89 9.3
One child 425 20.0 237 21.5 188 18.1
Two children 492 24.8 241 22.5 251 27.6
Three children 351 16.1 173 14.9 178 17.8
Four children 238 9.7 129 9.7 109 9.8
Five and more 377 14.5 198 12.3 179 17.4
Total 2190 100.0 1196 100.0 994 100.0
Sample: 2,190 disabled elderly living in the community. Every child is over the age of legal majority.
Source: HSM survey (DREES and INSEE, 2008)
Notes: weighted frequencies.
caregivers. We regard a child as caregiver if she is included in this list.4 This definition of
care thus rests on the declaration of the parent. It implies risks of missing some children,
or considering wrongly a child as caregiver, depending on the declaration of the parent.
It is also potentially affected by the use of a proxy to answer the questionnaire5. It could
even be influenced by the choices made by the person in charge of filling the questionnaire
(Beliard et al., 2013).6 Moreover, this measure does not give any information on potential
constraints explaining the care decision (requests from the parent for instance) nor on the
volume or the type of care provided.
With this definition, some children living with their parent are not regarded as care-
givers. We assume that the cohabitation leads de facto to care provision, even indirectly,
through the accomplishment of tasks of daily living. We thus consider as caregiver a child
living with her parent.7 Due to this choice, we suppressed from our sample families where
one of the children is still under the age of legal majority (18 years old in France),8 since
the cohabitation status is ambiguous in their case.
4In three cases, some of the individual’s children are not included in the list of ten caregivers and
the individual declares she has more than ten caregivers. There is then a concern for missing caregiver
children. We suppress from our sample these observations.
5In our sample, 64% persons answered the survey themselves, 20% were helped by someone. For the
remaining 16%, somebody else answered the survey (proxy).
6It is a problem for our estimations if the declaration bias are correlated with some of our variables
of interest (care arrangements, parent’s or children’s sexes), which is likely to be the case.
77% of children of a disabled elderly parent live with their parent and 4% children of a disabled elderly
parent live with their parent without being declared as caregiver. Among two-child families (with a
disabled elderly parent), 10% of children live with their parent and 3% children live with their parent
without being declared as caregiver (with same frequencies for elder and younger children).
8They represent 1.6% of families with a disabled elderly parent and 1.2% of two-child families with a
disabled elderly parent.
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The definition of care in the survey gathers several types of care together. It includes
not only the care provided to perform the tasks of daily living (hygiene, dressing, household
maintaining) but also the financial or material help and the moral support. This diversity
echoes the broad definition of disability we retained. The survey makes it possible to
distinguish between these types of care. Among children declared caregivers, around 85%
provide at least moral support, 59% provide care for the tasks of daily living and 18%
provide a financial or material help (Figure 1.1). Financial or material help is thus rarely
provided without any other type of care.9 Including it in the definition does not markedly
change the identification of caregiver children. Including moral support, however, is more
problematic, as over one third of children are declared caregiver for this type of care only.
Our results will rest on the broad definition of care. Since the coordination issues are
probably more important for the help provided for the tasks of daily living, our analysis
of endogenous interactions is additionally run with the definition of care restricted to
domestic help.
9Financial support to parents is rare in Western countries; Bonsang (2007) shows that only 2.6% of
adult children in European countries provide financial assistance to their parents.
71
Chapter 1
Figure 1.1 – Types of care provided by caregiver children of a disabled elderly parent
Sample: 1,341 children over the age of legal majority declared caregivers by a disabled
elderly parent living in the community.
Source: HSM survey (DREES and INSEE, 2008)
Notes: weighted frequencies. A caregiver child is a child declared as caregiver by the parent
(whatever the type of care provided). Children cohabiting with her parent but not declared
as caregiver are not included.
Reading: 12.8% of children of a disabled elderly exclusively provide domestic care. Overall,
58.6% (12.8% + 36.5% + 0.3% + 8.9%) of children provide care for domestic care at least.
4 What are the observed care arrangements?
Care arrangements can be observed either at the child level (how many children are
providing care? — Table 1.2) or at the parent level (how many parents are provided
with care? — Table 1.3). Comparing these frequencies according to the marital status of
the parent and the size of the sibling gives interesting results on the care arrangements
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in France. As expected, involvement of children is more frequent when the parent lives
alone, both at the parent and child level. The involvement rate of children is up to twice
lower when the parent is in couple, whatever the size of the sibling (Table 1.2); among
only children of a single disabled parent, one over two is declared caregiver while it is only
one over four when the parent lives with a spouse. Parents declares being provided care by
children in only 27.6% of the case when they live in couple while the proportion is of 53.4%
when they live without children (Table 1.3). However, the relatively more important care
provided for single parents is not associated with an increase in shared care provision. On
average, 44.8% of caregiver children are providing care alone when the parent is single
(Table 1.2), or about the same proportion than when the parent lives in couple (43.4%).
The similarity of frequencies is also observed at the parent level. The marital status also
affects the link between the children involvement and the size of the sibling. When the
parent lives alone, the proportion of caregiver children tends to decrease with the size
of the sibling. When she lives in couple, the involvement rate for children with sibling
is lower than the involvement rate of only children, but it is remarkably constant across
sibling sizes (around one child over six).
When the parent has several children, interactions are likely. Indeed, the proportion
of parents provided with care is systematically lower than what we would observe if the
care decisions of children in one family were independent. When the parent lives with a
spouse, the stability of children involvement rates results in an increase in the proportion
of parents provided with care only from siblings with three children. When the parent
lives alone, no simple mechanisms can be identified.
Taking the rank into account provides an another insight. According to Figure 1.2,
there are significant variations in the probability to be caregiver according to the rank and
the sibling size.10 In families with more than two children, involvement rates according to
the rank seem to follow a U-shaped trend, with younger and elder children having higher
probabilities to be caregiver; this trend is unbalanced, as younger children have a higher
probability to be caregiver than elder children. This U-shaped trend is not observed,
though, in families with seven children. In all sibling size, the provision of care as a single
caregiver is rather erratic.
In two-child families, younger children are more frequently caregiver than elder child-
ren. How is it possible to explain this difference? Is it related to a difference in the
distribution of individual characteristic according to the rank? We do observe that the
younger and elder children differ in terms of sociodemographic characteristics (Table 1.4).
10Independence tests accounting for the survey structure (weights and family as sampling unit) shows
that the differences observed in the probability to be caregiver according to the rank are significant at
the 10%, except for families with three, five and seven children (P-values respectively at 0.31, 0.14 and
0.80).
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Is the gap rather due to differences in the reaction to individual characteristics? Alterna-
tively, can it be explained by asymmetric interactions? We propose to explore these three
sources of variations, studying the effects of child or family determinants and interactions
and allowing them to vary with the rank.
Table 1.2 – Caregiver children of disabled elderly individuals
Observations Caregiver or Involvement If caregiver,
(child) cohabiting rate (%) share of children
children providing
care alone (%)
Single
One child 237 148 56.0 100.0
Two children 482 208 38.5 42.0
Three children 519 162 21.1 38.4
Four children 516 153 28.9 33.4
Five or more 1328 298 24.8 22.8
Total 3082 969 30.4 44.8
With a spouse
One child 188 49 26.4 100
Two children 502 104 15.0 48.9
Three children 534 106 17.9 31.9
Four children 436 72 17.8 29.2
Five or more 1198 198 14.3 36.6
Total 2858 529 16.4 43.4
Sample: 5,940 children over the age of legal majority having a disabled elderly parent living in the
community.
Source: HSM (DREES and INSEE, 2008)
Notes: weighted frequencies. A caregiver child is a child declared as caregiver by the parent
(whatever the type of care provided) or cohabiting with her parent.
Reading: in two-child families with a disabled elderly single parent, 38.5% of children are caregiver.
42% are the only caregiver child.
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Table 1.3 – Share of disabled elderly parents provided with care by their children
Observations Share of parents Among parents
(parent) provided with care provided with care,
by a least one child (%) share of parents
provided with care
by only one child (%)
Single
One child 237 56.2 100.0
Two children 241 51.2 63.4
Three children 173 37.8 58.9
Four children 129 64.1 57.9
Five or more 198 69.3 54.7
Total 978 53.4 69.9
With a spouse
One child 188 24.7 100.0
Two children 251 19.1 62.9
Three children 178 22.7 42.7
Four children 109 32.5 55.0
Five or more 179 46.6 71.9
Total 905 27.6 68.2
Sample: 1,883 disabled elderly living in the community and having at least one child. Every child
is over the age of legal majority.
Source: HSM survey (DREES and INSEE, 2008)
Notes: weighted frequencies. A caregiver child is a child declared as caregiver by the parent
(whatever the type of care provided) or cohabiting with her parent.
Reading: 51.2% of the disabled elderly living without a spouse and having two children receive
care from at least one child. 63.4% of them receive care from only one child.
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Figure 1.2 – Involvement rates of children according to rank and sibling size
Sample: 4,349 children over the age of legal majority with a disabled elderly parent living in the
community, whose sibling size is not higher than 6 children.
Source: HSM survey (DREES and INSEE, 2008)
Notes: weighted frequencies. On the x-axis, the first line of numbers is the rank and the second
line of numbers is the size of the siblings. A caregiver child is a child declared as caregiver by the
parent (whatever the type of care provided). Children cohabiting with her parent but not declared
as caregiver are regarded as caregiver.
Reading: In families with three children, 25% of the elder children provide care (17% provides care
with one other child at least, 8% provides care alone).
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Table 1.4 – Sociodemographic characteristics of children (two-child families)
Elder child Younger child Difference
(p-value)
Age (years) (a) 51.6 46.7 0.00
Women (%) 52.2 53.4 0.70
Having a spouse (%) 71.8 68.7 0.29
Having children (%) 80.4 75.2 0.05
Number of children (b) 02.2 02.0 0.01
Active of the job market (%) 67.4 75.8 0.00
Cohabiting with the parent (%) 09.4 10.0 0.74
Living in the parent’s municipality (%) 20.9 24.4 0.19
Living in the parent’s department (%) 29.0 32.0 0.33
Living in the parent’s region (%) 11.3 10.6 0.75
Living outside of the parent’s region (%) 28.0 22.1 0.04
Sample: 958 children from two-child families, over the age of legal majority,
having a disabled elderly parent living in the community.
Source: HSM survey (DREES and INSEE, 2008)
Notes: Unweighted frequencies. P-value from a Student test.
(a) The average age is computed on children for whom the parent was able to
respond (469 elder children, 474 younger children).
(b) Among those having children (385 elder children, 360 younger children).
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5 Determinants of care decision in two-child families
In order to isolate the effect of endogenous interactions, our analysis focuses on two-
child families. We work at a given sibling size, instead of aggregating families with diffe-
rent sibling sizes. Indeed, care behaviors vary with both the rank and the sibling sizes.
Two-child siblings present important differences in care behavior according to the rank.
Technically, two-child families makes it possible to avoid restrictive hypothesis that would
be needed to formalize interactions among larger siblings: with two children, the care be-
havior of siblings is mechanically reduced to the other child. Moreover, two-child families
tend to be the more frequently observed size of siblings in France: 34% of men and 31%
of women born between 1931 and 1935 with children have two children. For generations
born 30 years later, these proportions equal 46% and 45% (Masson, 2013). If we compare
the frequency of each sibling size in Table 1.1, two-child families are the most frequent
case (1/4 of siblings).
5.1 Micro-econometric model
To analyze if the care decision of a child depends on the care behavior of her sibling,
we need a statistical model considering simultaneously the care behavior of both children.
In a two-child family j, the care behavior of a child i is represented by a binary variable
aij (i = 1 for the elder child, i = 2 for the younger), with aij = 1 if the child is providing
care to the parent, aij = 0 otherwise.
Depending on the care decision of each child, four care arrangements kj are observed:
• no child is caregiver (a1j = 0, a2j = 0) : kj = 0 ;
• the elder child only is caregiver (a1j = 1, a2j = 0) : kj = 1 ;
• the younger child only is caregiver (a1j = 0, a2j = 1) : kj = 2 ;
• both children are caregiver (a1j = 1, a2j = 1) : kj = 3.
The utility function of each child depends not only on her own involvement but also
on the care behavior of her sibling.
U1j = U1j(a1j, a2j)
U2j = U2j(a2j, a1j)
(1.1)
The care behavior of a child depends on her net utility of caregiving, ∆Uij which
corresponds to the utility gap between the situation when the child provides care (aij = 1)
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and where she does not (aij = 0). The utility gap for the elder child is thus defined as
follows:
∆U1j(a2j) = U1j(1, a2j) − U1j(0, a2j) (1.2)
while the utility gap for the younger child is:
∆U2j(a1j) = U2j(1, a1j) − U2j(0, a1j) (1.3)
Utility gaps can be either positive or negative. It is is positive, the child is a caregiver
while she does not provide care if the utility gap is negative. Following the model imple-
mented by Fontaine et al. (2009), we assume that the net benefit of caregiving depends
on individual and family characteristics and on the care behavior of the sibling. It is
decomposed as follows:
∆U1j(a2j) = α1.X1j + β1.a2j + �1j
∆U2j(a1j) = α2.X2j + β2.a1j + �2j
(1.4)
α1.X1j (resp. α2.X2j) captures the effect of the characteristics Xij on the net benefit
of caregiving. It includes child characteristics, parent and sibling characteristics. The
choice of the variables is detailed in the next subsection.
β1.a2j (resp. β2.a1j) is the interaction component: it measures the way the net utility
to provide care is affected by care behavior of the sibling.
Note that both the α and the β are specific to the elder child and the younger child: the
model allows the effects of the child and family characteristics to affect differently the care
behavior of each child, and the interactions can be asymmetric.
Care behaviors of children might depend on unobserved characteristics that are likely
to correlate within a family. To cope with this potential bias, we allow the error terms to
be correlated within a family. We assume that the residuals are distributed according to
a bi-variate normal density function: (�1j, �2j) ∼ N [0, 0, 1, 1, ρ], where ρ is the correlation
coefficient between �1j and �2j.
We assume that an observed care arrangement is stable and corresponds to a pure Nash
equilibrium: within a family, given the behavior of the sibling, no child wants to change
her care behavior. We choose to model decisions as a non-cooperative game: children
independently decide on their own behavior. Such a modeling is consistent with what has
been done in the literature on intrafamily allocations regarding care to an elderly parent
(Hiedemann and Stern, 1999; Pezzin and Schone, 1999; Byrne et al., 2009; Fontaine et al.,
2009; Antman, 2012). It is argued to be relevant as adult siblings are independent and
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might have conflicting interest (Antman, 2012). It also has the interest to be self-enforcing
and then to avoid the need of binding agreements (Chen and Woolley, 2001). Alternative
modeling would either consider the family as the unit of decision (unitary model) or
allow for some cooperation within the family (cooperative bargaining model). Assuming
a unique joint utility function for the whole family, the unitary model can be regarded
as non-relevant for modeling decisions of adult individuals living separately (Antman,
2012). The cooperative bargaining model presents more interest for the invesgation of
children care decisions. Indeed, it could be the case that children behaviors depend
on intra-sibling bargaining and adjustments. As underlined by Antman (2012), siblings
might consider the joint maximization of their utilities relative to a threat point, that
could be determined in comparison to utilities in the non-cooperative framework. Such a
framework is appealing but is hard to implement empirically. To empirically cope with
the possibility of cooperation, Engers and Stern (2002) decomposes the care decision in
two steps. First, each child independently (non-cooperatively) chooses whether she will
join the parental care decision; then, the involved children decide together what the care
arrangement will be. It echoes the more general family bargaining model proposed by
Konrad and Lommerud (2003), where human capital investment decisions are made non-
cooperatively in a first stage and day-to-day allocation of time is determined later through
Nash bargaining, with non-cooperative behaviour as a threat point. Sloan et al. (1997),
focusing on the care decision of only one child, discusses two potential frameworks. In
the first, either the child or the parent unilaterally makes the decision on the quantity
of formal and informal care. In the second case, decisions about informal care are made
jointly. In this case, the outcome of the joint decision depends on the bargaining power of
both individuals, whose explaining factors are empirically captured. Knoef and Kooreman
(2011) directly address the issue of the choice between a cooperative and non-cooperative
framework when modeling the care decision of siblings. They compare the empirical
estimations of two models, one non-cooperative (both siblings maximize their utility given
the choice of the other and their own characteristics), the other cooperative (siblings
maximize the sum of their utilities subject to their own constraint). They find that in
most siblings, the non-cooperative framework has a better fit than the cooperative model.
Finally, decisions are assumed to be simultaneous. As formulated by Stöhr (2015), it
is equivalent to assume that decisions are only infinitesimally spaced in time and repeated
until an equilibrium is reached. This is a strong assumption however, preventing one child
to choose first and to have a first mover advantage. This assumption is further discussed
in Section 7.
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A care arrangement (a1j, a2j) is a pure Nash equilibrium if:



U1j(a1j, a2j) ≥ U1j(a1j − 1, a2j)
U2j(a2j, a1j) ≥ U2j(a2j − 1, a1j)
(1.5)
With Nj the set of Nash equilibria for a family j, the probability of each care arran-
gement to be a Nash equilibrim of Nj is:















P (0 ∈ Nj) = P (∆U1j(0) < 0 ∩ ∆U2j(0) < 0)
P (1 ∈ Nj) = P (∆U1j(0) > 0 ∩ ∆U2j(1) < 0)
P (3 ∈ Nj) = P (∆U1j(1) < 0 ∩ ∆U2j(0) > 0)
P (4 ∈ Nj) = P (∆U1j(1) > 0 ∩ ∆U2j(1) > 0)
(1.6)
With the specification of the net utility described in Equation 1.4, the probability for
each care arrangement to be a Nash equilibrium can be written:
P (0 ∈ Nj) = F (−α1.X1j, −α2.X2j, ρ)
P (1 ∈ Nj) = F (α1.X1j, −α2.X2j − β2, −ρ)
P (2 ∈ Nj) = F (−α1.X1j − β1, α2.X2j, −ρ)
P (3 ∈ Nj) = F (α1.X1j + β1, α2.X2j + β2, ρ)
(1.7)
where F is the joint cumulative distribution of the bivariate normal.
As it often happens to be the case in models with multiple agents making discrete
choice, this model is “incomplete” (Tamer, 2003): it can lead to multiple equilibria or no
equilibrium. We overpass this difficulty with a selection rule applying to situations of
multiple equilibria or absence of equilibrium.11 With the selection rule, the probability of
observing each care arrangement are estimated as a function of the exogenous variables
and the model is estimated by maximum likelihood.12
5.2 Child and family determinants
We detail here the choices made to select the child and family determinants included
in the estimation of the model (Xij variables).
13 Along with the child age, we study
the effect of the family and professional status of each child. These characteristics affect
the availability of the child (Le Bihan-Youinou and Martin, 2006; Peyrache and Ogg,
2017). Family status includes the marital status (living with a spouse or not) and the
11See Appendix 10.1.A for details on the selection rule.
12The equations that are finally estimated are presented in Appendix 10.1.A (System 4.5).
13Appendix 10.2 provides the descriptive statistics on these variables.
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parental situation (having children or not). Child care is likely to be a competing demand
to parental care (negatively affecting the probability to provide care), but it could also
increase contacts with the parent due to their grand-parenting role. Living in couple can
reduce the availability of the child or make it possible to report the care on the spouse
(expected negative effect), but it also makes it possible to share household shores and
give the child more time for the parent (expected positive effect). The variable related
to the professional status distinguishes between children who are active in the labour
market (employed or seeking work) and inactive children (retired, students, homemakers
or others)14. The opportunity costs of care is likely to be higher for active individuals;
previous works have shown that the willingness to pay for diminishing the care provision by
an hour is higher for caregivers active on the job market (Davin et al., 2015). Additionally,
we isolate the case when the parent was not able to answer the question on the job status,
as it is likely to be correlated to her health status and the provision of informal care (Davin
et al., 2009). Overall, controlling for these variables is essential, especially because the
definitions of care include the children cohabiting with their parent, who have specific
family and professional status (Ogg et al., 2015).
Regarding parental characteristics, we include, along with her age, the effect of her
sex. It can affect both the volume and the nature of care. Indeed, women more frequently
declare receiving regular care (Bonnet et al., 2013) and the help they receive is more
frequently material or financial. Conversely, men more frequently declare being provided
care for the tasks of daily living (Soullier and Weber, 2011; Soullier, 2012). All parents are
disabled but we distinguish between two disability levels: most disabled individuals are
those who declare they need help to perform one of the ADL. Others encounter limitations
for the IADL. We control for the marital status of the parent, as the literature has shown
the importance of the spouse in the care provision, likely to substitute for care provided
by children (Fontaine et al., 2007; Weber, 2011) and it is confirmed in our description of
care arrangements. We additionally test for the effect of the education level of the parent,
isolating individuals who have the French baccalauréat. We also control for the income,
isolating individuals whose income is below the last quartile of our sample (monthly
income at least equal to e1,800). These variables, correlated with the social position of
individuals, are assumed to affect the care provided by children through differences in the
utilization of professional home care and specific social norms (Weber et al., 2014).
The last type of variables included in the estimation relates to the sibling characteris-
tics. These variables aims at capturing the contextual effects identified by Manski. For
each child, the professional status of her sibling is controlled for, distinguishing the sibling
14As is explicitly stated in the questionnaire of the survey, the “other” category might refer to a case
where the child is declared disabled and can not be active. This situation is rare in our sample (3.5% of
children).
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who is active in the labour market from other situations. Instead of including directly the
sex of each child, we control for the sex composition of the sibling. Rarely used in the
literature, this variable makes it possible to test for contextual interactions depending on
the sex of children. It is a well-known fact that women are more systematically assigned
to the role of caregiver (Bonnet et al., 2013; Membrado, 2013). We would like to go furt-
her by studying if the effect of being a woman is different when the sibling is a man or
when she is a woman. Finally, we include a dummy equal to one when the age difference
between the children is superior to ten years.
Our estimation makes use of the quasi-totality of the available information on children.
Two variables have not been directly included. The first is the socioprofessional category of
the child, highly correlated with the professional status of the child and the education level
of the parent. The second is the geographical proximity of children to their parent. This
variable is potentially highly endogenous. Instead of determining the care behavior, the
distance to the parent’s location can be explained by the care behavior (reverse causality).
It could also be a source of collinearity: living outside of the region of the parent is
correlated to the family and professional status of children, as well as to the marital
status and education level of the parent. Including this variable is thus likely to bias
estimates and to lower their precision. In the robustness checks, we discuss the inclusion
of these variables.
6 Results
6.1 From differentiation to convergent behaviors
Table 1.5 presents the estimation results, with the two definitions of care. In the
first estimation, the effect of the determinants of care provision are estimated for the
elder child (Column 1) and the younger child (Column 2), regarding as caregiver all the
children cohabiting with their parent or declared caregiver, whatever the type of care
provided (broad definition). In the second estimation (Columns 4 and 5), the definition
of care is restricted to children cohabiting or declared caregiver for the performance of the
tasks of daily living (restricted definition). In the estimation procedure, some coefficients
have been forced to be equal for the elder and younger child: it is indicated in Column 3
(resp. 6) for the first (resp. second) estimation.
With the broad definition, important differences are observed when comparing the
care behavior of the elder and the younger child. The involvement of the younger child
appears to be more sensitive to her individual characteristics than the elder’s involvement:
her probability to be caregiver is lower when she lives in couple, she has children or she
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is active in the labour market.15 Conversely, the elder child’s behavior is only affected
by her marital status. When restricting the definition of care to the help provided in
the tasks of daily living, behaviors are more similar in terms of individual characteristics’
effect: the elder child has a lower probability to provide care if she has children or if she is
active. Situations when the parent was not able to respond to the question on the child’s
professional status are associated with a lower probability for the child to be caregiver.
In both cases, children age is controlled for, such that the effects tied to differences in the
life cycle should be limited.
The effect of parent characteristics according to the rank are more homogeneous.
Whatever the definitions and the rank, children are more likely to be caregiver when the
parent is older, lives alone or has a lower level of education. Both children are also more
likely to be caregiver if the parent is their mother. This effect, however, is significant only
for the broad definition of care; it suggests that that the parent’s sex mainly affects the
material, financial care or the moral support. In addition, rank-related divergences are
observed when we focus on the broad definition. A lower level of income and a higher
level of disability increases the probability of the younger child to be caregiver. The effect
of parent’s income, however, disappears with the restricted definition. It suggests the
effect observed was due to financial support from the younger child when the parent have
a relatively lower income. The elder child’s behavior is remarkably not affected by these
two variables.
Regarding family variables, several regularities are observed. First, whatever the defi-
nition and the rank, a child has a higher probability to be caregiver when she is a woman
whose sibling is a man. This results echoes previous findings on the systematic assignation
of woman to the role of caregiver. But it also originally underlines the relative dimension
of this effect: being a woman is significantly associated with a higher probability of being
caregiver if, and only if, the sibling is a man. The only exception is observed the younger
child, with the broad definition: in this case, it can only be said that being a man with a
brother decreases the probability to be caregiver, compared to all other sex compositions.
In both definitions, children do not react to the job status of their sibling. In addition,
an important age gap decreases the probability to be caregiver for the younger child. An
important age gap could correspond to situations when the elder child has earlier played a
role of caregiver (helping the parent and caring for the younger child) and keeps on playing
this role. In two-child families, a elder child much older than her sibling could also behave
as if he was the only child; it would mechanically designate her as the caregiver (Weber,
2011).
15As we control for children age, the status on the labour market is not expected to reflect life cycle
effects.
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With respect to endogenous interactions, we finally observe asymmetric behaviors,
whatever the definition of care that is used. Ceteris paribus, the elder child has a higher
probability to be caregiver if the younger child is providing care; conversely, the younger
child tends to be less frequently caregiver when the elder child is providing care, or does
not react to the care behavior of their sibling (coefficient not significantly different from
zero at conventional thresholds).
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Table 1.5 – Determinants of care behaviors in two-child families
Broad definition Restricted definition
Elder Younger Coeff. Elder Younger Coeff.
Constant -0.364 -0.364 Yes -0.464 -0.464 Yes
(0.563) (0.563) (0.605) (0.605)
Child characteristics
Age -0.036∗∗∗ -0.010 No -0.032∗∗∗ -0.016 No
(0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010)
Has a spouse -0.490∗∗∗ -0.490∗∗∗ Yes -0.733∗∗∗ -0.733∗∗∗ Yes
Ref: lives without a spouse (0.124) (0.124) (0.126) (0.126)
Has children -0.174 -0.550∗∗∗ No -0.347∗∗ -0.347∗∗ Yes
Ref: has no children (0.188) (0.174) (0.140) (0.140)
Active in the labour market -0.177 -0.641∗∗∗ No -0.308∗ -0.823∗∗∗ No
(0.158) (0.158) (0.160) (0.159)
The parent does not know the job -1.434∗∗∗ -1.434∗∗∗ Yes -2.027∗∗∗ -2.027∗∗∗ Yes
status (0.376) (0.376) (0.469) (0.469)
Ref: retired, student, homemaker,
other
Parent characteristics
Age 0.026∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ Yes 0.026∗∗ 0.026∗∗ Yes
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
Woman 0.225∗∗ 0.225∗∗ Yes 0.159 0.159 Yes
(0.116) (0.116) (0.128) (0.128)
Has no spouse 0.394∗∗∗ 0.394∗∗∗ Yes 0.298∗∗ 0.298∗∗ Yes
Ref: lives with a spouse (0.125) (0.125) (0.121) (0.121)
Has the baccalauréat -0.519∗∗∗ -0.519∗∗∗ Yes -0.707∗∗∗ -0.707∗∗∗ Yes
Ref: does not have the baccalauréat (0.191) (0.191) (0.219) (0.219)
Monthly income ≥ e1,800 -0.116 -0.1551∗∗∗ No -0.123 -0.123 Yes
Ref: monthly income < e1,800 (0.159) (0.149) (0.114) (0.114)
One ADL limitation at least -0.073 0.368∗∗ No 0.104 0.468∗∗∗ Yes
Ref: IADL limitation(s) (0.165) (0.151) (0.178) (0.157)
Sibling characteristics
The other child is active -0.132 -0.132 Yes -0.076 -0.076 Yes
Continued on next page
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Table 1.5 – Continued from previous page
Broad definition Restricted definition
Elder Younger Coeff. Elder Younger Coeff.
Ref: the other child retired, student,
homemaker, other or the parent
does not know
(0.129) (0.129) (0.138) (0.138)
Ego = woman, alter = woman -0.399∗∗ -0.215 Yes -0.244∗ -0.244∗ Yes
(0.175) (0.176) (0.138) (0.138)
Ego = man, alter = man -0.459∗∗∗ -0.459∗∗∗ No -0.481∗∗∗ 0.481∗∗∗ Yes
(0.144) (0.144) (0.161) (0.161)
Ego = man, alter = woman -0.700∗∗∗ -0.122 Yes -0.402∗∗∗ -0.402∗∗∗ Yes
(0.190) (0.199) (0.145) (0.145)
Ego = woman, alter = man
Age gap ≥ 10 years 0.377 -0.720*** No 0.433∗ -0.514∗ No
Ref: age gap < 10 years (0.236) (0.265) (0.242) (0.280)
Interactions
The other child is caregiver 1.197∗∗∗ -0.476 No 1.004∗∗∗ -0.373 No
(0.360) (0.524) (0.367) (0.428)
Correlation coefficient -0.090 (0.361) -0.015 (0.322)
Log-likelihood -486.795 -403.442
Observations 479 479
Sample: 479 disabled elderly living in the community and having two children over the age of legal
majority.
Source: HSM survey (DREES and INSEE, 2008)
Notes: standard errors in parenthesis. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05 ∗∗∗p < 0.01. Columns “Coeff.” indicate
if the coefficients were constrained to be equal.
7 Additional estimations
In this section, the results of several additional estimations are presented. Table 1.6
presents the coefficients obtained for the additional variables and the interaction terms in
these robustness checks. We first focus on the broad definition for which care behaviors
are more likely to be differentiated. We add to the control variables the geographical
proximity of the child’s location to the parent’s home.16 We include a dummy indicating
if the child lives in the parent’s region.17 Following the literature (see, for instance,
Mulder and van der Meer (2009)), the geographical proximity is strongly correlated to
the care behavior: living outside of the region decreases significantly the probability to
16This dimension is further explored in Appendix 10.3.A.
17We tried to use more precise indicators (living in the same municipality, or in the same department)
but we encountered convergence issues.
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be caregiver, for both children. Moreover, in this estimation, the implication of the
elder child decreases the probability for the younger child to be caregiver (significant
negative coefficient). Despite our concerns regarding collinearity, our results on the other
determinants are robust to the inclusion of this dummy.
The model is estimated including as controls the socioprofessional category of the
children. We use the classification of socioprofessional categories done by the Institut
nationale de la statistique et des études économiques (INSEE). In this classification, six
different categories are found: 1) farmers, 2) craftspersons, shopkeepers, company heads,
3) executives, intellectual professions, 4) intermediate professions, 5) employees, 6) wor-
kers. Higher socioprofessional categories are expected to have a lower probability to be
caregiver, because of time constraints and higher opportunity costs. With executives and
intellectual professions as a reference, being a worker or having an intermediate profession
for the elder child, being farmer for the younger child, is associated with an increased
probability to be caregiver. To ease the interpretation, we test the effect of a difference
in the socioprofessional categories of the two children. We consider there is a difference
when one of the children belongs to the first three categories while the other belongs to
the last three categories. When the elder child belongs to the first categories and not
the younger child, the probability to be caregiver is higher for the elder child and lower
for the younger. In the reverse case, there is no effect on children care provision. We
also interact the difference in the socioprofessional categories with the sex of each child.18
In this model, we control for the sex of each child rather than the sibling composition.
It shows that when the elder child belongs to a higher socioprofessional category, if she
is a woman, she has a higher probability to be caregiver, compared to a elder son or a
sibling with no socioprofessional differences. When the younger child belongs to a higher
socioprofessional category and is a women, she does not have a higher probability to be
caregiver than a man. Thus, for the younger child, higher opportunity costs compensate
the effect of being a woman on the probability to provide care, while it is not the case for
the elder child.
At the parent’s level, the model is also estimated with a control for the location of the
parent: we include a dummy for residence in rural areas. No significant effect is observed
for parent’s rural residence and the results on other determinants are unchanged. We
additionally control for the status of the respondent of the questionnaire (the individual,
the individual helped by someone, or someone else). When someone else was involved in
the survey (responded to the questionnaire or helped the individual), the probability for
the younger child to be caregiver is higher; it is the case for the elder child only if someone
helped the individual to respond. This inclusion does not affect the other variables, except
18For the sake of conciseness, these results are not presented in Table 1.6 but are available upon request.
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a loss of significance for the effect of parent disability level and age for the younger child.
Other parental variables are included, which do not affect the results. When the parent
is single, a sharing effect would possibly be observed if the parent is actually separated
or divorced. We distinguish in the initial model separated or divorced parent on the one
hand, and widowed or never-married parent on the other hand. There is no significant
effect of this variable. When the disabled parent lives with a spouse, the spouse is more
than likely to be caregiver. We include a dummy indicating if the spouse was declared as
caregiver in the list of informal caregiver. This dummy negatively affects the probability to
be caregiver only for the younger child. To take into account formal care and informal care
provided by other relatives (broader family, friends, neighbours), we estimate the model
including successively a dummy indicating if the parent is provided with formal care and
a dummy indicating when the parent receives care from other relatives.19 According
to these estimations, the children care behaviors are not affected by formal care nor by
informal care from other relatives. The absence of a (negative) correlation between formal
care consumption and informal care is surprising, as the literature has shown evidence of
a substitution effect between formal care and informal care (Ettner, 1994; Pezzin et al.,
1996; Stabile et al., 2006; Viitanen, 2007; Rapp et al., 2011; Fontaine, 2012; Arnault,
2015). However, we are here focusing on care provision by children, at the extensive
margin, instead of the overall volume of informal care. Moreover, for severly disabled
individuals, the substitution effect is less likely to be observed (Bonsang, 2009). Results
on other determinants are robust to the inclusion of these dummies.
We also restrict our sample to individuals aged 75 at least (64% of our initial sample).
Probably due to a loss of precision, some variables that were previously significant from
zero are not anymore, while the coefficient estimates do not change importantly. It is the
case for the age variables, the parental sex for both children, the sex composition and the
age gap for the younger child. The income of the parent, however, turns to negatively
affect the probability of the elder child to be caregiver. Regarding interactions, they
are still asymmetric with a positive coefficient for the elder child and a negative for the
younger child, but only the younger child coefficient is significantly different from zero
while the other is not.
With the definition of care restricted to the activities of daily living, we have tested
the existence of a relationship between the provision of this type of care and other types
of care. We include in the control variables the fact that the child is providing moral
19Formal care corresponds to individuals who have declare they receive help from a professional care-
giver for the activities of daily living, either essential or instrumental; it is the case for 51.3% of parents
in our sample. Informal care from other relatives corresponds to the care provided by the broader family
(siblings of the parent for instance) or non-family members (neighbours, friends). One quarter of parents
in our sample declares they receive informal care from other relatives.
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support or material help.20 The provision of care for the activities of daily living could
increase the provision of moral support (or material help): in that case, we expect a
positive relationship. If providing moral support or material help is a way to substitute
to the care provided for daily living, we conversely expect a negative coefficient. Results
shows that moral support or financial help are substitutes to the care for activities of daily
living only for the younger children, while there is no significant relationship for the elder
children. The sign and magnitude of interaction terms are robust to these inclusions.
20The provision of material help only is scarce in our sample (0.5% of children). Thus, the results on
this variable are likely to be driven by the provision of moral support.
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Table 1.6 – Synthesis of additional results
Variable coefficient Interaction coefficients
Elder Younger Elder Younger
Broad definition
Baseline estimation 1.197∗∗∗ -0.476
Children variables
Outside parent’s region -1.413∗∗∗ -1.413∗∗∗ 0.852∗∗ -0.531∗
Parent variables
Parent in rural area -0.165 -0.165 1.172∗∗∗ -0.501
Spouse as caregiver 0.053 -0.346∗ 1.300∗∗∗ -0.668
Divorced or separated -0.074 0.213 1.257∗∗∗ -0.638
Other informal care 0.142 -0.131 1.205∗∗∗ -0.440
Formal care 0.088 0.088 1.196∗∗∗ -0.475
Respondent:
Parent, with someone else 0.329∗∗ 0.329∗∗
0.924∗∗ -0.054Someone else -0.147 0.560∗∗∗
Ref: parent alone
Sibling variables
Difference in socioprofessional categories (SPC) :
Elder: SPC+ -0.233∗ -0.233∗
1.144∗∗∗ -0.499
Younger: SPC+ -0.044 -0.044
Ref: no difference in SCP
Sample restriction
75+ only 0.385 -1.090∗∗∗
Restricted definition
Baseline estimation 1.004∗∗∗ -0.373
Children variables
Provides material or moral support -0.176 -1.077∗∗∗ 1.184∗∗∗ -0.417
Samples: 479 disabled elderly living in the community and having two children over the age of
legal majority. Among them, 308 individuals are aged 75 or more (restricted sample).
Source: HSM survey (DREES and INSEE, 2008)
Notes: ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05 ∗∗∗p < 0.01. Estimations of the baseline model with additional
variables or sample restrictions. Individual and family variables are controlled for.
8 Discussion and potential extensions
Our results show that care behaviors are relatively differentiated with a broad defini-
tion of care, while they are more similar when the definition of care is restricted to the
care provided for the tasks of daily living. They confirm the importance of children family
and professional situation as well as parent’s marital status and education level. They
informatively provide evidence for a relative gender effect : daughters are more frequently
declared caregivers, especially when they have a brother rather than a sister. Finally, they
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confirm the existence of asymmetric endogenous interactions.
Our results are relevant for a quite specific definition of disabled parents: we focus
here on individuals who declare they need human help to perform some activities of daily
living. We have tried to enlarge our sample by including all parents declaring they have
at least one activity restriction.21 In this case, there are much less differences in child and
family determinants according to the rank and the type of care provided, and we are not
able to identify endogenous interactions. It is possibly due to the higher heterogeneity of
our enlarged sample in terms of care needs compared to our baseline sample.
The data we use present several limitations. First, our results rests on the parent’s
declaration regarding the identification of disability, of caregiver children and with respect
to the characteristics of the children. Moreover, reconstituted families are plausibly not
taken into account.22 Moreover, we do not observe some determinants of care. Are
children caregivers because of their preferences, or because of more systematic requests
from the parent? Data on the demand or the frequency of contacts would be needed to
take this point into account. Additionally, we could have tried to control for unobserved
family norms using information on the birth country or the nationality of individuals, but
there are few variations in our sample on these dimensions.23
Our work focuses on the extensive margin of care, without saying anything on the
volume of care provided by children. It thus only provides the first step in the analysis
of care arrangement by understanding the decision to be caregiver. Along with the type
of care provided, we do observe in the survey the volume of care provided by children.24
Thus, it might be possible to estimate the determinants of the volume of care provided.
This study would need to be carried out separately, as it raises specific technical issues.
Focusing on families where the two children are caregiver would further restrict our sample
size. Moreover, the utilization of a linear model would raise the “reflection problem”
identified by Manski (Manski, 1993, 2000). A simple way to bypass this issue would be
to transform linear variables (i.e. volume of care provided) into discrete variables (i.e.
brackets of hours) (Brock and Durlauf, 2001).
We assume the simultaneity of care decisions. To comprehensively understand the
genesis arrangements, a model with several decision moments would be useful (see for
instance Hiedemann and Stern (1999); Engers and Stern (2002); Pezzin et al. (2007)).
However, while being very demanding in terms of data, such structural models have
21See Appendix 10.3.B for details.
22The questionnaire mentioned the children of the individual but it does not specify if it might include
(or not) stepchildren. However, the document giving instructions to the persons in charge of filling the
questionnaire makes it clear that the aim of this part is to know better on the legal descendants (“obligés
alimentaires”).
2385% were born in France. 89% of individual are French by birth.
24See Appendix 10.2 for descriptive statistics on the volume provided by children.
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exclusively been developed for a single caregiver and have not yet considered multiple
care arrangements. Assuming that the elder child move first, Appendix 10.1.B presents
a simple estimation taking the elder child’s behavior as exogenous to the behavior of the
younger children. It is a limited empirical contribution on this question, which is open
for future research.
Another field of extension is related to the size of the sibling we consider. We are
focusing on two-child families, taking one step further compared to the literature focused
on one only caregiver. However, mechanisms operating in larger families are still unknown
and models making it possible to study them would be needed. Such models would require
to specify assumptions on the aggregation of care behavior of others. For instance, the
care decision of one child could depend on the fact that at least one other child is providing
care. The literature on intra-household selection could offer interesting methods to study
such a question. Chort and Senne (2013) builds on a model explaining the selection of
migrant(s) among an household. This type of model could be useful to study the effect of
children and family determinants, but might not be sufficient to study interactions. Stöhr
(2015) studies the migration and care decisions in Moldova, with an explicit insight on
the interactions of decisions within siblings. Working at the children level, he aggregates
decisions of family members as the share of migrants among siblings. Although such
approach also has its own limitations, it offers an interesting way of broading the analysis
to larger families.
9 Conclusion
Our results shed light on the genesis of children care arrangement for a disabled elderly
parent in France. The description of care arrangements confirm that the presence of a
spouse for the disabled parent decreases the involvement rate of children. It also affects
the impact of the sibling size on child involvement. In two-child families, behaviors are
differentiated when considering several types of care, while they are more convergent when
focusing on the care provided for the tasks of daily living. Endogenous interactions are
asymmetric whatever the type of care: the elder child is more likely to be caregiver when
the younger child is providing care, while the provision of care from the younger child is
not affected by the elder’s child behavior.
Results obtained at the European level with SHARE are akin to ours regarding the
asymmetry of interactions and the effect of mixed siblings (Fontaine et al., 2009). Nonet-
heless, differences are observed; in particular, parent variables mainly affect the behavior
of the younger children. These differences could be due to the differences in the sample:
Fontaine et al. (2009) focus on single parents, while we are including both single parents
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and those living with a spouse. It could also come from differences in the scale of the
study: Fontaine et al. (2009) work on several European countries, potentially heteroge-
nous, while we are focusing on France. Finally, it might result from differences in the
definition of care used. Indeed, in SHARE, caregivers are not necessarily providing care
regularly, in response to a disability problem.
Determinants of care behavior, interactions in particular, are thus asymmetric depen-
ding on the rank in the sibilng. Results also provide additional and original evidence
on the existing imbalance in care provision between men and women. In this context, a
public policy that would encourage informal care as a major source of care provision could
potentially increase the inequalities within sibling, especially with respect to the sex and
the rank.
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10 Appendices
10.1 Details on the econometric specification
10.1.A Selection rule
The equations provided in the subsection 5.1 describe a well-defined economic mo-
del ; this model, however, can not be directly estimated econometrically. Indeed, for some
vectors of exogenous variables, the economic model can predict several equilibria or no
equilibrium.
The absence of equilibrium (Nj = {∅}) is likely when interactions are asymmetric
(β1 and β2 do not have the same sign: β1.β2 < 0 ). In this case, one child tends to
behave like her sibling, while the other chooses the care decision opposite to the one of
her sibling. This coordination issue will lead to an unstable care arrangement, with the
children successively changing their care behavior following the other’s decision.
Multiple equilibria are likely when the care behaviors of children interact symmetrically
(β1 and β2 do have the same sign). If both children want to provide care alone (β1 < 0,
β2 < 0), it can result in either the elder or the younger child providing care alone (Nj =
{1, 2}). Conversely, if the two children want to adopt the same care behavior, none or
both can be caregivers (Nj = {0, 3}).
This indetermination can be dealt with by imposing a selection rule in the region of
non-uniqueness (Krauth, 2006). The selection rule is a function S(Kj, Nj) which assigns
a probability to each Nash equilibrum in the regions of non-uniqueness or no equilibrium.
To describe a probability distribution, the selection rule must obey the following con-
straints:
sel(kj, Nj) ≥ 0 (1.8)
�
kj
sel(Kj, Nj) = 1 (1.9)
In addition, there is the constraint that only existing Nash equilibrium can be attri-
buted a positive probability.
∀kj /∈ Nj, sel(kj, Nj) = 0 (1.10)
When the economic model predicts no equilibrium, each equilibrium k0, k1, k2 and k3
will be chosen with a probability S(k0, {∅}), S(k1, {∅}), S(k2, {∅}) and S(k3, {∅}). When
the economic model predict multiple equilibria, each equilibrium included in the set of
multiple equilibria will be assigned a probability. In each case, the sum of the probability
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assigned to each case will sum to 1.
3
�
j=0
sel(kj, {∅}) = 1
sel(1, {1, 2}) + sel(2, {1, 2}) = 1
sel(0, {0, 3}) + sel(3, {0, 3}) = 1
(1.11)
With the selection rule, the probability of observing each care arrangements according
to the different sets of Nash equilibrium can be written:
P (kj = 0) = P (Nj = {0}) + sel(0, {0, 3}).P (Nj = {0, 3}) + sel(0, {∅}).P (Nj = {∅})
P (kj = 1) = P (Nj = {1}) + sel(1, {1, 2}).P (Nj = {1, 2}) + sel(1, {∅}).P (Nj = {∅})
P (kj = 2) = P (Nj = {2}) + sel(2, {1, 2}).P (Nj = {1, 2}) + sel(2, {∅}).P (Nj = {∅})
P (kj = 3) = P (Nj = {3}) + sel(3, {0, 3}).P (Nj = {0, 3}) + sel(3, {∅}).P (Nj = {∅})
(1.12)
To be able to implement the model econometrically, we finally need to write each
probability of observing a given care arrangements as a function of the exogenous variables.
To do so, we express the probability of each care arrangement to be a unique Nash
equilibrium given its probability to be a Nash equilibrium, from which we subtract the
probability that it belongs to a set of multiple equilibrium.
P (Nj = {0}) = P (0 ∈ Nj) − P (Nj = {0; 3})
P (Nj = {1}) = P (1 ∈ Nj) − P (Nj = {1; 2})
P (Nj = {2}) = P (2 ∈ Nj) − P (Nj = {1; 2})
P (Nj = {3}) = P (3 ∈ Nj) − P (Nj = {0; 3})
(1.13)
We express the probability of having a set of multiple equilibrium with respect to the
probability of each care arrangement to be a Nash equilibrium.
P (Nj = {1; 2}) = �β1<0,β2<0.[P (0 ∈ Nj) + P (1 ∈ Nj) + P (2 ∈ Nj) + P (3 ∈ Nj) − 1]
P (Nj = {0; 3}) = �β1>0,β2>0.[P (0 ∈ Nj) + P (1 ∈ Nj) + P (2 ∈ Nj) + P (3 ∈ Nj) − 1]
P (Nj = {∅}) = �β1.β2<0.[1 − P (0 ∈ Nj) − P (1 ∈ Nj) − P (2 ∈ Nj) − P (3 ∈ Nj)]
(1.14)
Dummies �β1<0,β2<0, �β1>0,β2>0 and �β1.β2<0 respectively refer to situations when in-
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teractions are symmetric and negative, symmetric and positive, and asymmetric. The
presence of these dummies indicates that the likelihood function will not be differentiable
at the points β1 = 0 and β2 = 0.
We replace in Equation 1.12 the expressions given in Equations 1.7 and 1.13: we can
thus express the probability of each outcome as a function of the exogenous variables, the
selection rule parameters and the parameters α, β, ρ.
P (kj = 0) = F (−α1.X1j, −α2.X2j, ρ) + sel(0, {0, 3}).�β1>0,β2>0.[A − 1]
+ sel(0, {∅}).�β1.β2<0.[1 − A]
P (kj = 1) = F (α1.X1j, −α2.X2j − β2, −ρ) + sel(1, {1, 2}).�β1<0,β2<0.[A − 1]
+ sel(1, {∅}).�β1.β2<0.[1 − A]
P (kj = 2) = F (−α1.X1j − β1, α2.X2j, −ρ) + sel(2, {1, 2}).�β1<0,β2<0.[A − 1]
+ sel(2, {∅}).�β1.β2<0.[1 − A]
P (kj = 3) = F (α1.X1j + β1, α2.X2j + β2, ρ) + sel(3, {0, 3}).�β1>0,β2>0.[A − 1]
+ sel(3, {∅}).�β1.β2<0.[1 − A]
(1.15)
With:
A = P (0 ∈ Nj) + P (1 ∈ Nj) + P (2 ∈ Nj) + P (3 ∈ Nj)
= F (−α1.X1j, −α2.X2j, ρ) + F (α1.X1j, −α2.X2j − β2, −ρ)
+ F (−α1.X1j − β1, α2.X2j, −ρ) + F (α1.X1j + β1, α2.X2j + β2, ρ)
(1.16)
We are able to estimate our parameters α, β, ρ once the selection rule is specified.
Our selection rule is the following : in the absence of equilibrium, we attribute to each
Nash equilibrium a probability to be selected equal to the frequency observed for this
care arrangement in the sample. For multiple equilibra, we attribute to each of the two
possible equilibria a probability of 1/2 to be selected (random equilibrium).
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10.1.B Considering sequentiality
To take into account the potential non-simultaneity of decisions, we provide here an
alternative estimation where the decision of the younger child depends on the decision of
the decision (and the characteristics) of the elder child, which is regarded as given. Table
1.7 presents the results of a Probit estimation at the younger child level in two-child fami-
lies. It shows that the care behavior of the younger and the elder children are positively
correlated: with both definitions of care, when the elder child is caregiver, the probability
of the younger child to be caregiver is higher. The coefficient, however, only reflects a
correlation and illustrates the fact that both children are more frequently providing care
together than alone. In our baseline estimations, we are estimating the probability to
observe a given care arrangement given children and family variables and interactions.
Studing the care arrangements rather than the individual behaviors as dependent varia-
ble makes it possible to disentangle between the effect of the elder child behavior on the
behavior of the younger, and the reverse effect.
98
Informal care arrangements and interactions in France
Table 1.7 – Determinants of care provision by younger children
Younger child is caregiver
Broad definition Restricted definition
Younger child characteristics
Age -0.000 -0.002
(0.001) (0.002)
Woman 0.283∗∗ 0.405∗∗∗
(0.138) (0.154)
Has a spouse -0.283∗ -0.482∗∗∗
(0.164) (0.182)
Has children -0.510∗∗∗ -0.081
(0.185) (0.208)
Active on the labour market -0.521∗∗∗ -0.595∗∗∗
(0.162) (0.168)
Lives outside of the parent’s region -1.241∗∗∗ -1.148∗∗∗
(0.226) (0.294)
Elder child characteristics
Is caregiver (broad) 0.691∗∗∗
(0.167)
Is caregiver (restricted) 0.506∗∗∗
(0.191)
Woman -0.076 0.005
(0.141) (0.153)
Age -0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
Has a spouse 0.477∗∗∗ 0.654∗∗∗
(0.183) (0.211)
Has children 0.007 -0.235
(0.195) (0.217)
Lives outside of the parent’s region 0.342∗∗ -0.098
(0.174) (0.199)
Parental controls Yes Yes
Observations 479 479
Log-likelihood -234.617 -192.560
Sample: 479 younger children in two-child families having a disabled elderly
living in the community.
Source: HSM survey (DREES and INSEE, 2008)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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10.2 Descriptive statistics on the sample
We first provide in Table 1.8 and Table 1.9 the descriptive statistics on the variables
exploited in our estimations.
Table 1.8 – Children characteristics
Caregiver(s):
Total
None Elder
child
Younger
child
Both
children
Age (years)(a)
Elder 49.73 53.02 55.04 52.63 51.63
Younger 45.19 45.49 50.42 47.99 46.68
Has a spouse (%)
Elder 76.40 46.67 80.65 65.79 71.82
Younger 77.20 61.67 56.99 60.53 68.68
Has children (%)
Elder 81.60 70.00 81.72 82.89 80.38
Younger 82.40 70.00 73.12 64.47 76.20
Active on the labour market (%)
Elder 76.80 51.67 56.99 61.84 67.43
Younger 86.00 71.67 59.14 65.79 75.78
The parent does not know Elder 2.80 6.67 5.38 0.00 3.34
the job status (%) Younger 2.80 3.33 1.08 0.00 2.09
Sample: 479 disabled elderly living in the community and having two children over the age of legal
majority.
Source: HSM survey (DREES and INSEE, 2008)
Notes: unweighted frequencies. A caregiver child is a child declared as caregiver by the parent (whatever
the type of care provided) or cohabiting with her parent.
(a) computed for children whose parent answered the question (469 elder, 474 younger children).
Figure 1.3 presents the number of care hours provided by caregiver children for the
activities of daily living. Following the correction made by the Ministry of Health, we
are only able to exploit the volume of care for informal caregivers providing care for
the activities of daily living. This volume of care, though, is not available for all the
children that have been declared caregivers. It is observable only for caregivers whose
parent has been able to declare both the frequency and the number of hours provided at
the frequency. Consequently, there are numerous missing values (61 missing values / 185
caregivers for the activities of daily living). It should be taken into account when reading
the Figure. Figure 1.3 shows that, among children with observed volume of care, younger
children provide on average 20 hours per week while the average volume provided by elder
children is lower (16 hours per week). The heterogeneity in the volume is more important
for younger children, with the first quartile at 5 hours per week (3 for elder children), the
third quartile is at 28 (21 for elder children). More extreme values, however, are observed
among elder children. This short and incomplete description shows that being caregiver
covers a large variety of situations.
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Table 1.9 – Parent and family characteristics
Caregiver(s): Total
None Elder
child
Younger
child
Both
children
Parent characteristics
Age 75.11 80.17 80.47 78.67 77.35
Woman (%) 62.80 70.00 74.19 82.89 69.10
One ADL limitation at least (%) 23.20 21.67 33.33 36.84 27.14
Has the baccalauréat (%) 16.00 3.33 7.53 6.58 11.27
Monthly income ≥ e 1800 (%) 45.20 43.33 33.33 17.11 38.20
Sibling characteristics
Elder = woman, younger = man (%) 20.40 46.67 22.58 31.58 25.89
Elder = man, younger = woman (%) 27.20 15.00 37.63 23.68 27.14
Elder = woman, younger = woman (%) 26.80 23.33 24.73 28.95 26.30
Age gap > 10 years (%) 7.20 21.67 8.60 7.89 9.39
Sample: 479 disabled elderly living in the community and having two children over the age of legal
majority.
Source: HSM survey (DREES and INSEE, 2008)
Notes: unweighted frequencies. A caregiver child is a child declared as caregiver by the parent
(whatever the type of care provided) or cohabiting with her parent.
Figure 1.3 – Volume of care provided by children for the activities of daily living
Sample: 124 children over the age of legal majority declared caregivers for the
activities of daily living by a disabled elderly parent living in the community. Only
children whose parent has been able to quantify the volume of care provided are
included.
Source: HSM survey (DREES and INSEE, 2008)
Notes: “1” refers to the group of elder children and “2” refers to the group of
younger children.
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10.3 Additional results
10.3.A Child proximity and care decisions
In this section, we further explore the effect of the proximity of the child on the decision
to be caregiver, differentiating according to the type of care provided (Table 1.10). As we
are mainly interested in the effect of the inclusion of proximity, we do not differentiate
children according to their rank. Consequently, we do not include the sex composition of
the siblings, the age gap, the job status of the other child nor the interactions.
Living outside of the parent’s region could decrease the probability to be caregiver
for domestic help but could be associated with provision of moral support or material
help. Indeed, moral support and material help do not require the child to be physical
present. A child living far from her parent is likely to compensate the distance with other
types of care (Bonsang, 2007). Moreover, a higher distance between the caregiver and the
individual she is taking care of has been found to increase her willingness to pay for being
replaced by a formal caregiver (Davin et al., 2015).
Table 1.10 shows that living outside of the parent’s region systematically implies a
lower probability to be caregiver, whatever the type of care (though the magnitude of the
effect is lower for material help). Including this variable also cancels the significance of
the effect of the parent’s education level for moral support and material help.
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Table 1.10 – Individual and parental determinants of care provision
Broad definition of care Moral support Domestic help Material help
Child characteristics
Age -0.001 -0.000 -0.001∗ -0.001 -0.001∗∗ -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Woman 0.346∗∗∗ 0.399∗∗∗ 0.288∗∗∗ 0.320∗∗∗ 0.426∗∗∗ 0.507∗∗∗ 0.061 0.062
(0.093) (0.097) (0.095) (0.098) (0.106) (0.113) (0.145) (0.147)
Has a spouse -0.304∗∗∗ -0.216∗ -0.367∗∗∗ -0.303∗∗ -0.449∗∗∗ -0.397∗∗∗ -0.469∗∗∗ -0.442∗∗∗
(0.112) (0.118) (0.114) (0.119) (0.123) (0.133) (0.164) (0.167)
Has children -0.025 -0.038 0.023 0.018 0.034 0.036 -0.223 -0.221
(0.127) (0.134) (0.131) (0.136) (0.145) (0.157) (0.182) (0.185)
Active on the labour market -0.207∗ -0.208∗ -0.108 -0.104 -0.403∗∗∗ -0.446∗∗∗ -0.033 -0.024
(0.108) (0.111) (0.111) (0.113) (0.116) (0.122) (0.167) (0.167)
Lives outside of the parent’s region -1.162∗∗∗ -0.929∗∗∗ -1.573∗∗∗ -0.462∗∗
(0.143) (0.142) (0.235) (0.215)
Parent characteristics
One ADL limitation at least 0.192∗ 0.210∗ 0.108 0.117 0.397∗∗∗ 0.429∗∗∗ -0.123 -0.132
(0.104) (0.108) (0.107) (0.110) (0.113) (0.120) (0.167) (0.169)
Has the baccalauréat -0.412∗∗ -0.261 -0.396∗∗ -0.266 -0.506∗∗ -0.398∗ -0.470∗ -0.383
(0.168) (0.177) (0.174) (0.181) (0.205) (0.222) (0.284) (0.285)
Woman 0.252∗∗ 0.300∗∗∗ 0.224∗∗ 0.258∗∗ 0.288∗∗ 0.367∗∗∗ 0.013 0.044
(0.109) (0.112) (0.112) (0.115) (0.127) (0.135) (0.175) (0.177)
Age 0.017∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009)
Monthly income ≥ e 1800 -0.385∗∗∗ -0.337∗∗∗ -0.354∗∗∗ -0.312∗∗∗ -0.134 -0.076 0.065 0.084
(0.102) (0.106) (0.105) (0.108) (0.113) (0.120) (0.157) (0.158)
Lives without a spouse 0.397∗∗∗ 0.397∗∗∗ 0.350∗∗∗ 0.342∗∗∗ 0.255∗∗ 0.212∗ 0.431∗∗ 0.403∗∗
(0.104) (0.108) (0.107) (0.110) (0.118) (0.125) (0.174) (0.176)
Observations 958 958 958 958 958 958 958 958
Sample: 958 children from two-child families, over the age of legal majority, having a disabled elderly parent living in the community.
Source: HSM survey (DREES and INSEE, 2008)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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10.3.B Change in the definition of disability in the sample
In our baseline sample, individuals are regarded as disabled if they declare they need
to be provided with care by someone else to perform at least one ADL or IADL. We test
here the effects of enlarging our sample to individuals who declare they have restrictions in
the activities of daily living (essential or instrumental). This sample counts 1,550 disabled
elderly having two children. The heterogeneity in the demand for informal care is likely
to be more important in this sample than the our baseline sample. The estimation of our
model on this sample induces a gain of precision in all control variables (child and family
variables), with signs consistent with our baseline findings on control variables. It is the
case for both types of care. Thus, the differentiation of behaviors according to the rank
and the definition of caregiving is much less important than in our baseline estimations.
Regarding interaction coefficients (reported in Table 1.11), they are not significant, in
both definitions. Our baseline results are relevant for the specific case when activity
restrictions generate a demand for human care, but not for the broader case of activity
restrictions in general.
Table 1.11 – Interactions in care provision with an enlarged sample
Broad definition Restricted definition
Elder Younger Elder Younger
Interactions
The other child is caregiver -0.187 0.002 0.292 -0.314
(0.213) (0.225) (0.269) (0.269)
Controls Yes Yes
Correlation coefficient 0.497∗∗ (0.206) 0.315 (0.228)
Log-likelihood -1168.155 -969.845
Observations 1150 1150
Sample: 1,150 disabled elderly living in the community and having two
children over the age of legal majority.
Source: HSM survey (DREES and INSEE, 2008)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Compared to the baseline estimations, these individu-
als are “disabled” in the sense that they have activity restrictions (ADL
or IADL).
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Pay less, consume more?
The price elasticity of home care
for the disabled elderly in France
This chapter was co-authored
with Marianne Tenand.
Summary of the chapter
Little is known about the price sensitivity of demand for home care of the disabled elderly.
We partially fill this knowledge gap by using administrative data on the beneficiaries of the
main French home care subsidy program in a department and exploiting inter-individual
variation in provider prices. We address the potential endogeneity of prices by taking
advantage of the unequal spatial coverage of providers and instrumenting price by the
number of municipalities served by a provider. We estimate a price elasticity of around -
0.4 that is significantly different from both 0 and -1. This less than proportionate response
of consumption to price has implications for the efficiency and redistributive impact of
variations in copayments in home care subsidy schemes.
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Rochaix, Nicolas Sirven, Jérôme Wittwer as well as to two anonymous Referees and the
editorial committee of Health Economics, for their critical reading and suggestions. This
paper also benefited from valuable feedback from the participants of various seminars (at
Hospinnomics, PSE, Liraes and Ined) and several conferences (the 2016 editions of JESF,
CDC Scientific Seminar on Pensions and Aging, ILPN Conference, European Workshop
on Econometrics and Health Economics, EuHEA Conference, HESG Summer Conference,
AFSE Annual Meeting and JMA).
Publication
This Chapter was published in a similar version as:
Roquebert Q, Tenand M. “Pay less, consume more? The price elasticity of home care for
the disabled elderly in France”. Health Economics. 2017; 26: 1162—1174.
It has won the 3rd prize of the International Health Economics Association (iHEA)
Student Prize Committee in the 2018 edition.
106
The price elasticity of home care
Contents of the Chapter
1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
2 Institutional context and demand for home care . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
2.1 The APA program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
2.2 Computation rules of APA subsidies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
2.3 Modeling demand for home care with APA . . . . . . . . . . . 111
3 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
3.1 Administrative data from a Departmental Council . . . . . . . 113
3.2 Sample selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
3.3 Descriptive statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
4 Empirical strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
4.1 A censored measure of home care consumption . . . . . . . . 116
4.2 Econometric specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
4.3 Identification using cross-sectional variations in prices . . . . . 117
4.4 An instrumental variable strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
5 Results and discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
5.1 Main results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
5.2 Further results and robustness checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
5.3 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
7 Appendices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
7.1 Additional information on the data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
7.2 Specifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
7.3 Maximum likelihood estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
7.4 Determinants of the care plan volume and censoring . . . . . 142
7.5 The home care sector in France . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
7.6 Explaining variations in provider prices . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
7.7 Robustness checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
107
Chapter 2
1 Introduction
Like most developed countries, France is facing the ageing of its population: due to
the increase in life expectancy and the advance in age of baby-boomers, the share of the
population above 75 is predicted to grow from 9.0% in 2013 to 17.2% in 2060 (Blanpain
and Buisson, 2016). As healthy years fall short of the life expectancy (Cambois and
Robine, 2017), the number of the elderly needing assistance to perform the activities of
daily living is expected to grow substantially. Most disabled elderly keep on living in the
community rather than entering specialized institutions (Colombo et al., 2011). Besides
medical and nursing care, they are often provided with domestic help and personal care.
Assistance may be provided by relatives (informal care) and also by professional services
(formal care), whose utilization is increasing. In most countries, public policies foster the
utilization of formal home care by subsidizing its consumption. These programs, however,
only partially cover the cost of professional home care and the disabled elderly often bear
non-negligible OOP costs. In France, the average monthly OOP payment for home care
was estimated to be e300 in 2011 (Fizzala, 2016), or over one fifth of the average pension
(Solard, 2015).
We address the following question: how sensitive to price are the disabled elderly when
consuming professional home care? Besides concerns regarding the financial accessibility
of long-term care services, OOP payments raise efficiency issues. As in the health care
context, generous home care subsidies may induce over-consumption and a welfare loss,
while insufficient coverage could have adverse health effects (Stabile et al., 2006; Rapp
et al., 2015; Barnay and Juin, 2016) or induce beneficiaries to substitute home care for
more expensive institutional care (Ettner, 1994; Guo et al., 2015). Uncovering the impact
of OOP price on home care consumption is crucial to design an optimal subsidy policy that
would achieve ex ante insurance of uncertain LTC costs while limiting ex post demand-
side moral hazard (Zeckhauser, 1970; Cutler and Zeckhauser, 2000; Bakx, Chernichovsky,
Paolucci, Schokkaert, Trottmann, Wasem and Schut, 2015). Our paper brings evidence on
this empirical question by estimating the price elasticity of the demand for non-medical
home care services of the disabled elderly, at the intensive margin.
We focus on the French home care scheme targeted to the disabled elderly, the APA
policy. Administrative records of the scheme provide detailed information on home care
consumption and OOP payments of APA beneficiaries, but they are available only at the
local level. We use an original dataset made of the individual records we collected for
the beneficiaries of a given Departmental Council (Conseil départemental). We exploit
inter-individual variations in provider prices to identify consumer price elasticity. Price
endogeneity may arise if APA beneficiaries non-randomly choose their home care provider.
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To address this issue, we exploit the unequal spatial coverage by providers in the depart-
ment. We fit a censored regression model to deal with observational issues and control for
disposable income and other individual characteristics likely to affect the consumption of
home care. Our results indicate a negative price elasticity, with point estimates ranging
from −0.5 to −0.1. According to our favoured estimation, an increase of 10% of the
hourly OOP price would reduce total hours consumed by 4% on average, or 70 minutes
per month for a beneficiary consuming the median monthly volume of 18 hours. Although
confidence intervals are relatively large, we statistically reject a price elasticity of both 0
and −1 in most specifications. We thus conclude to a significant but limited volume effect
of an OOP price variation.
Our paper provides one of the very first estimates of the price elasticity of the demand
for home care services of the disabled elderly. Despite the growing concern about the
financing of long-term care, the impact of OOP payments on the consumption of home
care has been little investigated in the economic literature. A few papers tested for the
effect of benefiting from subsidies on the utilization of paid home care (Coughlin et al.,
1992; Ettner, 1994; Pezzin et al., 1996; Stabile et al., 2006; Rapp et al., 2011; Fontaine,
2012); because of data limitations, they were not able to quantify the price sensitivity.
To our knowledge, the only existing studies addressing this gap in the literature exploit
French data. Using national survey data, Hege (2016) makes assumptions on unobserved
OOP prices and estimates a price elasticity of −0.16. Bourreau-Dubois et al. (2014) use
APA records from a department to observe exact home care prices, as we do, and estimate
an elasticity of −0.55. We use a different, original dataset and propose an instrumental
variable strategy to deal with potential price endogeneity.
Our results entail important policy implications, as home care subsidy schemes are
expanding with population ageing. Home care consumption is found to be price sensitive,
meaning that home care support programs have efficiency implications. Moreover, since
consumption of home care reacts less than proportionately to a price change, home care
subsidies should be regarded as a tool to achieve redistribution from taxpayers to the
disabled elderly and reduce OOP spending on long-term care.
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2 Institutional context and demand for home care
2.1 The APA program
The French APA program aims at fostering the utilization of professional care services
by the elderly requiring assistance in the activities of daily living (household chores, meal
preparation or personal hygiene). The APA policy is established at the national level and
implemented at the departmental level.1 To be eligible, an individual must be at least
60 years-old and recognized as disabled. If she applies to the program,2 she receives at
home a specific assessment from a team managed by the Departmental Council, called the
evaluation team, made of medical professionals (nurses, doctors) and/or social workers.
The evaluation team visits each APA applicant to evaluate her needs of assistance using a
national standardized scale. The applicant is thus assigned a disability group (Groupe Iso-
Ressources, or GIR ). Individuals found to be moderately (GIR-4) to extremely disabled
(GIR-1) are eligible for APA, while the least severely disabled (GIR-5 or -6) are not.
The evaluation team then establishes a “personalized care plan”. This document lists
the activities for which the individual needs assistance and sets the number of hours
necessary to their realization. It gives the maximum number of hours eligible for APA
subsidies of each beneficiary, called the care plan volume.3 Up to the care plan volume,
the OOP price of each hour of care is lowered by the APA subsidy. The beneficiary is free
to consume hours beyond the care plan volume but there are no more subsidies.
When setting the care plan volume, the evaluation team supposedly takes into account
the needs of the beneficiary in terms of assistance with the activities of daily living. By
law, the care plan volume should depend on the administrative disability group. Gender
and age may influence the care plan volume, as they correlate with unobserved health pro-
blems and housekeeping skills. Additionally, even tough matrimonial status and family
structure are not supposed to influence the care plan volume, anecdotal evidence suggests
that the evaluation team takes into account the possible assistance regularly provided by
relatives when establishing the care plan; it appears to depend on departmental orienta-
tions (Billaud et al., 2012). Appendix 7.4 provides additional elements on the set up of
the care plan volume.
1Metropolitan France is divided into 95 departments.
2See the introduction of the thesis for more information on the application process and potential non
take-up.
3The monetary valuation of the care plan volume must not exceed a legal ceiling, which depends on
the disability level. At the end of 2014, the ceiling was e1,313 (resp. e563) per month for GIR -1 (resp.
GIR -4).
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2.2 Computation rules of APA subsidies
For subsidized hours, the APA beneficiary is charged an hourly OOP price that de-
pends on both the provider price for one hour of care, and a copayment rate, increasing
with disposable income. For low-income individuals (below e739 per month at the end
of 2014) the copayment rate is zero, while it reaches 90% for the richest beneficiaries
(monthly income above e2,945). In between the two, the copayment rate is an increasing
linear function of disposable income.4
If the provider chosen by the beneficiary is regulated, then the hourly OOP price is
given by applying the copayment rate to the regulated price charged by the provider.5
For “non–regulated” providers,6 the copayment rate is applied to a lump–sum price to get
the OOP price. This distinction has important implications for what can be known of
beneficiaries’ OOP payments, since Departmental Councils usually keep track only of the
prices of regulated providers.
2.3 Modeling demand for home care with APA
We write the Marshallian demand for professional home care assuming a heterogeneity-
only model (Moffitt, 1986):
h∗i = g(CPi, Îi; Xi) + νi (2.1)
where h∗i is the number of hours of home care consumed by individual i and g(.) denotes
the demand function. Care consumption depends on the consumer (or OOP) price for one
hour of home care, CPi, on the total disposable income available for consumption Îi, and
on individual sociodemographic characteristics, Xi. νi is an individual preference shifter.
With APA, up to the care plan volume denoted h̄i, the hours consumed are subsidized.
The consumer price is CPi = c(Ii)pi, where pi is the hourly provider price for individual
i and the copayment rate ci is a function of individual i’s monetary disposable income:
ci = c(Ii), with c(.) a linear function.
Beyond the care plan volume h̄i, the consumer price equals the full provider price as
4The schedule of APA copayments was substantially reformed in 2016. We describe the pre-reform
schedule.
549 metropolitan Departmental Councils out of the 73 that answered a national survey conducted
in 2012 applied this computation rule (LEDa-LEGOS and CES, 2012; Bourreau-Dubois et al., 2015).
Regulated providers are generally priced by the Departmental Councils.
6It can be either a non-regulated structure (service agréé non-autorisé) or an over-the-counter worker
(gré-à-gré or mandataire). See Appendix 7.5 for more details on the French home care sector.
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there is no APA subsidy any more. The budget constraint is:



Ii = cipih
∗
i + Yi if h
∗
i ≤ h̄i
Ii = cipih̄i + pi(h
∗
i − h̄i) + Yi ⇐⇒ Ii + (1 − ci)pih̄i = pih
∗
i + Yi if h
∗
i > h̄i
where Y denotes the composite good, with price set to 1. The APA program creates
a kink in the budget constraint of the beneficiary (Figure 2.1).7
Figure 2.1 – Budget constraint for home care under the APA program
h*
Y
I
p
+ (1 − c)h̄ I
cp
I
h̄
I + (1 − c)ph̄
Slope : −p
Slope : −cp
As shown by the previous system, when deciding upon an increase in home care con-
sumption beyond h̄i, the individual should take into account not only her monetary dis-
posable income Ii but also the subsidies received on the first h̄i hours of care she has
consumed. Denoting Ĩi = Ii + (1 − ci)pih̄i the “virtual” income of individual i (Moffitt,
7The budget constraint is classically supposed to be saturated. Potential transfers from children to
parents could generate an empirical problem, as we do not observe them. These transfers, however, are
scarce in France and in Europe (see Chapter 1). Another point of discussion is that individuals might
save money in the perspective of inheritance constitution. We could argue that saving money enters the
decision to allocate income in a similar way than the consumption of the composite good.
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1986, 1990), we rewrite the demand function specified in Equation (2.1) as follows:









h∗i = g(cipi, Ii; Xi) + νi if h
∗
i < h̄i
g(pi, Ĩi; Xi) + νi ≤ h̄i ≤ g(cipi, Ii; Xi) + νi if h
∗
i = h̄i
h∗i = g(pi, Ĩi; Xi) + νi if h
∗
i > h̄i
The objective of the paper is to obtain an empirical estimate of the following quantity,
which is the point price elasticity:
dg(CP, Î; X)
dCP
CP
g(CP, Î; X)
3 Data
3.1 Administrative data from a Departmental Council
In France, there is no national survey or administrative data set that provides precise
information on both the OOP payments and the formal home care use of the disabled
elderly. We collected data from one Departmental Council that uses the most frequent
APA subsidy computation rule. We selected a department with demographic characte-
ristics close to the national averages, although its population has higher than average
incomes (Appendix 7.1.A).
Data were collected for every month in 2012-2014. Since within year variation in
provider prices is negligible, we only use data for the month of October,8 when home care
consumption is less likely to be affected by seasonal variations (like public holidays and
visits from children).
3.2 Sample selection
To ensure clean identification, we focus on APA beneficiaries served by a regulated
home care provider for which the provider price is observed: we exclude 23% of benefi-
ciaries of the initial sample as they receive care from other providers. We also exclude
beneficiaries with missing information on subsidized consumption around the month of
interest, so as to limit the risk that unobserved shocks (temporary absences or hospitali-
zations) could bias the estimates.
In addition, we exclude beneficiaries whose copayment rate is zero: their OOP price on
subsidized hours is zero. We also exclude beneficiaries whose copayment is strictly equal
8Averaging consumption and OOP prices on an annual basis would hamper identification by blurring
the true empirical relationship between price and consumption.
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to 90%: the relationship between their disposable income and their copayment rate is not
linear. Indeed, their income being equal or higher than the higher income threshold, their
copayment is capped at 90%. This makes identification more complex. We end up with
8,190 individuals, or about 2,700 per year, representing 51% of the initial sample.9
3.3 Descriptive statistics
Columns [3] and [4] of Table 2.1 describe our estimation sample for October 2014.10
The typical individual is a woman, in her mid-80s and living alone.
Six APA beneficiaries out of ten do not consume their full care plan volume;11 price
sensitivity is one possible candidate to explain part of this high figure. The beneficiaries
that consume their entire care plan volume are supposedly privately financing their ad-
ditional consumption. No public source, at either the departmental or the national level,
provides information on home care consumption beyond the care plan volume. However,
data collected on a large provider operating in a French department show that 17% of
its customers receiving APA consume strictly more than their care plan volume, with a
median “over-consumption” of 1.5 hour per month (Fontaine and Gramain, 2017).
Columns [1] and [2] present the same statistics for two larger populations we selected
our final sample from (all APA beneficiaries / all beneficiaries with a regulated provider).
The last two columns indicate whether our sample and the larger samples differ in statis-
tical terms when they can be compared.12 Differences are significant in terms of income
and disability level, translating into differences in copayment rate and both care plan
volume and value. Implications for the external validity of the analysis will be discussed
in Section 4.
9Appendix 7.1.B provides more details.
10We present the data of October 2014 to draw a better picture of the population of interest. Appendix
7.1.D replicates these statistics for the pooled sample.
11In our data, care plan volume are generally revised every two years; they are thus unlikely to be
driven by actual consumption.
12Information on care plan volume, effective consumption and provider price is not available when the
beneficiary receives care from a non-regulated provider.
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Table 2.1 – Descriptive statistics on the estimation sample and APA beneficiaries (Oct.
2014)
All With an
authori-
zed
provider
Estimation sample Differences
between
samples
Mean Mean Mean Std-dev. P–value
Variable [1] [2] [3] [4] [1] −
[3]
[2] −
[3]
Care plan volume [a] n.a. 21.9 20.5 10.7 n.c. 0.00
Care plan monetary value [b] n.a. e471.7 e455.5 e238.3 n.c. 0.00
Hours effectively subsidized [c] n.a. n.a. 17.7 10.9 n.c. n.c.
Amount of effective subsidies [d] n.a. n.a. e300.8 e201.4 n.c. n.c.
[c] inferior to [a] n.a. n.a. 59.8% - n.c. n.c.
Ratio [c]/[a] n.c. n.c. 85.0% 20.7 pp. n.c. n.c.
Ratio [d]/[b] n.c. n.c. 65.1% 22.2 pp. n.c. n.c.
Individualized income e1,324.5 e1,264.6 e1,315.8 e422.5 0.00 0.00
Co-payment rate 24.4% 22.3% 23.7% 17.3pp. 0.01 0.00
Regulated provider price n.a. e22.2 e22.2 e1.3 n.c. 0.04
Hourly OOP price n.a. e4.9 e5.2 e3.8 n.c. 0.00
Total OOP payments n.a. e84.5 e91.3 e98.6 n.c. 0.00
on subsidized hours
Age n.a. 84.1 84.2 7.4 n.c. 0.29
Women 76.7% 73.8% 74.0% - 0.03 0.76
Disability group 1 (most severe) 1.5% 1.3% 1.2% -
0.00 0.00
Disability group 2 14.5% 13.8% 12.5% -
Disability group 3 21.2% 21.0% 19.6% -
Disability group 4 (moderate) 62.8% 63.9% 66.7% -
100% 100% 100%
Living with a spouse 32.1% 31.0% 33.8% -
0.00 0.00Living alone 66.6% 67.5% 65.6% -
Spouse in institution 1.3% 1.6% 0.6% -
100% 100% 100%
Number of individuals 5486 4199 2862 - -
Number of households n.a. n.a. 2785 - -
Samples: [1]: sample of community-dweller APA beneficiaries in the department; [2]: sample of benefi-
ciaries who receive care, but not necessarily exclusively, from a regulated provider; [3] and [4]: estimation
sample.
Notes: “pp.” stands for percentage points, “n.a.” for “not available”, “n.c.” for “not computable” (avai-
lable information is insufficient). Care plan volume, effective home care consumption, income, subsidies
and total OOP payments are expressed per month.
Tests: P-values from a Student (resp. Pearson χ2) test if variable is binary or continuous (resp. ca-
tegorical). The comparison of the estimation sample with the reference sample ([1] - [2]) excludes the
estimation sample in [1].
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4 Empirical strategy
4.1 A censored measure of home care consumption
APA files register the individual number of home care hours that are charged by
the provider to the Departmental Council or, equivalently, the subsidized hours of home
care. However, we do not observe the total volume of home care consumed by each
APA beneficiary. For the beneficiaries whose recorded consumption equals their care plan
volume (40% of our sample), our measure of home care consumption is then right-censored.
Denote hi the number of home care hours billed to the Departmental Council for
beneficiary i. We observe:



hi = g(cipi, Ii; Xi) + νi if g(cipi, Ii; Xi) + νi < h̄i
hi = h̄i if g(cipi, Ii; Xi) + νi ≥ h̄i
(2.2)
Hence, the parameters of the demand function g(.) can only be identified from infor-
mation relating to the first segment of the budget constraint. For individuals with the
maximum number of billed hours h̄i, the only information we can use is that their demand
is at least as high as this number.13
4.2 Econometric specification
Since the distribution of (observed) home care consumption is slightly skewed, we
assume a log-linear specification of g(.), as follows:
ln(h∗it) = β0 + β1.ln(cit.p
j
it) + β2.ln(Iit) + X
�
it.θ + λt + �it (2.3)
where pjit denotes the hourly price charged by provider j chosen by individual i in
year t14 and λt are year fixed effects. Both price and income are included in log so that
β1 represents the consumer price elasticity and β2 captures the income elasticity of the
demand for home care services. As c(.) is fully linear in income in the sample,15 Equation
2.3 can be rewritten as:
ln(h∗it) = γ0 + β1.ln(p
j
it) + (β1 + β2).ln(Iit) + X
�
it.θ + λt + �it (2.4)
13Appendix 7.3 provides more details.
14All beneficiaries with the same provider are charged the same provider price, before APA copayment
rate applies.
15The relationship between cit and Iit depends on the year the copayment rate was set. We control
for this source of inter- and intra-individual variation in our estimations. Appendix 7.2.A provides more
details.
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Equation (2.4) makes it clear that the income variations identify the empirical income
effect within the APA framework. With APA, any marginal increase in the disposable
income has two effects. First, it increases home care consumption, provided home care
is a normal good (standard income effect). Then, it induces the reassessment of the
copayment rate, which may further affect home care consumption through an increased
OOP price (price effect).
As System (2.2) corresponds to the typical observational scheme underlying censored
regression model, β1 and β2 can be estimated by Maximum Likelihood after making a
parametric assumption on � (Tobit model).16 Our favoured specification though, is a
more flexible version of Equation (2.4). In Equation (2.5), we take as dependent variable
the log-share of the care plan volume consumed by the individual, h∗it/h̄it (call it “relative
consumption”) and include the care plan volume h̄it as a control. Equation (2.4) is nested
in Equation (2.5) and β̃1 can still be interpreted as a price elasticity.
17
ln(h∗it/h̄it) = γ̃0 + β̃1.ln(p
j
it) + (β̃1 + β̃2).ln(Iit) + β̃3.ln(h̄it) + X
�
it.θ̃ + λ̃t + �̃it (2.5)
This specification comes with several advantages. First, it includes h̄it as a control,
which might be a proxy of the unobserved determinants of consumption.18 Technically,
relative home care consumption has a better-behaved distribution than absolute consump-
tion, making parametric estimates more likely to be consistent.19 Its censoring point is
unique (equal to 0), which eases the implementation of the estimation.
Our baseline estimates are obtained fitting a population-average20 censored regression
estimation of Equation (2.5) assuming that:
�̃ | p, I, h̄, X, λ̃ ∼ N (0, σ̃2). (2.6)
4.3 Identification using cross-sectional variations in prices
As suggested by Equations (2.4) and (2.5), the consumer price elasticity of demand is
identified by the cross-sectional variation in provider prices. In the department, there are
28 regulated providers. Each provider price is reassessed every year. In the panel, provider
prices range from e19.35 to e23.50, with an average of e21.8 and a standard-deviation
16Appendix 7.3 derives the maximum likelihood function.
17Appendix 7.2.A provides more details.
18The care plan volume is supposedly based only on the specific activity restrictions of the beneficiary;
but qualitative studies have shown that the evaluation team is likely to take into account additional
characteristics of the individual, such as the informal care she receives (Billaud et al., 2012).
19See Figures 2.3 and 2.4 in Appendix 7.2.B.
20We use the unbalanced sample: selecting individuals staying in the APA programme for three years
would raise additional selection issues.
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of e1.3. As yearly variation in prices was small between 2012 and 2014, most of the price
variation is cross-sectional.21
To get unbiased estimates, the provider price charged to individual i must be uncorrela-
ted with the unobserved factors affecting her home care consumption, �i. Supply-demand
simultaneity may violate this condition (Zhen et al., 2014), but it should be negligible in
our context. Indeed, although each provider is priced by the Departmental Council on
the basis of its average production cost of two years earlier, the pricing process largely
depends on administrative and political considerations (Gramain and Xing, 2012).
The risk of omitted variable biases is more difficult to dismiss. Beneficiaries may
non-randomly select their provider (price) on the basis of some unobservable individual
characteristics such as quality expectations, unobserved health condition or informal care
provision (Billaud et al., 2012). Some sources of price variations can be documented and
are unlikely to be correlated with unobserved determinants of home care consumption
(Appendix 7.6), but it is insufficient to rule out any price endogeneity induced by non-
random provider choice. To address this potential bias, we exploit the unequal spatial
coverage by regulated providers in the department.
4.4 An instrumental variable strategy
We propose to instrument the provider price by the number of municipalities in which
the provider serves APA beneficiaries and estimate an IV-Tobit. To be valid, our instru-
ment must first correlate with the price, conditional on the control variables. Second, it
must be uncorrelated with the unobserved determinants of professional home care con-
sumption.
From a practical standpoint, serving more municipalities translates into higher trans-
portation and coordination costs for a provider.22 Exploiting the service files of a large
French home care provider, Chapter 4 of thus thesis gives an estimate for the travel costs
supported by a given provider, for one hour of intervention. The average value is bet-
ween 6% and 8% of the provider price and is found to vary considerably according to
the type of areas served by the provider. For regulated providers, such costs are partially
incorporated in the price set by the Departmental Council (Gramain and Xing, 2012).
Several public and research reports on the French home care sector have insisted on the
heterogeneity in transportation costs borne by providers and the differences in prices it in-
duces (Aube-Martin et al., 2010; Vanlerenberghe and Watrin, 2014; Branchu et al., 2015;
21On average, provider prices increased by 1.9% between October 2012 and 2013 and by 1.3% between
2013 and 2014.
22Transportation costs here refers to the costs that are paid by the structure and incorporated into the
provider price. It does not take into account potential additional costs paid by professional caregivers
but not reimbursed by the structure (i.e, fees for going away from/back to the caregiver’s own home).
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Garabige et al., 2015).
In our data, as is evidenced by Figure 2.2, the price charged by a given provider and the
number of municipalities in which it operates are positively correlated. The coefficient
correlation is 0.45, significant at the 1% level.23. The IV-Tobit first stage (Table 2.2)
shows that a one standard-deviation increase in the number of municipalities served by
the provider is associated with a 4.9% increase in its price. The F-statistic associated
with this estimate exceeds 143 - a figure far higher than the conventional threshold used
to assess the risk that the instrument is weak (Staiger and Stock, 1997).
A potential threat to the exclusion restriction is that the instrument may correlate
with individual consumption through another channel than the price charged by the pro-
vider. In particular, it would be the case if the number of hours provided by a service
systematically increases its provision costs due to decreasing returns to scale. Apart from
transportation and coordination costs though, the care provision process may be assumed
to exhibit roughly constant returns to scale, as most of the provision costs is made of
caregivers’ wages. The strong association between the price charged by a provider and
its geographical area of operation is thus unlikely to be driven by the volume of care it
delivers.
23When excluding the biggest provider, as is done in Figure 2.2 When it is included, the coefficient
correlation is 0.50, significant at the 1% level.
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Figure 2.2 – Correlation between provider price and number of municipalities served by
the provider
Notes: The number of municipalities served by each provider is constructed
using information on all APA beneficiaries receiving home care from a re-
gulated provider in October 2012, 2013 and 2014. The line is fitted using
all three years of observation. To make the graphical representation more
readable, we excluded the largest provider. With 199 municipalities served
in October 2014, it charged the highest price over the 3 years of observation
(e23.5 in 2014). The positive correlation displayed by the graph is preserved
when we include the largest provider.
5 Results and discussion
5.1 Main results
Table 2.2 presents our main results, obtained on the panel data. The coefficients
displayed give the predicted impact of a marginal (or 0/1) change in a given explanatory
variable on the total, uncensored relative home care consumption. First stage (Panel B)
regresses the log-provider price on the standardized number of municipalities served by
the provider. Column (1) presents Tobit estimates of Equation (2.5). Column (2) presents
the estimates we obtain when the price is instrumented by the number of municipalities
served by the provider.24 We cluster the standard errors at the provider level since our
“treatment” variable, pjit, essentially varies at the provider level (Moulton, 1990; Cameron
and Miller, 2015).
When the provider price is considered as exogenous, the consumer price elasticity
24We use the parametric version of Stata command ivtobit. We thus assume the error terms of the
first-stage and second-stage equations are jointly normally distributed.
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estimate is about −0.45. When using our instrument, the coefficient is slightly lower in
absolute value. The difference between the two is not statistically significant, suggesting
that the potential bias due to non-random provider selection may be limited.25 Overall,
price elasticity estimates are negative, statistically significant, confirming that the disabled
elderly are sensitive to the price of professional home care. Our favoured estimation
(Column (2)), which instruments the price, gives a point estimate of −0.387, or about
−0.4.
The income effect in the APA framework appears negative, but negligible and statisti-
cally not different from zero. Richer APA beneficiaries do not tend to consume more formal
care, all other things being equal. With ˆ̃β1 +
ˆ̃
β2 close to zero, our estimations suggest that
the increase in the copayment rate, induced by an increase in income, compensates for
the standard income effect. We also derive an estimate of the standard income elasticity
β̃2. Both the Tobit and the IV-Tobit give a value of about 0.4, statistically different from
zero. Although this income effect is imprecisely estimated,26 we are able to conclude that
home care is a necessity good for the disabled elderly.
Individuals with a higher care plan volume tend to consume a larger share of their care
plan. For a given disability level, a higher care plan volume could be explained by a lower
provision of informal care. Alternatively, a higher care plan may also have a stronger
prescriptive effect.
As expected, the severly disabled individuals consume relatively more than the benefi-
ciaries with mild to moderate disability, all other factors being equal. Even when control-
ling for the disability level, age retains a significant effect on the consumption on home
care services. Being a woman increases the consumption of professional home care rela-
tive to the care plan volume, by a small but statistically significant amount. Living alone
(spouse in institution or no spouse) increases the amount of professional assistance recei-
ved, consistently with previous works showing the importance of the co-residing spouse
in providing informal care substituting partly for formal home care services.
5.2 Further results and robustness checks
We replicate the estimations on each year separately (Appendix 7.7.A); price elasticity
estimates are found to range from −0.54 to −0.13. Precision is low but we can reject that
the price elasticity is zero (except for 2014)27 or unity.We check our results are robust
25We implement a cluster Bootstrap Hausman test. We cannot reject that the provider price is exoge-
nous (p = 0.88).
26 ˆ̃β2 corresponds to the difference between the empirical income elasticity with APA and the price elas-
ticity estimates; the associated standard error is high (around 0.19), due to the relatively large standard
error of the price elasticity estimate.
27Precision in 2014 is lower, as a provider closed down.
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to the fact that inference relies on a small number of clusters by implementing a cluster
percentile-t bootstrap (Appendix 7.7.B). Statistical significance of the price elasticity is
preserved at the 5% level on the pooled sample.
To investigate the potential heterogeneity in price sensitivity, we estimate the model
interacting the price with the disability level, the income level or the maital status(Table
2.3). A credible IV strategy would require to find an additional instrument for each
interaction term. As Table 2.2 suggests that the bias due to potential price endogeneity is
limited, we fit a simple Tobit model when adding the interaction terms. We expected more
severely disabled individuals to be less price sensitive, but we are not able to detect such an
effect. Price sensitivity is higher for individuals whose income is above the sample median
income. This result echoes Duarte (2012), who finds that higher income individuals are
more price elastic in their medical care consumption. Richer individuals may be more able
to understand the health care system and cost-sharing schedules due to a higher financial
literacy, or they have more outside options. Finally, the price elasticity tend be be lower
(in absolute value) but is not significantly differnt for individuals living alone compared to
those living with a spouse. Thus, the potential provision of informal care — by a spouse
– does not affect the price elasticity estimate.
As a robustness check, we implement an alternative identification strategy (Appendix
7.7.C). We estimate our equation of interest (without instrumenting the price) on the sub-
sample of APA beneficiaries who live in a municipality where a single regulated provider
is found to operate. In a context in which price selection is arguably limited, we find a
price elasticity estimate around -0.5, not statistically different from our main result.
5.3 Discussion
Our results confirm that the consumption of home care of the disabled elderly is
sensitive to the price they pay. Decisions relating to formal home care consumption are
influenced by a trade-off between the OOP price of an extra hour and its marginal value.
Such a pecuniary trade-off has been documented at the extensive margin, as the take-up
of APA benefits is affected by the average subsidy rate in the department (Arrighi et al.,
2015). We find original evidence that the price elasticity of the demand for home care
is seemingly lower than unity at the intensive margin: the adjustment of consumption is
proportionally lower than a given change in price. This implies a positive price elasticity
of OOP expenditures: a decrease in the OOP price should lead to a decrease in total OOP
payments.
The price sensitivity we obtain is of an order of magnitude similar to the estimates
found for health care demand. Although the magnitude of the −0.2 estimate derived
from the Rand Health Insurance Experiment (Manning et al., 1987; Keeler and Rolph,
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1988) is subject to discussion (Aron-Dine et al., 2013), a large literature has confirmed
that medical spending is price-elastic, with price sensitivity varying with the type of care
(Duarte, 2012; Fukushima et al., 2016). Our paper provides interesting evidence that, at
the intensive margin, home care consumption is closer to acute care than to elective care
in terms of price sensitivity.
Our OOP price measure does not take into account possible tax reductions on home
care services, unobserved in the APA records. Without sufficient information to simulate
them, we implicitly assume APA beneficiaries to be sensitive to the “spot” price (Geof-
fard, 2000). We also assume that APA recipients react in the same way to variations in
the copayment rate and in the provider price. If salience differs (Chetty et al., 2009),
implications for the design of the copayment schedule are less straightforward.
In our administrative data, information on family characteristics is poor. Receiving
more informal care has been found to decrease formal care use, both at the extensive and
intensive margins (Van Houtven and Norton, 2004; Bonsang, 2009). Omitting informal
care provision could bias the estimates of our entire set of coefficients. This is all the
more of a concern as the share of (self-declared) APA beneficiaries who declare receiving
some informal help is higher in the department than in the rest of France.28 The existence
and the importance of the bias depend on the relationship existing between the provider
price and the informal care consumed. This relationship is unclear and little documented.
There might be a negative correlation if the provision of informal care leads individuals to
choose a low-price provider; in this case, the more individuals are provided with informal
care, the less they consume formal care and the lower the price they choose. It would thus
lead to underestimate the price-elasticity. On the reverse, the consumption of informal
care could be positively correlated with the price, if individuals delegate to relatives the
low-qualified care (i.e. domestic help) while choosing to be provided with professional care
for tasks requiring more qualification (i.e. personal care). In this case, consumption of
informal care would be associated with a lower formal care use and a higher provider price,
leading to overestimate the price elasticity. As a robustness check, we include as a control
whether the individual receives formal home care during the weekend and public holidays
(Appendix 7.7.D). We hypothesize that individuals not receiving professional home care
over the weekend are more likely to receive assistance from their relatives.29 Receiving
formal care during the weekend is associated with more hours consumed during working
days; reassuringly though, it does not significantly affect the price elasticity estimate.
28Over four-fifths in the department, against 75% in metropolitan France (INSEE-DREES, 2014).
29It is a strong assumption, as (non) consumption during the week-end could be due to other unobserved
variables. For instance, some consumers might not consume during the week-end if the provider is not
available to provide care. Comparing areas with one single provider operating and those with several
providers, though, shows that there is no significant differences in the probability to consume during the
week-end (Table 2.13).
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Finally, external validity of our results should be qualified, as our sample is selected.
First, we focus on individuals living at home; they are expected to have a lower disability
level and more informal care than those living in institutions. Moreover, they have applied
to the APA program and consume formal care, thus being different from community-
dweller individuals that do not apply to the program. From the existing evidence on
the APA take-up, we known that individuals who do not apply tend not to be strongly
disabled, to have preferences for informal care or to have a high income such that the
expected gain from the APA subsidy is low (Chauveaud and Warin, 2005; Ramos-Gorand,
2016). In addition, we focus on a department which is slightly richer than France as a
whole. Overall, with price sensitivity being greater for richer beneficiaries, our estimates
may be an upper bound (in absolute value). Yet the department is reasonably close
to “average France” in terms of other sociodemographic characteristics and most APA
beneficiaries in France receive care from regulated providers (Hege et al., 2014). Finally,
our results are in line with the two available estimates (Bourreau-Dubois et al., 2014;
Hege, 2016), which rely on different estimation strategies and data.
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Table 2.2 – Censored regression estimates of demand for home care hours
Tobit IV–Tobit
(1) (2)
Panel A: Second stage Dependent variable: relative consumption h∗/h̄ (log)
Price (log) -0.450∗∗ -0.387∗∗
(0.181) (0.192)
Disposable income (log) -0.010 -0.010
(0.008) (0.008)
Care plan volume (log) 0.040∗ 0.040∗
(0.023) (0.023)
Woman 0.029∗∗ 0.030∗∗
(0.014) (0.014)
Age: 60–69 -0.124∗∗∗ -0.123∗∗∗
(0.047) (0.047)
Age: 70–79 -0.042∗∗ -0.042∗∗
(0.017) (0.017)
Ref: age: 80-89
Age: 90 or older 0.051∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.015)
Disability group: 1 (most severe) 0.154∗∗∗ 0.153∗∗∗
(0.057) (0.057)
Disability group: 2 0.027 0.027
(0.022) (0.022)
Ref: disability group: 3
Disability group: 4 (moderate) 0.008 0.009
(0.012) (0.012)
Living with no spouse 0.107∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.013)
Spouse receives APA 0.036 0.037
(0.034) (0.034)
Spouse in institution 0.170∗ 0.170∗
(0.095) (0.094)
Ref: living with non–APA spouse
Constant 1.225∗∗ 1.032∗
(0.556) (0.592)
Panel B: First stage Dependent variable: provider price p (log)
Number of municipalities (std.) 0.049∗∗∗
(0.004)
F statistic 143.98
Observations 8190 8190
Censored observations 39.6% 39.6%
Number of clusters 28 28
AIC 11454 -22049
BIC 11644 -21860
Sample: Pooled samples of APA beneficiaries in October 2012, 2013 and 2014.
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the provider level; ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All specifications include year fixed effects, dummies for the year in which the copayment
rate was computed as well as dummies for the year the latest plan was decided upon.
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Table 2.3 – Price elasticity of home care by disability level, income and marital status
Dependent variable: relative consumption h∗/h (log)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Price (log) -0.450∗∗ -0.323 -0.446∗∗ -0.507∗∗∗
(0.181) (0.236) (0.178) (0.194)
Price (log) × disability group 4 (moderate) -0.190
(0.270)
Price (log) × income above median -0.019∗∗∗
(0.006)
Price (log) × lives alone 0.090
(0.186)
Disposable income (log) -0.010 -0.010 0.011 -0.010
(0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008)
Observations 8190 8190 8190 8190
Censored observations 39.6% 39.6% 39.6% 39.6%
Number of clusters 28 28 28 28
AIC 11454 11453 11439 11454
BIC 11643 11642 11629 11643
Sample: Pooled samples of APA beneficiaries in October 2012, 2013 and 2014.
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the provider level; ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Pooled data from October 2012, 2013 and 2014. Estimation of
Tobit model by Maximum Likelihood. All specifications include as controls the care plan
volume, sociodemographic characteristics, year fixed effects, dummies for the year in which the
copayment rate was computed as well as dummies for the year the latest plan was decided
upon.
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6 Conclusion
This paper estimates the consumer price elasticity of the demand for professional home
care services of the disabled elderly benefiting from the French APA program. Our results
suggest this parameter is about −0.4, with point estimates statistically different from zero
and unity in absolute value.
Our findings pave the way for several policy implications. As the disabled elderly are
sensitive to the price of care, the copayment rates in home care subsidy programs entail
allocative and dynamic efficiency issues. Given the low value of the price elasticity, the
generosity of home care subsidies also has substantial redistributive effects from taxpayers
to the disabled elderly.
While remaining cautious regarding the external validity of the results, our estimates
can be used to discuss the effects of potential reforms of home care subsidies. The decrease
of copayment rates enacted by the 2016 APA reform, higher for low-income recipients,
should reduce overall OOP expenses on professional home care of current APA recipients,
while having a limited volume effect.
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7 Appendices
7.1 Additional information on the data
7.1.A Comparison of the department with metropolitan France
Table 2.4 compares the department studied to metropolitan France. We use either
administrative sources ([A]: INSEE et al. (2013); [B]: INSEE (2014); [D]: DREES (2013))
or survey data ([C]: INSEE-DREES (2014)).
Column [1] gives descriptive statistics on metropolitan France while Column [2] focuses
on the department studied. Column [2] reports intervals around the true department value
to preserve its anonymity. Bounds are computed so that 20% of the French departments
closest to the department of interest (weighting by the size of the departmental population
aged 60 or more) have a value lying in the interval.30 If the department is located in the
bottom quintile, we report as a lower bound the minimum value observed across French
departments for the variable; similarly, when the department ranks in the top quintile,
the upper bound we report is the maximum value observed in metropolitan France.
The third column tests the significance of the differences between the first two columns.
For statistics computed using exhaustive administrative sources ([A], [B] and [D]), we test
whether the department population can be considered as a random draw from the French
metropolitan population. When using survey data ([C]), the tests of difference compare
the sample of the respondents of the department with the respondents of the rest of
France.
Although differences are quasi-systematic in statistical terms, the selected department
has sociodemographic characteristics close to that of France overall. Our selected depart-
ment is however richer than the rest of France: it has a higher share of households subject
to the income tax and a lower poverty rate in the 75+ population, although the median
taxable income in the department is only slightly higher than in France. Albeit the pre-
valence of functional limitations in the 60+ population is similar in the department and
in the rest of France, the rate of APA beneficiaries is slightly higher in our department.
This possibly reflects local variations in the way the APA policy is implemented (Billaud
et al., 2012; Arrighi et al., 2015).
30INSEE et al. (2013) directly provides the deciles of the taxable income distribution in the metropolitan
French population aged 75 or more. The department is found to be richer than the 40% least wealthy
departments, but poorer than the 40% richest departments. We use the 4th and 6th deciles of the national
distribution to bound the median taxable income observed in the department studied.
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Table 2.4 – Descriptive statistics for department studied and metropolitan France
Metropolitan
France
Department Difference
(p. value)
Source
[1] [2] [1] − [2]
General population
Households subject to income tax 58.2% [61.9%–75.1%] 0.00 [A]
60+ population/total population 24.4% [23.8%–26.3%] 0.00 [B]
Elderly population (60+)
Average age 71.8 [71.3–71.7] 0.00
[C]
Health status (functional limitations)
0.48
Level 1 (least severe) 64.9% [63.9%–66.2%]
Level 2 21.4% [20.1%–21.0%]
Level 3 7.7% [7.2%–7.8%]
Level 4 (most severe) 6.0% [6.3%–7.0%]
100% 100%
Poverty rate in 75+ population 8.9% [6.9%–7.9%] 0.00
[A]
Median taxable income (75+ households) e19,536 [e17,380–
e22,050]
n.c.
Rate of APA beneficiaries 7.8% [8.1%–9.1%] 0.00
[D]
At–home recipients/all APA beneficiaries 58.7% [56.1%–60.6%] 0.00
At–home APA beneficiaries
Woman 73.7% [71.7%–72.8%] 0.00
[D]
Age groups
n.c.
Age 60-74 12.7% [11.2%–12.7%]
Age 75-79 13.6% [13.8%–14.6%]
Age 80-84 23.9% [23.5%–24.4%]
Age 85+ 49.7% [49.2%–51.0%]
100% 100%
Living arrangements
0.88 [C]
Living alone 55.3% [54.7%–56.9%]
Living with her spouse 30.4% [27.7%–32.7%]
Living with a relative other than
her spouse
14.3% [9.5%–12.5%]
100% 100%
Disability group
n.c.
[D]
Disability group 1 (most severe) 2.4% [1.7%–2.1%]
Disability group 2 16.8% [14.1%–15.6%]
Disability group 3 22.1% [20.0%–21.7%]
Disability group 4 (moderate) 58.8% [60.5%–64.5%]
100% 100%
Amount of effective subsidies e361.1 [e329.1–e350.5] n.c.
Sources: [A]: INSEE et al. (2013); [B]: INSEE (2014); [C]: INSEE-DREES (2014) - APA benefit is
self-declared. Rate of spousal co-residence may be underestimated; [D]: DREES (2013)- Administrative
files on APA beneficiaries in 2013, all French departments. Decomposition by sex and age (resp. by
disability level) not available in 21 (resp. in 5) departments.
Notes: Column [2] reports intervals around the true department value to preserve its anonymity. Bounds
are computed so that 20% of the French departments closest to the department of interest (weighting by
the size of the departmental population aged 60 or more) have a value lying in the interval.
Tests: n.c. stands for “not computable”. P-value from a Student (resp. Pearson χ2) test for binary
(resp. categorical) variables.
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7.1.B Sample selection
This Appendix aims at documenting the selection steps the data from October 2014
have gone through. We follow the same steps to construct the samples of October 2012
and 2013. The percentages of individuals selected at each step are very similar to what
is found for 2014 and are available upon request.
The initial number of beneficiaries is considered to be 5,486.31 Table 2.5 sums up the
selection steps.
Table 2.5 – Sample selection steps
Recipients with a regulated provider at least
All Recipients effectively consuming care in the month
All “Stable” recipients
All Recipients consuming only from
All one regulated provider
All Recipients with
0 < ci < 90%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Number 5,486 4,475 4,199 3,527 3,327 2,862
% of previous step - 81.6% 93.8% 84.0% 94.3% 86.1 %
% of initial sample 100% 81.6% 76.5% 64.3% 60.6% 52.2%
Notes: “Stable” APA recipients in October 2014 are defined as those for which information is available
also for the months of September and November 2014. For additional 63 individuals (not in the numbers
here above), the administrative files contain no information on the copayment rate or or the consumption
of home care hours, or are inconsistent with national APA legislation.
To observe precisely both the OOP price and the number of hours that are effecti-
vely consumed and subsidized, we retain the beneficiaries receiving care from a regulated
provider. They represent the majority of APA recipients in the department (more than
4/5).
Among them, about 6% have no actual consumption of home care recorded in the files.
This might be explained by temporary absences (like hospitalizations) or disruptions (e.g.
visits from relatives, who replace temporarily professional home care services by providing
informal care). As the outcome of interest is missing, we drop these observations. Another
15% of APA recipients with a regulated provider have missing information on subsidized
care consumption for the preceding or the following month. We choose to drop them
31For October 2014, administrative records indicate that 5,549 beneficiaries were receiving APA; but
for 61 individuals, essential information on subsidized hours, copayment rate or on matrimonial status
was missing or inconsistent. These individuals are presumably former APA recipients not yet erased from
the files. For 2 additional individuals, the monetary value of the care plan was beyond the national legal
ceiling, signaling a probable error in the records. We dropped these 63 observations from our sample.
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to avoid potential unobservable shocks likely to bias our estimations. The remaining
individuals can be regarded as “stable”.
Among beneficiaries actually receiving care from a regulated provider at least, less
than 6% receive care from a secondary provider.32 As we generally do not observe care
consumption from the secondary provider nor its price,33 we drop multiple-provider indi-
viduals.
Beneficiaries with income below a certain threshold have a 0% copayment rate: their
OOP price is zero. Our log-log specification cannot be estimated on these observations. In
addition, so as to make the relationship between the consumer price and the provider price
fully linear in disposable income (see Appendix 7.2.A), we retain only those individuals
with a copayment rate strictly below 90%. These two income groups represent respectively
12.7% and 1.3% of the remaining 3,327 beneficiaries.
We end up with a sample that represents 52% of total at-home APA recipients of the
department.
A Heckman-type model would allow to take into account the selection of our sample
on both observable and unobservable factors affecting the demand for home care. But
we do not have any good instrument at hand to construct an estimator that would not
entirely rely on a parametric assumption. We choose to estimate our parameters of interest
directly on the selected sample. Such a choice imposes to remain cautious about the
external validity of our estimates, as discussed in Section 5.3 of the paper.
32The majority of these beneficiaries receive additional care from an over-the-counter worker (see
Section 7.5 for more details on the different types of home care providers). Over-the-counter workers
are generally cheaper and more flexible than home care structures. 7 individuals receive home care from
a second regulated provider. Theoretically, there might be a third case: beneficiaries could also com-
plement the care provided by a regulated structure with care provided by a non-regulated structure.
Our files do not allow us to identify such cases; we believe they are marginal, as care provision by non-
regulated structures is rare (only 6% of beneficiaries with no regulated provider receive home care from
a non-regulated structure).
33Even if we had all necessary information, dealing with the simultaneity of consumption decisions
would have made our empirical strategy considerably more complex.
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7.1.C Imputation of couples of APA beneficiaries
The data we collected indicate when a beneficiary lives with a partner, but we do not
directly know whether the partner also receives APA. Having an APA-recipient spouse may
correlate with one’s own home care consumption; failing to control for such a characteristic
may bias our estimates.
To identify potential couples in our sample, we checked whether each individual could
be matched with another recipient of the opposite sex, recorded as living with a spouse,
with exactly the same income34 and residing in the same municipality. If two individuals
match, we assume they belong to the same household: our estimations will control for the
fact of having a spouse receiving APA.
The matching procedure may fail for individuals whose copayment rate is 0%. The
reported disposable income is the same for all such individuals, be they actual spouses
or not. The same pitfall applies for individuals whose copayment rate is 90%. In these
cases, the Departmental Council simply records the lower or upper income threshold of the
APA copayment schedule. In October 2014, only 16 individuals were not matched for this
reason. But all our estimations rely on the sample of individuals with a copayment rate
strictly between 0 and 90%, for whom the matching procedure is systematically successful.
There would be a risk to match people who are not partners if among a municipa-
lity, several individuals have the same income. Empirically, it is never the case case for
individuals whose copayment is comprised between 0% and 90%, as the copayment and
income reports are really precise (taking into account pensions as well as savings). It is
only the case for individuals having a zero or 90% copayment rate who are excluded from
the matching and estimation procedures.
7.1.D Descriptive statistics on the pooled sample
Table 2.6 replicates Columns (3) and (4) of Table I of the paper, by presenting the
descriptive statistics on the pooled sample (and not on the 2014 sample only).
The pooled sample we derive our baseline estimates from is an unbalanced panel. In
this sample, 26% of beneficiaries are present all three waves; another 26% are present
only in two waves; finally, 48% are only present in one wave.35 Focusing on the sample
of beneficiaries in October 2014, we see that the longer the individual has been receiving
APA, the older she is; this translates into a higher proportion of women, who have a
longer life-expectancy, and a lower proportion of beneficiaries with a spouse alive among
34The APA copayment schedule takes into account the household income. See Appendix 7.2.A.
35This does not mean that the typical APA recipient benefits from the scheme less than one year. For
individuals observed only in 2012, for example, we do not know whether they were receiving APA one
year or two years before. Average duration of APA benefits is estimated to be around 4 years (Debout,
2010).
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Table 2.6 – Descriptive statistics on the pooled sample (2012-2014)
Mean Std-dev.
Variable [1] [2]
Care plan volume [a] 20.9 10.7
Care plan monetary value [b] e456.1 e235.8
Hours effectively subsidized [c] 18.1 10.8
Amount of effective subsidies [d] e303.1 e199.2
[c] inferior to [a] 60.4% -
Ratio [c]/[a] 85.6% 19.8pp.
Ratio [d]/[b] 65.5% 21.7pp.
Individualized income e1,301.5 e415.6
co–payment rate 23.8% 17.2pp.
Provider price e21.8 e1.3
OOP price e5.2 e3.8
Total OOP payments on subsidized hours e91.6 e95.2
Age 84.0 7.3
Woman 73.2% -
Disability group 1 (most severe) 1.2% -
Disability group 2 12.8% -
Disability group 3 20.2% -
Disability group 4 (moderate) 65.8% -
100%
Lives with a spouse 33.8% -
Lives alone 65.6% -
Spouse in institution 0.6% -
100%
Number of individuals 8190 -
Notes: “pp.” stands for percentage points. Care plan volume and effective home
care consumption are expressed in hours per month; income, subsidies and total OOP
payments are expressed in euros per month. Sample from October 2012, 2013 and 2014.
the beneficiaries present in two or three waves. Those beneficiaries tend to be more
disabled; they have, on average, a higher care plan volume and a higher number of hours
subsidized by the APA scheme (consumption relative to the care plan volume being also
higher). On the contrary, we do not see any difference in average provider and OOP
prices, nor in income.
When using the unbalanced sample, we do not select a specific population (the more
recent entrants into the APA scheme that are going to be present in years 2012 to 2014);
the shortcoming of such a choice, however, is that the individuals who have been present
in several waves weigh more in the estimation than single-observation individuals. The
cross-sectional estimates presented in Appendix 7.7.A show that the magnitude of the
price elasticity estimate does not change substantially when replicating our estimations
using the sample of beneficiaries present in October of either 2012, 2013 or 2014.
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7.2 Specifications
7.2.A Income and copayment rate issues in the empirical specifications
In Section 4.2 of the paper, when taking the absolute consumption as the dependent
variable, our econometric specification is stated as follows:
ln(h∗it) = γ0 + β1.ln(p
j
it) + (β1 + β2).ln(Iit) + X
�
it.θ + λt + �it (2.7)
To ensure a clean identification of the parameters, two features of the data must be
taken into account. First, the disposable income recorded in the data at time t is not
the current value of income but the income when the copayment rate was computed or
last revised, denoted Iobsit . We express disposable income at time t as: Iit = ρitI
obs
it , with
ρit the rate of increase of individual disposable income between time t and the year i’s
last copayment rate was computed. As the rate of increase in disposable income ρit is
not directly observable, we include a dummy �dit equal to one when i’s copayment rate
(observed in t) was last revised in year d. Dummy coefficients should capture the rate of
increase in income between years d and t.36 In our data, most copayment rates were last
computed between 2010 and 2014; for a few observations though, the latest computation
of the copayment rate is older (d = 2002, ..., 2014).
Second, the copayment rate is set to be strictly proportional to the disposable income
at the time the latest personalized care plan was defined, Iobsit , according to the following
function:
cit =
0.9
2MTP Dit
Iobsit
where MTP Dit is the value of a particular disability allowance (Majoration pour Tierce-
Personne) the year the copayment rate was last computed for individual i observed at
time t. For a given observed income, the copayment might differ according to the year d
when the copayment rate was last computed. Year dummies �dit, d = 2002, ..., 2014 thus
additionally control for inter-individual and intra-individual variation in this parameter.
For 2% of our sample, the relationship between the income and the copayment rate
does not respect the legal formula used to compute the copayment rate. After a careful
examination of the data, we hypothesize that most of these errors occurred when the
copayment rate was computed; conversely, we assume the values of income and copayment
rate are well recorded. We add a dummy variable �eit signaling whether the observation
36We implicitly assume the rate of increase in disposable income to be identical for two individuals
observed a given year, whose personalized plans were decided upon the same year d. Retirees’ income is
mostly made of pension benefits (Deloffre, 2009), which are reevaluated every year following the inflation
rate. It remains a strong assumption given the heterogeneity in income composition across the income
distribution.
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is affected by such a calculation error. The full equation to be estimated is then:
ln(h∗it) = γ0 + β1.ln(p
j
it) + (β1 + β2).ln(I
obs
it ) +
2014
�
d=2002
ξd.�dit + ζ.�
e
it + X
�
it.θ + �it (2.8)
Finally, note that our econometric specification includes disposable income and not
income per se. In the APA scheme, disposable income is defined as the individualized
income37 minus an amount equal to 0.67 × MTP Dit (e739 per month for an individual
whose income and copayment rate was last reassessed in 2014). It roughly equals the old-
age minimum income allowance. This amount may be regarded as the minimum income
that will ensure the individual can satisfy her basic consumption needs: the individual
trades off home care consumption for other consumption goods only when deciding upon
the allocation of the part of her income in excess of the minimum income allowance.
7.2.B Specification with relative consumption
When using the specification with relative consumption, we consider as the dependent
variable the share of the care plan that is effectively consumed by the individual, h∗it/h̄it
(this is the ratio we call the “relative consumption”).
Empirically, we take the log of the ratio and estimate the following specification:
ln
�
h∗it/h̄it
�
= γ̃0 + β̃1.ln(p
j
it) + (β̃1 + β̃2)ln(I
obs
it ) + β3.ln(h̄it)
+
2014
�
d=2002
ξ̃d.�dit + ζ̃.�
e
it + X
�
it.θ̃ + λ̃t + �̃it (2.9)
The dependent variable is still censored when individuals fully consume their care
plan volume (exact volume or more), but the censoring point now equals ln(h∗it/h̄it) =
ln(1) = 0. It is the same for all beneficiaries, whatever the volume of the care plan.
37Individualized income equals the individual’s monetary income when the beneficiary has no spouse
alive; it is equal to the household monetary income divided by 1.7 when the beneficiary has a spouse
alive. The consumption unit attributed to the second adult of the household follows the Oxford (or
“old OECD”) scale (OECD, 2013). Compared to the OECD-modified scale, which is nowadays the most
frequently used in France, using the Oxford scale to compute APA individualized income implies that the
economies of scale in a household with a disabled elderly are lower than in other households.
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Equation (2.9) is equivalent to:
ln(h∗it) − ln(h̄it) = γ̃0 + β̃1.ln(p
j
it) + (β̃1 + β̃2)ln(I
obs
it ) + β̃3.ln(h̄it)
+
2014
�
d=2002
ξ̃d.�dit + ζ̃.�
e
it + X
�
it.θ̃ + λ̃t + �̃it
ln(h∗i ) = γ̃0 + β̃1.ln(p
j
it) + (β̃1 + β̃2)ln(I
obs
it ) + (β̃3 + 1).ln(h̄it)
+
2014
�
d=2002
ξ̃d.�dit + ζ̃.�
e
it + X
�
it.θ̃ + λ̃t + �̃it (2.10)
In Equation (2.5), β̃1 can thus be interpreted as the price elasticity of demand. The
equation presented in the previous section, Equation (2.8), is nested in this equation. It
would be equivalent to Equation (2.10) if we imposed the constraint that β̃3 = −1.
The specification with relative consumption comes with several advantages. First, it
includes the care plan volume as a control, which might be a proxy of the unobserved
determinants of consumption. Second, relative consumption is a better-behaved outcome
than absolute consumption: its distribution is closer to a normal (Figures 2.3 and 2.4)
and the consistency of Tobit estimates requires the normality of the error term. Finally,
it enables us to overcome the limitation of having an individual-specific censoring point:
it eases the implementation of the estimations.
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Figure 2.3 – Distribution of absolute home care consumption, by disability level
Sample: Estimation sample (data from October 2012, 2013 and 2014; 8,190
individuals). Sub-sample size: N=1,145 in GIR 1 or 2 (most severe disability
levels); N=1,655 in GIR 3; N=5,390 in GIR 4 (least severe disability level).
Notes: The “GIR” corresponds to the official disability level of APA benefi-
ciaries. The dashed vertical line indicates the pooled sample median value of
home care consumption.
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Figure 2.4 – Distribution of relative home care consumption, by disability level
Sample: Estimation sample (data from October 2012, 2013 and 2014; 8,190
individuals). Sub-sample size: N=1,145 in GIR 1 or 2 (most severe disability
levels); N=1,655 in GIR 3; N=5,390 in GIR 4 (least severe disability level).
Notes: Relative home care consumption designates the ratio hi/h̄i. The“GIR”
corresponds to the official disability level of APA beneficiaries. The solid ver-
tical line at 1 indicates the censoring point of relative consumption.
7.3 Maximum likelihood estimation
The objective of this appendix is twofold. First, it provides the expression of the
likelihood function we maximize to derive our baseline estimates (Tobit estimation). Se-
cond, it shows that, within the framework proposed by Moffitt (1986), the censoring of
the measure of consumption at the kink and beyond does not prevent the identification
of the sample average price elasticity of demand, conditional on some assumptions on the
stability of individual preferences.
To keep notations simple and concise, we ignore the time dimension (subscript t and
year dummies are not included) and consider home care consumption in level when deri-
ving the likelihood function (while we include its log in the empirical specification).
7.3.A General setting
The demand for home care with the kinked budget constraint generated by APA writes:









h∗i = g(cipi, Ii; Xi) + νi if h
∗
i < h̄i
g(pi, Ĩi; Xi) + νi ≤ h̄i ≤ g(cipi, Ii; Xi) + νi if h
∗
i = h̄i
h∗i = g(pi, Ĩi; Xi) + νi if h
∗
i > h̄i
(2.11)
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with νi an individual preference shifter. We denote:
ψ a set of parameters characterizing the function g(.);
κ a set of parameters characterizing the distribution of the error term ν;
S1 the left-hand side segment of the budget constraint: i ∈ S1 ⇐⇒ h
∗
i < h̄i;
S2 the right-hand side segment of the budget constraint: i ∈ S2 ⇐⇒ h
∗
i > h̄i;
K the kink of the budget constraint: i ∈ K ⇐⇒ h∗i = h̄i.
7.3.B Observational scheme with censoring
With hi the consumption in the data and h
∗
i the true consumption, our observational
scheme is:
hi =



h∗i if h
∗
i < h̄i
h̄i if h
∗
i ≥ h̄i
(2.12)
From Systems 2.11 and 2.12, we know that:
1. For all individuals i such that hi < h̄i, we know that hi = h
∗
i ; thus we have h
∗
i < h̄i
(i ∈ S1):
hi = g(cipi, Ii; Xi) + νi < h̄i
2. For individuals i such that hi = h̄i, we know that h
∗
i ≥ h̄i; these individuals can be
split in two different sub-groups:
(a) Individuals i such that h∗i = h̄i (i ∈ K); then:



g(cipi, Ii; Xi) + νi ≥ h̄i
g(pi, Ĩi; Xi) + νi ≤ h̄i
(b) Individuals i such that h∗i > h̄i (i ∈ S2); then:



g(cipi, Ii; Xi) + νi > h̄i
g(pi, Ĩi; Xi) + νi > h̄i
Thus, all censored observations (i ∈ S2 or i ∈ K) have in common the fact that:
g(cipi, Ii; Xi) + νi ≥ h̄i
We can thus write:
hi =



g(cipi, Ii; Xi) + νi if g(cipi, Ii; Xi) + νi < h̄i
h̄i if g(cipi, Ii; Xi) + νi ≥ h̄i
(2.13)
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which corresponds to the usual censored regression model setting.
The individual contributions to the likelihood function are derived from this setting.
Denote f(.|ci, pi, Ii, h̄i, Xi) the conditional density function of ν and F (.|ci, pi, Ii, h̄i, Xi)
its conditional cumulative distribution function. Then the likelihood function writes:
L(ψ, κ) =
n
�
i=1
�
f
�
hi − g(cipi, Ii; Xi)|ci, pi, Ii, h̄i, Xi
�
�
I[hi<h̄i]
×
��
1 − F
�
h̄i − g(cipi, Ii; Xi)|ci, pi, Ii, h̄i, Xi
�
��
I[hi=h̄i]
In our setting, the censoring of the dependent variable exactly at the kink prevents us
from distinguishing between the individuals who consume exactly at the kink and those
who actually locate on the right-hand side segment of the budget constraint. Interestingly,
it does not prevent the identification of our parameters of interest (which relate to function
g(.)), although it comes at a cost in terms of precision. Assuming some stability of
individual preferences,38 we can interpret the price elasticity estimated using information
relating to the left-hand side of the kink as the price sensitivity of demand along the entire
budget constraint.
Weaker assumptions on individual preferences would not undermine the identification
of the price sensitivity for the selected sample of APA beneficiaries consuming less than
their care plan volume. However, if the underlying data generating process actually
changes at the kink, censored regression methods would not adequately correct for the
bias induced by the non-observability of the individuals consuming at the kink or beyond.
7.3.C Likelihood of our sample
As explained in Section 4.2 of the paper, we assumed the following specification for
the demand for home care:39
ln(h∗i ) = γ0 + β1.ln(p
j
i ) + (β1 + β2).ln(Ii) + X
�
i.θ + �i
We assume a normal distribution for the idiosyncratic shock �:
� | p, I, X ∼ N (0, σ2)
38 Moffitt (1986) assumes the functional form of g(.) is invariant to changes in consumer price and
income.
39Again, for the sake simplicity, we do not include in the expressions provided in this Appendix the
full set of dummies we actually include in our specifications to control for both the unobserved increase
in income and the legal relationship between the copayment rate and disposable income (see Appendix
7.2.A).
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Our likelihood function thus writes:
L(β, γ, θ, σ) =
n
�
i=1
� 1
σ
φ
� ln(hi) − γ0 − β1.ln(p
j
i ) − (β1 + β2).ln(Ii) − X
�
i.θ
σ
�
�I[hi<h̄i]
×
��
1 − Φ
� ln(h̄i) − γ0 − β1.ln(p
j
i ) − (β1 + β2).ln(Ii) − X
�
i.θ
σ
�
��I[hi=h̄i]
where φ(.) (resp. Φ(.)) the conditional density (resp. cumulative distribution) function
of a standardized normal variable.
When using the specification with the relative consumption, we have:
ln
�
h∗i /h̄i
�
= γ̃0 + β̃1.ln(p
j
i ) + (β̃1 + β̃2).ln(Ii) + β̃3.ln(h̄i) + X
�
i.θ̃ + �̃i
Similarly, we assume a normal distribution for the idiosyncratic shock �̃:
�̃ | p, I, X, h̄ ∼ N (0, σ̃2)
The likelihood function writes:
L̃(β̃, γ̃, θ̃, σ̃) =
n
�
i=1
� 1
σ̃
φ
� ln(h∗i /h̄i) − γ̃0 − β̃1.ln(p
j
i ) − (β̃1 + β̃2).ln(Ii) − β̃3.ln(h̄i) − X
�
i.θ̃
σ̃
�
�I[hi/h̄i<1]
×
��
1 − Φ
� ln(h∗i /h̄i) − γ̃0 − β̃1.ln(p
j
i ) − (β̃1 + β̃2).ln(Ii) − β̃3.ln(h̄i) − X
�
i.θ̃
σ̃
�
��I[hi/h̄i=1]
Consistent estimators of β1, β2 and θ (respectively of β̃1, β̃2, β̃3 and θ̃) can be derived as
the arguments of the maximization of the log-likelihood function, provided it is concave.40
In order to derive the likelihood function when taking the log-absolute consumption
as the dependent variable, we must assume the censoring point h̄i does not depend on the
error term, �i. In other words, the individual censoring point is assumed to be exogenous,
conditional on the observable variables. This assumption is discussed in the next Section
and is not needed when we take the log-relative consumption as the dependent variable.
40Similarly, though with a little more work, we could derive the likelihood function of the IV-Tobit
model. In the version we estimate (using Stata command ivtobit), the error terms of the first-stage and
second-stage equations are assumed to be jointly normally distributed.
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7.4 Determinants of the care plan volume and censoring
When taking the log-absolute consumption as the dependent variable, the Maximum
Likelihood function (Appendix 7.3) is derived assuming the individual censoring point,
defined by h̄i, is exogenous conditional on explanatory variables. In addition, consistency
of estimates relies on the additional assumption that the provider price pij is exogenous.
When estimating Equation (2.7) (Appendix 7.2.A), one particular concern is that the
provider price and the care plan volume are correlated even conditional on the control
variables.
These two assumptions - exogeneity of the censoring point and no systematic con-
ditional relationship between the care plan volume and the provider price - are relaxed
when we take the log-relative consumption as the dependent variable. This Appendix
nonetheless discusses the plausibility of these assumptions, by presenting elements on the
establishing of the care plan volume and additional empirical material.
When setting the care plan volume h̄i, the evaluation team supposedly takes into
account the needs of the beneficiary in terms of assistance with the activities of daily
living. By law, the care plan volume should depend on the administrative disability
group. Gender and age (which we control for) may influence the care plan volume, as
they correlate with unobserved health problems and housekeeping skills. Additionally,
even tough matrimonial status and family structure are not supposed to influence the care
plan volume, anecdotal evidence suggests that the evaluation team takes into account the
possible assistance regularly provided by relatives when establishing the care plan.
Additionally, h̄i could directly relate to the price of the chosen provider in a specific
case: when the evaluation team sets the personalized care plan, it has to check that the
monetary equivalent of the care plan volume is below the legal ceiling associated with the
disability level of the beneficiary. In the case care is provided by a regulated provider, the
monetary equivalent of the care plan equals the number of hours granted by the evaluation
team times the provider price. If the monetary equivalent of the care plan volume is higher
than the legal ceiling, the adjustment will go through a reduction in h̄i or the choice of
a cheaper provider. This may be a source of price endogeneity in both (absolute and
relative consumption) specifications.41
Empirically, once controlling for income, gender, age, disability group, matrimonial
status and professional care received on weekends, we find a small positive correlation
between the (OOP or provider) price and the volume of the care plan, but the effect is
not statistically significant.42 Then, a probit estimation of the probability to be censored,
41Yet it should remain limited: for 7% of our sample at most, the monetary equivalent of their care
plan volume would exceed their legal ceiling if they choose the most expensive provider operating in their
municipality.
42In the panel analysis, we include fixed effects and cluster at the individual level. Table of results is
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P(hi = h̄i), shows that the probability to be censored slightly correlates with the price. A
e1 increase in the provider price is predicted to increase the probability to be censored by
2 pp. (as a reminder, the sample censoring rate is around 40% and the standard-deviation
in provider prices is of e1.3).
Although they are statistically significant, these effects are small in practical terms.
In addition, they fade out when we restrict our attention to beneficiaries living in a
municipality where only one provider is operating. This suggests that the strategic choice
of a provider (price) to comply with the legal ceiling is empirically negligible in this sub-
sample (see Appendix 7.7.C).
The probability to be censored is higher for individuals with no partner at home,
possibly because individuals living with a partner benefit from economies of scale in home
care utilization43 and from informal help provided by their spouse. Consuming the care
plan volume totally is also more likely for individuals who are entitled to subsidies on
formal care served during the weekends.
Individual observable characteristics explain about 50% of the variations observed in
the care plan volume. This leaves a large share of the variations unexplained. Ethno-
graphic work suggests that unobserved informal care or health status can influence the
evaluation team in the set up of the care plan volume (Billaud et al., 2012). It is likely
to rather depend on the general orientation given by the departmental councils to their
evaluation team, rather the composition of the evaluation team. Billaud et al. (2012) have
shown that taking informal care into account is a departmental decision while Gramain,
Billaud and Xing (2015) show that the composition of the evaluation team little influence
the practices. Overall, if there is a bias in the set up of the care plan volume, it is expected
to be common to all individuals in a department, whatever the evaluation team.
As we do not have any good instrument to test the endogeneity of the care plan volume
in our dataset, we have to rely on the assumption that it is reasonably exogenous when
estimating the specification with log-absolute consumption as the dependent variable.
This is one of the reasons why we favour the specification with the relative consumption
(Equation (2.5), Appendix 7.2.B).
not included but is available upon request.
43These economies of scale are not factored in by the evaluation team when setting the care plan
volume. This is consistent with the fact that APA is meant to be a personal subsidy: legal ceilings do
not depend on whether a beneficiary has a partner also receiving APA.
143
Chapter 2
7.5 The home care sector in France
7.5.A Three main types of home care providers
Home care to the disabled elderly can be provided by three types of providers:
(1) Regulated structures (services autorisés), which must receive a special authorization
granted by the Departmental Council to enter the market; their price is fixed by the
Departmental Council.
(2) Non-regulated structures (services agréés non autorisés) are allowed to provide
home care services to APA beneficiaries under lighter conditions than regulated
structures; they are free to set their price (with some restrictions on yearly price
evolution being set at the departmental level).
(3) Over-the-counter workers (gré-à-gré ou mandataire): the beneficiary directly con-
tracts with a home care worker. The beneficiary is free to set her employee’s hourly
wage provided she complies with general labor law.
There is no regulation for over-the-counter workers. Both regulated and non-regulated
structures have to meet quality standards, though requirements are higher for regulated
structures. The existence of differences in quality between regulated providers is less
clear-cut. From a theoretical prospective though, the uncertainties regarding the quality
of services in the home care sector lead to rule out vertical differentiation through prices
(Messaoudi, 2012).
In our empirical analysis, we focus on regulated providers: technically, we are able
to compute the exact OOP price of their customers receiving APA as these services are
priced by the Departmental Council. More broadly, APA subsidized professional care
is mainly provided by this type of structure: using a survey conducted on the French
departments (LEDa-LEGOS and CES, 2012), Hege et al. (2014) document that in over
45% of (responding) departments, more than two thirds of APA home care hours are
provided by regulated services. Care provided by regulated structures represent less than
one third of APA hours in only 15% of departments.44
7.5.B The different status for regulated providers
Regulated providers can be either public, for-profit or non-profit. Historically, in
France, non-profit organizations were important providers of home care and they remain
44Using our data, we study the determinants of the choice of a provider. We find that individuals
receiving care from a regulated provider are on average less rich than the overall population of APA
beneficiaries; they tend to be younger, less disabled and live more often alone (results available upon
request).
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predominant in most rural areas. In our department, 5 regulated providers are non-profit,
providing care to about 54% of our estimation sample in October 2014. 20 municipal
services are providing care to APA recipients (about 43% of the 2014 sample). For-
profit structures represent a small share of the regulated home care providers (3 in the
department), as they provide home care only to 3% of our 2014 sample.45
Theoretically, an APA beneficiary is free to choose her provider. In practice, the spatial
coverage by the different types of regulated services is unequal over the territory. In some
municipalities, several providers are found to operate, while there is only one provider
in others (see Section 7.7.C). In our department, among the beneficiaries living in a
municipality where several regulated providers serve APA recipients, more than 50% can
choose between the three types of regulated providers. These beneficiaries live in relatively
large municipalities: the supply mix is more diversified when there is an important market
for home care services, while small municipalities are generally de facto served by a unique,
non-profit structure. Conversely, the typical supply mix in medium-size municipalities is
the combination of non-profit and public regulated providers. Finally, a for-profit provider
is never found to be the only regulated service operating in a given municipality.
45Proportions are similar in the pooled sample. The small market share of for-profit services among
regulated providers is not a specific feature of the department studied.
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7.6 Explaining variations in provider prices
7.6.A Components of costs in the home care sector
In this section, we explain why customers may exogenously face different provider
prices, by detailing the components of prices in the home care sector.
Regulated providers are priced by the Departmental Council. The hourly price of
each provider, for one given year, should be set on the basis of the overall average hourly
production cost of the provider, of two years before. The various components of production
costs are described in qualitative studies, either in academic works (Gramain and Xing,
2012) or in public reports.46 By order of importance (top-down), production costs can be
decomposed as follows:
• Workforce costs (80% of total charges): wages paid to professional caregivers and,
for a small part (around 10% of total charges), to the supervising staff. The wage of
a caregiver depends on her qualification, according to collective labour agreements.
We expect that the larger the proportion of skilled caregivers, the higher the pro-
duction cost and the price. Wages are also augmented if employees work on Sunday
or on public holidays, in accordance with general labour legislation.
• Operating costs (10-15% of total charges): those include rents for the service’s offices
and other running expenses.
• Transportation costs (5-10% of total charges)47 correspond to the compensation for
the costs borne by employees to go to the consumer’s home. This item is likely to
vary largely across services according to their geographical area of intervention.
• Contrary to the health care sector, technological progress and capital costs are
negligible in the home care sector.
We represent the relationship between the provider price and several providers’ charac-
teristics graphically.48 We distinguish between non-public (mainly non-profit) providers
and public providers. The latest are likely to receive grants or advantages (e.g., a free
office) from local municipalities that reduce operating costs. Such advantages are taken
46There is, though, no national, comprehensive benchmark study on the costs of home care services.
Public reports regularly deplore the lack of information on costs as a major shortcoming preventing from
understanding the functioning of the sector (Vanlerenberghe and Watrin, 2014; Poletti, 2012).
47This item only includes the compensation of employees for the monetary costs associated with trans-
port. The ongoing study mentioned in the paper additionally takes into account the unproductive hours
spent on transports by the employees that are paid by the provider.
48We explore here other characteristics than the number of served municipalities, that we use as an
instrument for the price. The empirical relationship between the two variables is documented by Figure
2 in the paper.
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into account in the pricing process done by the Departmental Council and lower down
the regulated price of public providers. In the graphical representation, we exclude the
largest provider of the department, a nationwide non-profit organization, which has sys-
tematically the highest values for the variables we are here interested in (see Appendix
7.7.B).
In Figure 2.5, provider prices are plotted against the number of APA beneficiaries
served by the service. Graphically, the more customers the provider has, the higher its
price. Having more customers might be associated with more municipalities to serve (see
discussion in Section 4.4 of the paper) or more unproductive hours.49 This graph should
be interpreted cautiously though: we only know the number of APA recipients served by
each home care provider, instead of the total number of customers (including non-APA
beneficiaries, like other elderly or disabled individuals) served in the department.
Figure 2.6 shows the relationship between the provider price and the share of hours
they serve on Sundays or on public holidays. Public providers have a very low share of
such hours, as most public services do not operate on weekends and holidays. A higher
share of hours made on holidays is associated with a higher price among public structures,
which is consistent with the financial compensation of employees for working on public
holidays.
49Unproductive hours (meetings, training) may become relatively more numerous when a service gets
relatively large.
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Figure 2.5 – Provider price according to the number of APA beneficiaries served by the
provider, by legal status
Sample: Regulated providers of the department serving at least one APA beneficiary in Oc-
tober 2012, 2013 or 2014.
Notes: The largest provider, which serves 43% of the APA beneficiaries receiving care from a
regulated provider in the department in 2014, is not included.
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Figure 2.6 – Provider price according to the share of hours served on Sundays and public
holidays, by legal status
Sample: Regulated providers of the department serving at least one APA beneficiary in Oc-
tober 2012, 2013 or 2014.
Notes: The largest provider, which has 1.80% of its home care hours provided on Sundays
and holidays in 2014, is not included.
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7.6.B Individual characteristics and provider price
We also investigate the importance of the observable characteristics on the choice of
a given level of provider price. Table 2.7 presents the individual characteristics associa-
ted with the choice of a “low-price” regulated provider, defined as a provider charging a
price strictly below the average price charged by the regulated providers operating in the
beneficiary’s municipality (in a given month). We estimate the probability of choosing a
“low-price” provider by a Probit on the sub-sample of individuals who live in a municipa-
lity where several regulated providers serve APA recipients. Beyond a slight age effect,
only the disability level is found to have a significant impact. The least severely disabled
are more likely to choose a “low-price” provider, possibly reflecting that they perceive
home care as less necessary and are thus ex ante more sensitive to its price. Income is not
found to have any impact on this choice, nor is matrimonial status (Fisher tests reject the
joint significance of both the set of income quartile dummies and the set of matrimonial
status dummies).50
50Although we do not find any evidence that beneficiaries who are able to choose between different
regulated providers choose a price level according to their income, it might still be the case that there
is systematic correlation between income and provider price in the sample, as about 30% of beneficiaries
are suspected not to be able to choose between different providers (Appendix 7.7.C). When we take our
estimation sample and regress the provider price on income and all the sociodemographic variables we
include in our estimations as well as year dummies, we find a negative partial correlation between income
and provider price. Although it is statistically significant, it is fairly small: a one standard-deviation
increase in disposable income is predicted to decrease provider price by 0.01 standard-deviation. This is
small enough not to undermine the separate identification of the price and empirical income elasticities.
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Table 2.7 – Individual characteristics and choice of a low provider price
Dependent variable: chooses a “low–price” provider
(1)
Income quartile: 1 -0.010
(0.025)
Ref: income quartile: 2
Income quartile: 3 -0.003
(0.028)
Income quartile: 4 -0.006
(0.029)
Woman -0.030
(0.019)
Age: 60–69 -0.050
(0.054)
Age: 70–79 -0.040∗
(0.021)
Ref: age: 80–89
Age: 90 or more -0.029
(0.021)
Disability level: 1 (most severe) -0.102
(0.113)
Disability level: 2 -0.024
(0.036)
Ref: disability level: 3
Disability level: 4 (moderate) 0.068∗∗∗
(0.022)
Lives with no spouse -0.000
(0.021)
Spouse receives APA 0.004
(0.051)
Ref: lives with non–APA spouse
Spouse in institution -0.098
(0.110)
Observations 5701
Number of clusters 82
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the municipa-
lity level; ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Estimation of a Pro-
bit model by Maximum Likelihood. Average partial effects (APE)
are displayed. “Low-price” providers are charging a price below the
average price of regulated providers within a given municipality (in
one given month: October 2012, 2013 or 2014); the estimation uses
the sample of beneficiaries served by only a regulated provider living
in a municipality where at least two different prices are offered by
regulated providers. Data pooled from October 2012, October 2013
and October 2014. Specifications include year fixed effects.
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7.7 Robustness checks
7.7.A Additional results: absolute or relative consumption
In this section, we present the results obtained on the pooled sample and by year, fitting
several specifications. Table 2.8 presents the estimates of the first specification, when the
dependent variable is the absolute consumption (Equation (2.7), Appendix 7.2.A). Tables
2.9 and Table 2.10 present the results obtained with the second specification, when the
dependent variable is the relative consumption, either assuming the provider price is
exogenous (Table 2.9) or instrumenting it (Table 2.10). In all three tables, Column (1)
gives the estimate obtained on the pooled sample, while Columns (2) to (4) display the
estimates obtained on October 2012, 2013 or 2014.
Whatever the specification, estimates on 2014 are of a lower precision, essentially
because there is one provider less (one provider closed down in 2014). The point estimates
are also systematically lower (in absolute value) in 2014 than in the other two years,
although the difference from one year to the other is never statistically significant.
When the dependent variable is the absolute consumption, the coefficients associated
with the price lie between -0.7 and -1.0: they are higher than those obtained with the
relative consumption (between -0.3 and -0.7 with no instrumentation, -0.1 and -0.5 when
the IV strategy is implemented). It might be explained by the fact that the care plan
volume, which may be a proxy for some unobserved determinants of professional care
consumption, is not taken into account in the specification with absolute consumption as
the dependent variable.
With the absolute consumption, the income effect within the APA scheme is suggested
to be negative. When taking the relative consumption as the dependent variable, and
including the care plan volume as a control, point estimates are lower in absolute value
(presumably because the omitted variable bias is reduced); the effect of income within the
APA scheme is no longer significant. The IV-strategy only little affects point estimates.
Except for 2014, we can systematically reject that the price elasticity is zero.
Overall, these results confirm that the price elasticity is significantly different from zero
and inferior to one in absolute value. The -0.4 point estimate we finally retain is the one
that is the most likely to be unbiased (care plan volume as a control & IV strategy) and
the most precise (pooled data with both intra- and inter- individual price variations). Yet
we must acknowledge the relatively low precision of our results: the 95%-level confidence
interval derived from our favoured specification indicates a price elasticity between -0.01
and -0.76.
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Table 2.8 – Censored regression estimates of demand for home care hours (absolute con-
sumption)
Dependent variable: absolute consumption h∗ (log)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2012–14 2012 2013 2014
Price (log) -0.793∗∗∗ -0.977∗∗∗ -0.721∗∗ -0.709∗∗
(0.248) (0.260) (0.297) (0.290)
Disposable income (log) -0.039∗∗∗ -0.033∗∗∗ -0.039∗∗∗ -0.048∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.012) (0.015) (0.019)
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 8190 2571 2757 2862
Censored observations 36.6% 40.4% 38.2% 40.2%
Number of clusters 28 28 28 27
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the provider level;
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. Data from October 2012, 2013
and 2014. Estimation of a Tobit model by Maximum Likelihood. All
specifications include as controls sociodemographic variables, dummies
for the year the latest plan was decided upon and dummies for the year
in which the copayment rate was computed. Column (1) additionally
includes year fixed effects.
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Table 2.9 – Censored regression estimates of demand for home care hours (relative con-
sumption)
Dependent variable: relative consumption h∗/h̄ (log)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2012–14 2012 2013 2014
Price (log) -0.450∗∗ -0.670∗∗∗ -0.376 -0.300
(0.181) (0.180) (0.236) (0.238)
Disposable income (log) -0.010 -0.003 -0.014 -0.014
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.016)
Care plan volume (log) 0.040∗ 0.054∗ 0.019 0.041
(0.023) (0.030) (0.027) (0.033)
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 8190 2571 2757 2862
Censored observations 36.6% 40.4% 38.2% 40.2%
Number of clusters 28 28 28 27
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the provider level;
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Data from October 2012, 2013
and 2014. Estimation of a Tobit model by Maximum Likelihood. All
specifications include as controls sociodemographic variables, dummies
for the year the latest plan was decided upon and dummies for the year
in which the copayment rate was computed. Column (1) additionally
includes year fixed effects.
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Table 2.10 – Censored regression estimates of demand for home care hours (relative con-
sumption, IV)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2012-14 2012 2013 2014
Panel A: Second Stage Dependent variable: relative consumption h∗/h̄ (log)
Price (log) -0.387∗∗ -0.537∗∗ -0.460∗∗ -0.134
(0.192) (0.209) (0.214) (0.245)
Disposable income (log) -0.010 -0.003 -0.014 -0.014
(0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.016)
Care plan volume (log) 0.040∗ 0.054∗ 0.019 0.042
(0.023) (0.030) (0.028) (0.033)
Panel B: First Stage Dependent variable: provider price p (log)
Number of municipalities (std.) 0.049∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 8190 2571 2757 2862
Censored observations 36.6% 40.4% 38.2% 40.2%
Number of clusters 28 28 28 27
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the provider level; ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p <
0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Data from October 2012, 2013 and 2014. Estimation of an IV-Tobit
model by Maximum Likelihood. Price is instrumented by the number of municipalities
served by the provider. In the first stage (Panel B), the log-provider price is regressed
on the standardized number of municipalities served by the provider. All specifications,
for both Panel A and Panel B, include as controls sociodemographic variables, dummies
for the year the latest plan was decided upon and dummies for the year in which the
copayment rate was computed. Column (1) additionally includes year fixed effects.
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7.7.B Clustering and Bootstrap inference
Level of clustering
In the paper, we denote �̃it the error term in our favoured specification (Equation (5)).
As we cluster at the provider level j, we actually implicitly assume the following structure
for the error term �̃:
�̃ijt = ξ̃i + ν̃j + ζ̃ijt
with ξ̃i capturing the unobserved individual heterogeneity, and ν̃j the provider level time-
invariant unobserved heterogeneity. For two individuals i and i� that are served by the
same provider j (assume for the sake of simplicity that t is not varying), corr(�̃ijt, �̃i�jt) �= 0
as long as there are unobserved shocks taking place at the provider level.
For a given individual observed at t and t�, error terms will be necessarily correlated
if there is some individual time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity.51 As standard with
panel data, we would need to cluster at the individual level. Yet, as almost all APA
beneficiaries keep the same provider j over time, the latter way of clustering (at the
individual level) is essentially nested in the former clustering option (at the provider
level). We believe that within-individual correlation of errors is more important than
within-provider shock correlation; we nonetheless choose to cluster at the most aggregate
level. In our specific setting, in which our main explanatory variable varies at the provider-
year level, clustering at the provider level is of due caution as the provider price does not
change within one cluster cross-sectionally (Moulton, 1990; Cameron and Miller, 2015).
Inference with few clusters
With clustered standard errors, inference relies on asymptotic properties that kick
in as the number of clusters tends to infinity. The “few-cluster issue” was documented
notably by Cameron et al. (2008): in an OLS setting, Wald hypothesis tests based on
the standard cluster-robust estimate of the variance matrix tend to over-reject the null.
Rejection rates increase when clusters are of unequal sizes (Imbens and Kolesár, 2015).
In our department, there are relatively few regulated providers (28 in 2012 and 2013,
27 in 2014 as one provider closed down).52 and there is one very large regulated provider
(Figure 2.7). This service is a local branch of a long-standing nationwide non-profit home
care service; it serves 37% of the APA beneficiaries in our sample. With only 28 clusters,
including one being considerably larger than the others, we face the risk that standard
cluster-robust inference is biased.
In order to assess the robustness of the inference on the estimates presented in the
paper, we use a bootstrap procedure. By bootstrapping the Wald t-statistic associated
51Note that we are not able to include individual fixed-effects in the type 1-Tobit model, as there is no
parametric solution to the incidental parameter problem (Lancaster, 2000).
52This is not a feature specific to our department though (LEDa-LEGOS and CES, 2012).
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Figure 2.7 – Distribution of the size of regulated providers (October 2014)
Notes: Size of a provider is measured by the number of APA beneficiaries
it serves. Data from October 2014, 27 regulated providers (one regulated
provider closed down in 2014).
with the price elasticity estimate ˆ̃β1, we may improve small-sample inference by attaining
asymptotic refinement (Cameron and Miller, 2015).
We start by estimating our equation on the original sample (by Tobit or IV-Tobit).53
We retrieve the point estimate of the price elasticity, β̂1 and its standard error, se(
ˆ̃
β1),
and we compute the original sample Wald t-statistic t = ˆ̃β1/se(
ˆ̃
β1). We then implement
a percentile pair cluster bootstrap, by repeating 1,000 times the following steps:
1. We form 28“pair” clusters of observations by re-sampling with replacement 28 times
from the original clustered sample.
2. For each bootstrap sample b = 1, ..., 1000, we estimate ˆ̃βb1 (by Tobit or IV-Tobit),
and the associated cluster-robust standard error se( ˆ̃βb1).
3. For each bootstrap sample b, we compute the Wald t-statistic centered in ˆ̃β1:
tb =
ˆ̃
βb1 −
ˆ̃
β1
se( ˆ̃βb1)
, b = 1, ..., 1000
53Here, as well as in the subsequent bootstrap replications, we do not use Stata’s ivtobit command,
through which standard errors are derived using the observed information matrix (oim). Instead, we
first regress the (log) provider price on the instrument and the other exogenous controls (clustering at
the provider level) and derive a prediction of the log of the provider price. We run the second step by
regressing the (log) relative consumption on the predicted log-provider price and the other controls, again
clustering at the provider level. It gives the inputs we use in the bootstrap procedure.
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We then use the empirical distribution of the bootstrap t-statistics tb to derive the
critical values to be used in lieu of the critical values derived from a standard normal or
T distribution. We compare the t-statistic associated with the price elasticity coefficient
obtained in the observed sample to the symmetrical critical values derived from the boot-
strapped t-statistic distribution. The percentile-t p-value for the symmetric two-sided
Wald test of H0: “β̃1 = 0” is computed as the proportion of times the absolute value
of the boostrapped t-statistic is greater than the absolute value of the observed sample
t-statistic; that is to say, the proportion of times that |tb| > |t|, b = 1, ..., 1000
Issues may arise when using pair cluster resampling with dummy control variables:
some of the bootstrap samples may have little or even no variation in the control variables.
The computation of tb in those samples is not possible; using the bootstrap t-statistics
that were actually computed is not an option either, as completed replications cannot
be assumed to be random.54 In order to avoid failure to complete the target number of
cluster bootstrap replications, we drop from our original sample the 8 individuals whose
copayment rate was last reassessed prior to 2011.55
Table 2.11 displays the price elasticity estimates and compares standard inference
with bootstrap inference. Columns (1) to (3) display the estimates obtained using a
Tobit model to estimate our specification with relative consumption, while Columns (4)
to (6) are derived from an IV-Tobit estimation. Columns (1) and (3) display the original
consumer price elasticity estimates obtained by either Tobit or IV-Tobit estimations, while
Columns (2) and (5) display the same estimates obtained on the sample on which the pair
cluster bootstrap can be completed. Comparing (1) and (2) first, then (4) and (5), we
see that dropping the 8 aforementioned individuals has virtually no effect on the point
estimate.
The Tobit estimation of the specification with the relative consumption produces a
t-stat equal to -2.50. The 25th lowest value of the bootstrap t-statistics is -1.87, while its
975th is equal to 1.90. Using a symmetric Wald test, we find that the absolute value of the
original t-stat is larger than |tb| a little less than 99% of times (p-value of 0.018, Column
(3) of Table 2.11). Bootstrap inference thus indicates that we can reject the hypothesis
that the price elasticity is zero at the 5% level.
Similarly, the IV-Tobit estimation of the specification with relative consumption pro-
duces a t-stat equal to -1.93. The 25th lowest value of the bootstrap t-statistics is -1.73,
while its 975th is equal to 1.38. Using a symmetric Wald test, we reject the hypothesis
54Wild cluster bootstrap has been documented as leading to more robust inference in the case of few
clusters, as well as helping in the case that right-hand side dummy variables induce incomplete replications
(Cameron and Miller, 2015). To our knowledge though, wild cluster bootstrap has not been extended to
nonlinear models.
55Our specifications with absolute and relative consumptions include a dummy for the year in which
the copayment rate was assessed, as justified in Appendix 7.2.A.
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Table 2.11 – Bootstrap inference
Dependent variable: relative consumption h∗/h̄ (log)
Tobit IV–Tobit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Price (log) -0.450∗∗ -0.451∗∗ -0.451∗∗ -0.387∗∗ -0.388∗∗ -0.386∗∗
(se) (0.181) (0.180) - (0.192) (0.192) -
p-value 0.013 0.012 0.018 0.044 0.044 0.014
Disposable income (log) -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010
(se) (0.007) (0.007) - (0.007) (0.007) -
p-value 0.184 0.184 0.163 0.186 0.186 0.165
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample All co–payment reassessed All co–payment reassessed
no earlier than 2011 no earlier than 2011
Observations 8190 8182 8182 8190 8182 8182
Censored observations 39.6% 39.6% 39.6% 39.6% 39.6% 39.6%
Inference Default Default Bootstrap Default Default Bootstrap
Number of clusters 28 28 28 28 28 28
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, the provider level; ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Data pooled from October 2012, 2013 and 2014. Estimation of a Tobit or IV-Tobit model by
Maximum Likelihood (Stata commands tobit for Columns (1) to (3), and ivtobit for Columns (4)
and (5)). In Columns (3) and (6), inference is obtained using a bootstrap procedure. Difference in
the point estimates between Columns (5) and (6) is due to the fact that in Column (6) we implement
manually the IV strategy in two separate steps, rather than using the ivtobit command, to make
the Bootstrap procedure consistent.
Samples: In Columns (2), (3), (5) and (6), individuals whose copayment rate was reassessed prior
to 2011 are not included in the sample (8 individuals).
Bootstrap inference: We implement a pair cluster percentile bootstrap of the t-statistics (1,000
replications). The percentile-t p-value for the symmetric two-sided Wald test of H0: β̃1 = 0, is
computed as the proportion of times the absolute value of the boostrap t-statistic is greater than
the absolute value of the observed sample t-statistic.
that the relative consumption of home care is price inelastic, again at the 5% level.
Figures 2.8 and 2.9 display the empirical distribution of the bootstrap t-statistics
obtained following either the Tobit or the IV-Tobit estimation of the consumer price elas-
ticity. We display a normal distribution with mean and variance equal to the mean and
variance of the empirical distribution of the bootstrap t-statistics, and the normal distri-
bution with mean 0 and variance 1 as a benchmark. Despite the sample containing one
very large cluster, we observe a quite smooth distribution of t-statistics in both Figures.
All replications are complete and the tails of the distribution do not seem excessively fat,
making us confident in the quality of our bootstrap and in the statistical power of the
deriving Wald test on the price elasticity estimate.
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Figure 2.8 – Percentile-t bootstrap quality: distribution of bootstrap t-statistics (Tobit
estimation)
Notes: t-stats from percentile bootstrap-t (1,000 replications). Output from
Tobit estimation on relative consumption (Column (3) of Table 2.11) on sample
of 8,182 individuals. ∗The first normal distribution displayed has a mean and
variance equal to the mean and variance of the distribution of bootstrap t-
stats. Dashed vertical lines represent the 25th and 975th ordered elements and
the mean of the bootstrap t-stat distribution.
Figure 2.9 – Percentile-t bootstrap quality: distribution of bootstrap t-statistics (IV-Tobit
estimation)
Notes: t-stats from percentile bootstrap-t (1,000 replications). Output from
manual IV-Tobit estimation on relative consumption (Column (6) of Table
2.11) on sample of 8,182 individuals. ∗The first normal distribution displayed
has a mean and variance equal to the mean and variance of the distribution of
bootstrap t-stats. Dashed vertical lines represent the 25th and 975th ordered
elements and the mean of the bootstrap t-stat distribution.
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7.7.C Alternative identification strategy: using single-provider areas
Single-provider and multiple-provider areas
According to their geographical location in the department, beneficiaries may not be
systematically able to choose between several providers of the department. We divide our
sample into two sub-populations (Figure 2.10): on the one side, beneficiaries living in a
municipality where a single provider is found to operate, or single-provider area (denoted
“SPA”; areas in plain color). On the other side, individuals living in a municipality where
two or more regulated providers have customers, or multiple-provider area (denoted “non-
SPA”; dotted areas).56
Figure 2.10 – Distribution of providers in the department - Schematic representation
Notes: We provide only a schematic representation to preserve the ano-
nymity of the department. Different shades of plain grey indicate different
areas served by a unique regulated service (single-provider areas, or SPA),
each being served by a different provider with a given price level. The dot-
ted areas correspond to multiple-provider (non-SPA) municipalities.
As displayed in Table 2.12, 79% of the municipalities represented in our sample belong
to an SPA; 35% of beneficiaries included in the estimation sample live in this type of
areas. The remaining beneficiaries live in a municipality where two or more regulated
providers have customers. This partition interestingly reflects the spatial concentration of
56To identify the two types of areas, we use the full population of APA beneficiaries in the department,
not only the APA beneficiaries of our estimation sample.
161
Chapter 2
the APA population: 65% of the beneficiaries in our sample live in 21% of the department
municipalities. Consistently, non-SPA municipalities are more often urban centers than
SPA municipalities.
Table 2.12 – Single-provider areas and multiple-provider areas (October 2014)
Municipalities Beneficiaries Average
price
Number Frequencies Number Frequencies
SPA 220 78.9% 995 34.8% e22.7
Non–SPA 59 21.1% 1867 65.2% e22.0
Total 279 100% 2862 100% -
Notes: Estimation sample from October 2014. Average provider price per type of area
is not weighted by the number of customers of the providers.
The spatial distribution of professional care provision is consistent with the fact that
transportation costs are an important factor in the provision decision of home care services
(cf. Section 4.4 of the paper). Providing services all over the department would be costly
for a relatively small service. Typically, municipalities where only one provider is found to
operate are served by non-profit home care services. In urban centers, the supply proposed
by non-profit services may be complemented with municipal home care services, or even,
in the largest municipalities, with one of the few for-profit regulated services found in the
department (cf. Appendix 7.5.B).
Table 2.13 presents the descriptive statistics computed on the two sub-samples of APA
beneficiaries, depending on the type of area in which they live. The two sub-samples are
similar in terms of their sociodemographic characteristics albeit non-SPA residents are
richer on average. This is consistent with the fact that non-SPA residents tend to locate
in urban centers. The under-consumption rate is higher among non-SPA beneficiaries, but
the average number of hours effectively subsidized is similar in both types of areas. This
goes against the concern that SPA beneficiaries may experience rationing in the provision
of professional care. Although subsidized consumption relative to the care plan volume is
slightly higher for SPA beneficiaries on average (86% versus 84%), the overall distribution
of relative consumption is fairly similar in the two sub-samples. Overall, except for the
income level, the two populations little differ in terms of outcome and explaining variables.
Price elasticity estimates using SPA and non-SPA beneficiaries
Arguably, SPA beneficiaries have limited choice if they resort to a regulated provider.
As a consequence, they are not able to choose their price pji . Note that home care price
endogeneity due to residential mobility is suggested to be negligible: the overall residential
mobility of the elderly is very low (Laferrère, 2008) and when moves occur, they are mainly
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Table 2.13 – Descriptive statistics on the SPA and non-SPA sub-samples (October 2014)
SPA Non–SPA Difference
(p-value)
Variable [1] [2] [1] - [2]
Care plan volume [a] 20.1 20.8 0.06
Care plan monetary value [b] e456.8 e454.8 0.83
Hours effectively subsidized [c] 17.5 17.8 0.38
Amount of effective subsidies [d] e311.7 e294.9 0.03
[c] inferior to [a] 57.2% 61.2% 0.03
Individualized income e1,272 e1,339 0.00
co–payment rate 21.9% 24.6% 0.00
Provider price e22.8 e21.8 0.00
Hourly out-of-pocket price e5.0 e5.4 0.01
Total OOP payments e86.0 e94.2 0.03
on subsidized hours
Consumes during the week-end 9.2% 7.5% 0.11
Age 84.4 84.0 0.18
Women 72.5% 74.7% 0.18
Disability group 1 (most severe) 1.5% 1.0 %
0.54
Disability group 2 12.2% 12.6%
Disability group 3 20.7% 19.1%
Disability group 4 (moderate) 65.6% 67.3%
100% 100%
Living with a spouse 34.7% 33.3%
0.81Living alone 64.7% 66.1%
Spouse in institution 0.6% 0.6%
100% 100%
Number of individuals 995 1867 -
Number of households 965 1820 -
Notes: Estimation sample from October 2014. Descriptive statistics are computed on the
sub-sample of APA beneficiaries living in single-provider municipalities (SPA) in Column (1)
and those living in multiple-provider municipalities (non-SPA) in Column (2). Compared to
Table 2.12, average provider price in each sub-sample is weighted by the number of beneficiaries
in the sample.
Tests: P-values from a Student (resp. Pearson χ2) test for binary or continuous (resp. cate-
gorical) variables.
explained by family motives or the need for adapted residences. Price endogeneity should
thus be limited in the SPA sub-sample; on the contrary, we suspect it may arise in the non-
SPA sample. Comparing the price elasticity estimates obtained on the two sub-samples
may thus provide a test of price endogeneity in the estimation sample.
The estimation is run using the specification with the relative consumption, the out-
come being h∗it/h̄it. Results are displayed in Table 2.14.
57 As presented in the paper, the
price elasticity is of -0.45 when estimated on the whole sample, significantly different from
57We only display the price and income coefficients as the effects of controls are similar to the estimates
obtained with the full estimation sample (displayed in Table II of the paper).
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zero at the 5% level. Restricting the sample to individuals who are assumed to have no
provider choice, the point estimate slightly changes to -0.52. Because of reduced sample
size and price variations, precision is lower but the estimate is still significantly different
from zero at the 10% level.
The point estimate is higher when we run the estimation on the sub-population of
individuals who can choose between different providers, with a point value of -0.63.58 The
difference between the two sub-sample estimates might potentially be explained by both
an omitted variable bias affecting the choice of the provider price and some differences
in the characteristics of the individuals of the two samples. However, the difference is
not statistically significant even at the 10% level. Overall, this alternative estimation
strategy (relying on SPA beneficiaries only) confirms our main results: the consumption
of home care by the disabled elderly is price-elastic, with a point estimate inferior to one
in absolute value and a magnitude seemingly around -0.5 or -0.4.
Table 2.14 – Censored regression estimates of demand for home care hours (SPA/non-
SPA)
Dependent variable: relative consumption h∗/h̄ (log)
Sample: All SPA Non–SPA
(1) (2) (3)
Price (log) -0.450∗∗ -0.522∗ -0.626∗∗
(0.181) (0.305) (0.258)
Disposable income (log) -0.010 0.001 -0.013
(0.008) (0.010) (0.009)
Care plan volume (log) 0.040∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.049∗
(0.023) (0.014) (0.029)
Other controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 8190 2489 5701
Censored observations 39.6% 40.7% 39.1%
Number of clusters 28 18 28
AIC 11454 3277.318 8144
BIC 11643 3376.252 8324
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the provider level;
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Pooled data from October
2012, 2013, 2014. Estimation of a Tobit model by Maximum Likelihood.
All specifications include as controls sociodemographic variables, dummies
for the year the latest plan was decided upon, dummies for the year in
which the copayment rate was computed and year fixed effects. SPA stands
for “single-provider area”beneficiaries, non-SPA for“multiple-provider area”
beneficiaries.
58Because of the non-linearity of the model, the point estimate obtained on the entire sample is not
comprised between the two point estimates obtained on the two sub-samples.
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This alternative identification strategy has several drawbacks. First, focusing on SPA
beneficiaries induces additional intra-departmental selection. We find the non-SPA to be
richer than SPA beneficiaries. If richer individuals are more price-elastic, as suggested by
Table 2.3 in the main text, the price elasticity obtained on the SPA sub-sample would
then be a lower bound (in absolute value) for the average price elasticity of our estima-
tion sample. But we may additionally suspect that the two sub-samples differ in terms
of unobservable determinants of professional care consumption. Using the specification
with relative consumption, we tested the effect of including a dummy equal to one for
SPA beneficiaries (Table 2.15): living in a SPA is found to positively affect home care
relative consumption, ceteris paribus. The inclusion of the SPA dummy affects the price
elasticity estimate (although not statistically significantly). This might suggest that SPA
beneficiaries behave differently than non-SPA in terms of care consumption decisions.
One might fear that regulated providers operating as monopolies may set their price
in accordance with the price elasticity of demand. In SPA municipalities, provider prices
could be higher where the price sensitivity of APA beneficiaries is lower, inducing a po-
tential downward bias (in absolute value) in our point elasticity estimate. Given that the
regulated providers operating in an SPA are systematically non-profit structures and that
they are priced by the Departmental Council, there is limited scope for consumer surplus
extraction by monopolist providers.
A more serious issue a priori is that SPA and non-SPA sub-samples are constructed
using the available information of our sample. We construct the non-SPA sample by
observing the municipalities in which there are beneficiaries served by at least two different
regulated providers.59 It might be the case, especially in very small municipalities, that
there are few beneficiaries living in a municipalities and they happen to all choose the
same provider. In this case, we will infer that there is only one provider operating; we
do not have any other way to infer from the data whether the individuals were able to
choose between different providers. Although such cases are scarce,60 we should remain
cautious when interpreting the price elasticity estimated on the SPA sample.
Finally, when focusing on SPA beneficiaries, we loose 10 clusters (corresponding to
regulated providers who are only found to operate jointly with other providers in the
municipalities where they are present). This may undermine the validity of inference in
the SPA sub-sample.
59We do not have direct information on the supply and geographical coverage by the different providers.
608% municipalities turn out to have a unique APA beneficiary, hosting 1% of the department’s benefi-
ciaries. More largely, beneficiaries living in municipalities with 5 or less APA recipients represent around
10% of total beneficiaries.
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Table 2.15 – Censored regression estimates of demand for home care hours, controlling
for the type of area of residence
Dependent variable: relative consumption h∗/h̄ (log)
(1) (2)
Price (log) -0.450∗∗ -0.613∗∗∗
(0.181) (0.202)
Disposable income (log) -0.010 -0.008
(0.008) (0.007)
Lives in a SPA 0.064∗∗∗
(0.023)
Other controls Yes Yes
Observations 8190 8190
Censored observations 36.9% 36.9%
Number of clusters 28 28
AIC 11454 11431
BIC 11644 11621
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the provider
level; ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Pooled data from Octo-
ber 2012, 2013 and 2014. Estimation of a Tobit model by Maximum
Likelihood. Specifications include as controls sociodemographic vari-
ables, dummies for the year the latest plan was decided upon, dum-
mies for the year in which the copayment rate was computed and
year fixed effects. SPA stands for “single-provider area”, non-SPA
for “multiple-provider area” beneficiaries.
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7.7.D Additional results: inclusion of care received on weekends
As we do not directly observe the informal care received by the individuals, we include
as a control in our estimation the formal home care the individual possibly receives during
the weekend and public holidays (Table 2.16).
As in our baseline estimations, the latent dependent variable is the number of hours
consumed between Monday and Saturday, except for public holidays, divided by the
care plan volume open for business days. Consistently, the care plan volume taken into
account to compute relative consumption only includes the hours that were prescribed to
be consumed over the week. APA beneficiaries may also be entitled to subsidies for a few
hours of care to be received during weekends and public holidays, which are set separately
in the personalized care plan. Although weekend hours are charged the same price, they
are not fungible with week hours. Only 7.5% of our estimation sample has weekend hours
included in her personalized care plan, for a median volume of about 5 hours a month.61
We did not include the home care hours received on weekends as a control in our baseline
specifications because of a simultaneity concern.
We hypothesize that, for given disability and sociodemographic characteristics, indi-
viduals not receiving professional home care over the weekend are more likely to receive
assistance from their relatives. We find that receiving formal care during the weekend is
associated with more hours consumed during working days; reassuringly though, it does
not significantly affect the price elasticity estimate.
61As beneficiaries with weekend care plan volume tend to be more severely disabled, their week care
plan volume, h̄it, is on average higher than the week care plan volume of the rest of beneficiaries. Among
these beneficiaries, APA hours prescribed on weekends amount only to 15% of the week care plan volume
on average.
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Table 2.16 – Inclusion of home care received on weekends
Dependent variable: relative consumption during the week h∗i /h̄i (log)
(1) (2) (3)
Price (log) -0.392∗∗ -0.452∗∗ -0.392∗∗
(0.193) (0.195) (0.196)
Consumes care on weekends 0.227∗∗∗ -0.054
(0.020) (0.054)
Number of hours received on weekends 0.080∗∗∗
(0.017)
Observations 8190 8190 8190
Censored observations 39.6% 39.6% 39.6%
Number of clusters 28 28 28
AIC -22073.724 -22168.783 -22215.301
BIC -21884.435 -21979.495 -22026.013
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the provider level; ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Pooled data from October 2012, 2013 and 2014 (population-
average model). Estimation of an IV-Tobit model by Maximum Likelihood. Provider
price is instrumented by the number of municipalities served by the provider. All
specifications, in both the first and second stages, include as controls the care plan
volume, sociodemographic variables, dummies for the year the latest plan was de-
cided upon, dummies for the year in which the copayment rate was computed and
year fixed effects.
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7.7.E Robustness check: estimation by a truncated regression model
As a further robustness check, we estimate the price sensitivity of the demand for home
care using a truncated regression model. We make as if we did not observe all individuals
who consume beyond their care plan volume. As shown in Table 2.17, the truncated
regression model gives a price coefficient very close to what the censored regression model
does. As we exploit less information when fitting a truncation model (on about 40% of
the sample), the precision is much lower. Although the coefficient on income is higher in
when using a truncated regression model, this comparison gives credit to the econometric
specification of the model. It gives empirical support to the theoretical discussion presen-
ted in Appendix 7.3.B: under an assumption of stability of preferences and constant price
elasticity along the demand curve, we are able identify the sample average price elasticity
by using information on the individuals that locate on the left-hand side of the kink in
the budget constraint.
Table 2.17 – Consumer price elasticity estimations: comparing truncated and censored
regression models
Dependent variable: relative consumption (h/h̄)
(1) (2)
Truncated reg. Censored reg.
Price (log) -0.304 -0.275∗∗
(0.449) (0.111)
Disposable income (log) -0.076∗∗∗ -0.007∗
(0.027) (0.004)
Observations 4947 8190
Clusters 28 28
AIC -4539 6594
BIC -4363 6783
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the provider level;
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Pooled data from October 2012,
2013 and 2014. Estimation of a Truncated regression model and a Tobit
model by Maximum Likelihood. Specifications include as controls socio-
demographic variables, dummies for the year the latest plan was decided
upon, dummies for the year in which the copayment rate was computed
and year fixed effects. The dependent variable is the relative consumption.
7.7.F Robustness check: estimation by a Poisson model
As a further robustness check, we estimate the price sensitivity of the demand for home
care using a Poisson regression model, taking into account the censored characteristic
169
Chapter 2
of our data (censored Poisson model).62 As it is a count model, we directly use as a
dependent variable the number of hours consumed (instead of the logarithm of the relative
consumption). The estimated coefficient thus will not be directly comparable to the
previous estimations.
Table 2.18 shows the results of the estimation of the censored Poisson model, both
while not including clusters at the provider level (Column 1) and including them (Column
2). These estimations show that a 10% increase in the OOP payments is expected to
decrease the number of hours consumed by almost 2 hours, but it is only significantly
different from zero at conventional threshold when clusters are not included. The effect
of disposable income is negative, significantly negative but with a very low magnitude.
The difference of results might be due to differences in the fitting of the models to our
data. Our data do not seem to follow a Poisson model. In particular, the variance is
substantially different from the mean, as is shown in Table 2.1.
Table 2.18 – Consumer price elasticity estimations: censored Poisson model
Dependent variable: hours consumed (h)
(1) (2)
Tarif (log) -0.193∗∗∗ -0.193
(0.060) (0.150)
Disposable income -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
Observations 8190 8190
Number of clusters 28
AIC 41684 41676
BIC 41887 41851
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the provi-
der level in Column 2; ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Pooled data from October 2012, 2013 and 2014. Estimation of
a censored Poisson regression model by Maximum Likelihood.
Specifications include as controls sociodemographic variables,
dummies for the year the latest plan was decided upon, dum-
mies for the year in which the copayment rate was computed
and year fixed effects. The dependent variable is the volume
consumed during the month.
62We use the command Stata cpoisson.
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Are there better places to grow old?
Decentralized policies and formal care use by
the disabled elderly
This chapter was co-authored with
Rémi Kaboré and Jérôme Wittwer.
Summary of the chapter
In a context of population ageing, public policies encourage the utilization of professional
home care for the elderly living in the community. This chapter studies the determinants
of professional home care use by the disabled elderly in the French context. It focuses
on the effects of the regulation of the supply and the generosity of public financing. We
use departmental variations in both the regulation of providers and the implementation
of the main program devoted to the disabled elderly, the APA policy. We exploit an
original survey on departmental practices matched with the HSM survey to estimate
the determinants of formal care use, at the extensive margin. We find no effect of the
departmental generosity while, on the supply side, when non-regulated providers — whose
quality is uncertain and price is lightly regulated — dominate the market, the disabled
elderly have a lower probability to use formal home care. Our results contribute to discuss
both the questions raised by the decentralization of a national policy and the recent reform
of the home care sector requiring all home care structures to be regulated.
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1 Introduction
OECD countries are facing the aging of their population, which results in an increasing
demand for long-term care. Most disabled elderly keep on living in the community rather
than entering nursing homes (Colombo et al., 2011). In this demographic context, public
policies foster the utilization of formal care, defined as the provision at home of basic
domestic help and personal care by a paid professional caregiver. In France, the main
long-term care program, the APA policy, is granted to the disabled elderly in order to help
them financing the consumption of formal care services when they keep on living in the
community. In 2015, it counted 748,000 community-dwelling beneficiaries and amounted
to an overall public spending of e3.2 billions (0.15% of GDP).1 The implementation
of the program is decentralized to local authorities, the departmental councils. Their
role is of utmost importance regarding both the generosity of the allowance and the
regulation of the home care providers. According to field studies and public reports,
it results in substantial differences in the costs and the availability of professional care
across departments (Billaud et al., 2012; Hege et al., 2014; Bourreau-Dubois et al., 2015;
Gramain, Hege and Roquebert, 2015; Observatoire National du domicile, 2018).
We use these departmental variations to study the determinants of formal care use by
the disabled elderly in the French context. Our question is twofold. Does the demand for
formal care depend on the generosity of public financing? Is it sensitive to the regulation
of the home care supply? To the best of our knowledge, the latter question has never
been addressed in the literature, despite the existing heterogeneity in the regulation of
care providers in France (Devetter et al., 2012). A few papers have investigated the
effect of public generosity, using territorial variations in long-term care programs. Stabile
et al. (2006) find that, in Canada, the generosity level of provinces, measured by the
yearly spending per individual aged 65 and older, increases formal care utilization and
decreases informal caregiving. In France, Arrighi et al. (2015) find that the APA take-up
increases with the departmental generosity, measured by the rate of APA beneficiaries in
the elderly population and the average subsidy rate. Focusing on the effect of formal care
use on mental health, Barnay and Juin (2016) use the departmental proportion of APA
beneficiaries in the elderly population to instrument formal care consumption.
We exploit an original departmental survey to describe departmental practices regar-
ding long-term care. Matched with the HSM survey (DREES and INSEE, 2008), it makes
it possible to study both the individual and departmental determinants of formal care use
(at the extensive margin). Departmental determinants are the generosity of the allowance,
measured by the way the department council computes the hourly subsidy, and the mar-
1Source: DREES (2015b).
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ket share of regulated providers compared to the others. We discuss the exogeneity of
these indicators. We find no effect of the generosity of the policy while, on the supply
side, the disabled elderly have a lower probability to use formal care when non-regulated
providers, whose price and quality are little regulated, dominate the market.
Though the interpretation of results needs to be cautious, our work has several policy
implications. These results first contribute to the debate on the difference of treatment
that can result from the decentralization of a national policy and questions the need for
further central control. Moreover, they highlight the determinants of formal care use,
especially those that depend on public policies, namely the public generosity and the
supply regulation. This understanding is needed to increase the efficiency of the long-
term care system. Indeed, formal care used has been found to have positive effects on the
health of the elderly and it also affects their relatives by relieving the burden of informal
care. According to our results, the 2016 reform of the home care program, which requires
all providers to be regulated, could help increasing home care utilization.
2 Institutional context
2.1 Financing of the demand
The French APA program2 aims at fostering the utilization of professional care services
by the elderly requiring assistance in the activities of daily living. To be eligible, an
individual must be at least 60 years old and recognized as disabled. The assessment of
the disability level is performed by a team from the departmental council, made of medical
professionals and/or social workers. The assessment is done using a national standardized
scale (“grille AGGIR”). It allows the evaluation team to assign the individual to a disability
group (“Groupe Iso-Ressources”, or GIR). Individuals found to be moderately (GIR–4) to
extremely disabled (GIR–1) are eligible for APA, while the least severely disabled (GIR–5
or –6) are not. If the individual is recognized as eligible, the evaluation team defines the
maximum number of hours of care that can be subsidized given her limitations, called the
“care plan volume”.3 Departmental heterogeneity has been proven regarding eligibility
decisions and hours open to public financing (Arrighi et al., 2015).
We focus on another dimension of the generosity of the program that depends on the
departmental council. For each hour consumed within the care volume, the OOP price of
2In our work, we describe the scheme before the 2016 reform. This reform has affected the copayment
scheme and the regulation of providers. We will discuss the potential effects of the last point with our
results.
3The monetary equivalent of the care plan volume (hours of the care plan converted in euros using a
tariff fixed by the department) must not exceed a legal ceiling, which is set nationally and depends on
the disability level of the beneficiary.
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care is lowered by the APA subsidy.4 By law, the OOP price depends on the copayment
rate of beneficiaries, which is a linear function of the individual’s income.5 However, the
central law does not make clear how the final OOP payment is computed.6 Three types
of practices are observed : either the copayment is applied to the provider price (rule 1),
either it is applied to a lump sum price, lower than the provider price. In this second case,
the difference between the price and the lump sum price is supported by the beneficiary
(rule 2) or it is paid by a departmental specific grant (rule 3). System 3.1 summarizes
these possibilities. Rule 3 is the most generous as it yields the lower OOP payment7 while
Rule 2 is the less generous.
OOPi =









ci.pi (Rule 1)
ci.t + (pi − t) (Rule 2)
ci.t (Rule 3)
(3.1)
with OOPi the OOP price paid by the individual; ci the copayment rate depending
on Ii individual i’s income (ci = c(Ii)); pi the provider price and t the lump sum price set
by the department.
Using the average value for the copayment rate, price and care plan volume in the
sample of APA beneficiaries used in Chapter 2, Appendix 7.1.B illustrates the variation
in monthly OOP payments that can result from the utilization of one rule or another. In
this case, using rule 2 rather than rule 3 would create a difference of e100 per month, or
about 8% of the average monthly income. The minimum difference (using rule 1 or rule
3) is of e22, or 2% of average income.
2.2 Regulation of the supply
In France, there is one key distinction in the home care sector: home care providers can
be regulated by the departmental council or not. Regulated providers receive a special
authorization from the departmental council to enter the market. They have to meet
quality standards, including certifications and regular external evaluations. Their price is
fixed by the departmental council on the basis of their previous costs of provision (Gramain
and Xing, 2012). The other providers, that we call non-regulated providers, are lightly
4The financing of the APA allowance by central government and departments is detailed in Appendix
7.1.A.
5The participation rate is zero for low-income individuals and it is capped to 90% for high-income
individuals.
6To illustrate our point, one can see that the official webpage on the OOP payment in the APA
scheme only mentions the copayment rate depending on income. See (in French): https://www.
service-public.fr/particuliers/vosdroits/F1802
7Provided that t < p, which is systematically the case.
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regulated. There are two types of non-regulated providers: non-regulated structures and
over-the-counter workers.8 Non-regulated structures have lower quality requirements and
they are relatively free to set their price.9 Over-the-counter workers contract directly
with the consumer who is free to set the hourly wage provided that she complies with
general labor law. Overall, the uncertainty regarding quality and price is higher when the
provider is not regulated.
There are few empirical elements on the market segmentation between regulated and
non-regulated providers. All providers can intervene on both publicly and privately finan-
ced formal care, and serve consumers with different disability levels. In the department
studied in Chapter 2, severe disability levels are less frequently observed among individu-
als served by a regulated provider. The determinants of the choice of a provider might
depend on the availability of providers (serving her municipality), the price and other
unobserved characteristics of the provider.10
To give a visual insight of variations existing in both the financing of the demand
and the regulation of the supply, Figure 3.1 shows the differences existing in the OOP
payments borne by an APA beneficiary with a copayment of 20%11 and served by the
biggest regulated provider in the department.12 Differences result from the choices of
departmental councils regarding the computation formula as well as differences in provider
prices. In the last group of our distribution divided by quartiles, the hourly OOP payment
is expected to be between e3.7 and e4.1 while in the first group, it is between e4.4 and
e6.2. The Figure also reveals differences existing regarding the regulation of the supply,
as some departments declare they do not have any regulated provider.
8In the General introduction of the thesis, non-regulated providers only refers to non-regulated structu-
res. Here, the term is used in opposition to regulated structures and implies both non-regulated structures
and over-the-counter workers.
9Restrictions on yearly price evolution are enacted at the national level.
10Appendix 7.6.B in Chapter 2 studies the determinants of the choice of a provider with a low price,
but among consumers served by a regulated provider.
11It corresponds to the average copayment rate of APA beneficiaries in the administrative data from
the APA program “Remontées individuelles” (DREES, 2011).
12We use the departmental survey “SolvAPA”. It is not the departmental survey we use in this paper
as we do not have concomitant individual information, but it is presented in Section 7 as an additional
source of information.
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Figure 3.1 – Hourly out-of-pocket payments of an APA beneficiary served by the biggest
regulated provider in the department
Source: SolvAPA survey (DREES, 2015a)
Notes: computation by the author. Copayment rate set at 20%.
Realization: Roquebert, 2018.
3 Data and modeling of the demand
3.1 Description of departmental practices
The “Territoire” survey (LEDa-LEGOS and CES, 2012) was implemented by a team
of sociologists and economists. Field studies were first conducted in eight departmental
councils to observe their practices regarding long-term care. They aim at evaluating the
latitude they have in the implementation of the policy. Their results underline the variety
existing in the organization of the policy (Billaud et al., 2012; Gramain and Xing, 2012).13
They have been used to construct a questionnaire that was sent to the 96 metropolitan
departmental councils in 2012.14 71 departmental councils returned the questionnaire.
Appendix 7.2.A compares the characteristics of respondents and non respondent depart-
ments with respect to sociodemographic characteristics and social policy indicators and
does not find significant differences between the two groups.
We use this original survey to get indicators of both the generosity of public financing
and the importance of the regulation of the supply in the department. First, we isolate
13In particular, on the basis of interviews with the persons in charge of the management of the allo-
wance, the researchers have identified the existence of the different computation formulas presented in
the preceding section.
14The questionnaire can be found here (in French): http://modapa.cnrs.fr/questionnaire.pdf.
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departments that have no regulated providers (7 departments). They have a limited
intervention on the formal home care sector, not controlling for prices or quality. They
use rule 2 to compute the allowance for all (non-regulated) providers. We then measure
departmental generosity with the rule used to compute the allowance when the beneficiary
is served by a regulated provider.15 The classical case is when departmental councils use
rule 1. A few departments use the third rule for regulated providers. As it implies
additional spending for the departmental council, we consider it is a “generous” policy.
Interestingly, this indicator of policy generosity does not depend by construction on the
distribution of the population nor on its actual consumption, but directly shows the
decisions of the departmental councils. Previous indicators used in the literature come
from departmental policies and actual consumption of beneficiaries. For instance, the
average subsidy per beneficiary depends on the copayment of APA beneficiaries, on the
care plan volume and on the share of the care plan that is actually consumed.
Regarding the regulation of the supply, we use the share of APA hours that is provided
by regulated providers, as a proxy for the market power of regulated in the home care
sector of the department. Either non-regulated providers are dominating the market,
or there is competition, or regulated providers providers dominate the market.16 This
indicator does not depend directly on the number of individuals consuming formal care,
nor on the volume they consume.
Appendix 7.2.B compares the characteristics of departments in each category. We
report here significant differences. In generous departments, the population is, on average,
younger and wealthier than the population in other departments. In departments where
non-regulated providers dominate the market, the population is, on average, younger,
with a lower rate of the elderly population receiving the APA. Interestingly, departments
without regulated providers are not different from the majority of departments in other
categories. We thus observe a correlation between some departmental practices and the
characteristics of the demand. We extensively discuss the endogeneity issues in Section 7
and, in the absence of an alternative empirical strategy confirming the exogeneity of our
indicators, we will remain cautious in the causal interpretation of our results.
Table 3.1 summarizes the distribution of departments according to their practices.
Each computation rules is represented in every level of supply regulation, suggesting that
choices are made independently. The size of categories, though, are unbalanced, with
some cases being much more frequent than others. Thus, we will evaluate the effects
15Departments can use different rules depending on the provider status. Quasi-systematically, benefi-
ciaries served by non-regulated providers are subsidized using rule 2. Variations are observed regarding
the rule used for beneficiaries served by regulated providers.
16The question in the questionnaire is: “What is the proportion of APA hours served by regulated
providers?”. Departmental councils choose either less of 1/3, between 1/3 and 2/3, more than 2/3 of
APA hours.
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of marginal practices compared to the more frequent case (classical with dominance of
regulated providers).17
Table 3.1 – Distribution of departmental practices
No regulated Classical Generous Total
providers (rule 1) (rule 3)
No regulated providers 7 - - 7
Dominance of non-regulated providers - 2 1 3
Competition - 25 3 28
Dominance of regulated providers - 30 3 33
Total 7 57 7 71
Sample: 71 metropolitan departments respondents to the survey.
Source: Territoire survey (LEDa-LEGOS and CES, 2012)
Notes: Columns correspond to the generosity of the hourly APA subsidies. Lines corre-
spond to the importance of the regulation in the home care sector.
3.2 A sample of disabled elderly
These indicators are used to supplement the HSM survey (DREES and INSEE, 2008).
Collected in 2008, this national survey focuses on the disabilities and health limitations
encountered by the French population. Our sample of interest gathers together individuals
aged 60 or more, who declare having at least one restriction in the activities of daily living,
either essential or instrumental (ADL or IADL)18.
We use as a variable of interest the variable indicating if the individual receives formal
home care.19 This variable comprises both privately and publicly funded formal care. It
includes care provided either by regulated or non-regulated providers.
We could alternatively have focused on the variable indicating if the individual receives
the APA (or, at least, has applied to receive it). Indeed, our demand indicator is likely to
directly influence the take-up of the program. The choice of the broader variable of formal
care use is motivated by two reasons. The first is technical: the variables related to the
APA program in the HSM survey have been shown to underestimated the actual use of the
APA program (Tenand, 2016). The weighted number of elderly declaring they receive the
benefit in the survey is much lower than the actual number of APA beneficiary in 2008. In
our sample of disabled elderly, among formal care users, only 17% declare they are APA
beneficiaries. The second argument relates to the effect of our supply indicator. It might
17Appendix 7.2.C shows the distribution of the observations in our sample across categories.
18See Appendix 7.3 for more details on ADL and IADL.
19In our definition, individuals consume formal care if they have specifically declared they receive care
from home care providers.
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affect formal care used by disabled elderly, regardless of their APA status. Some disabled
elderly are not eligible for the APA program (GIR 5 and 6) but they could nonetheless
consume formal care, while being potentially subsidized by other schemes like pension
funds.
On the basis of the department of residence, we match the individual data with the
Territoire survey.20 In our estimations, we will control for a set of sociodemographic
characteristics: age, sex, marital status, education level (highest diploma obtained) and
monthly income. We distinguish between different disability level using the Katz Index.
This index proposes eight categories that are constructed to take into account both the
number and the type of ADL restrictions (Katz et al., 1970; Katz, 1983). Group A refers
to independent individuals. Activity limitations increases in other groups, up to Group
G which gathers together individuals requiring assistance for six activities of daily living
(personal hygiene, dressing, toileting, transferring, eating and drinking, and continence).
In the last group, Group H, are found persons requiring assistance for at least two activities
but not falling in previous categories.21 We group some categories to distinguish between
independent (group A), moderately disabled (B-C-H), highly disabled (D-E) or severely
disabled (F-G) individuals, as has been done previously in the literature (Fontaine, 2012).
We also control for the fact that another person could have responded to the survey
(proxy), as this variable is correlated with the level of functional limitations and the
perception of unmet needs (Davin et al., 2009).22 To take into account the care provided
by the relatives, we control for the number of daughters and sons of the individual. In the
literature, these variables have been used to instrument informal care (Van Houtven and
Norton, 2004); they permit to capture only the effect of potential informal care provision
on the formal care use, while avoiding the potential reverse causality that would exist if
we include the volume of informal care provided by children.23 Finally, we also control for
the area of residence of the individual (rural or urban).24 Table 3.2 shows the descriptive
statistics of these variables on our sample.
20The HSM survey was constructed to be representative at the national level, not at the departmental
level. Consequently, we are not able to provide descriptive statistics on individuals by department. In our
estimations, the precision of estimates will depend on the number of individuals that have been surveyed
in each department. Remarkably, three departments are not represented in our sample.
21See Appendix 7.3 for the definition of each category.
22Some studies have also found that the proxy tends to over-estimate the activity limitations of the
individuals, but this is not what is found by Davin et al. (2009), working on French data.
23In that case, the coefficient would capture both the effects of informal care on formal care and the
reverse relationship.
24We use the zoning ZAUER proposed by the INSEE. Rural municipalities are those who belong to an
employment area defined as rural, or in the halo of such an area and other municipalities predominantly
rural.
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Table 3.2 – Descriptive statistics on the sample
%
Individual characteristics
Consumes formal care 43.89
Woman 69.24
Age: 60-70 21.23
Age: 70-80 38.48
Age: 80-90 33.40
Age: older than 90 6.89
Does not live with a spouse 51.67
Lives in a rural municipality 19.36
No diploma 47.10
Diploma of primary studies 39.61
Diploma of secondary school 7.24
Diploma: baccalauréat (high school) 6.05
Monthly income < e1000 20.59
e1000 ≤ monthly income < e1500 25.28
e1500 ≤ monthly income < e2000 17.34
Monthly income ≥ e2000 26.44
Income missing 10.35
Katz Index: independent 77.54
Katz Index: moderatly disabled 13.88
Katz Index: highly disabled 3.41
Katz Index: severely disabled 5.16
Use of a proxy 10.76
Number of sons (mean) 1.22
Number of daughters (mean) 1.25
Lives in a department...
Non-respondent 27.6
No regulated providers 3.55
Classical 55.70
Generous 13.13
Dominance of regulated providers 30.22
Competition 28.24
Dominance of non regulated providers 10.38
Sample: 4,395 individuals aged 60 or more, having at
least one ADL or IADL limitations.
Source: HSM survey (DREES and INSEE, 2008).
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3.3 Modeling formal care use
We focus on the extensive margin and denote yi the formal care utilization of individual
i, with yi = 1 if the individual receives formal care, yi = 0 otherwise. Formal care
utilization depends on a latent variable y∗i modeling the utility the individual gets from
formal care consumption. Only yi is observed. If y
∗
i is positive, the utility of formal care
is high enough to result in consumption. It can be expressed as follows:



yi = 1 ⇔ y
∗
i > 0
yi = 0 ⇔ y
∗
i < 0
(3.2)
The utility of formal care is assumed to depend on individual characteristics Xi and
on the practices in the department where the individual lives, denoted Dd(i).
y∗i = β0 + Xiβ + Dd(i)α + ui (3.3)
With Xi individual characteristics of i and Dd(i) departmental variables of the depart-
ment d of individual i.
We use a Logit25 model explaining the probability to consume formal care with in-
dividual and departmental determinants.26 As we are using mixed-level data, we cluster
standard errors at the department level to take into account potential correlation of dis-
turbances within departments (Moulton, 1990).27
To control for the characteristics of departments, we use the departmental classifica-
tion recently proposed by the Ministry of Health (DREES, 2014; Fizzala, 2016).28 It offers
an interesting opportunity to control for sociodemographic characteristics of departments.
This classification has been established on the basis of a principle component analysis and
it creates five departmental groups with respect to demographic and socioeconomic cha-
racteristics, that we will call “sociodemographic groups”. Variables taken into account
relate to the elderly population in the department: importance in the population, health
status, wealth, socio-professional characteristics and living arrangements. The classifi-
25Appendix 7.4 details the formalization of the Logit model.
26Appendix 7.5.A repeats our estimations using linear probability and Probit models to test whether
our results are sensitive to the functional form.
27We could have used a multilevel modeling, which less straightforward and more demanding in terms
of assumptions regarding the distribution error terms (Primo et al., 2007). Appendix 7.5.B discusses this
choice and provides the estimation of such a model.
28See Appendix 7.6 for a detailed presentation.
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cation also takes into account the equipment rate in institutions29 in the department.30
Controlling for the sociodemographic group of the department decreases the potential
omitted variable bias in the analysis of the effect of departmental practices.
4 Results
4.1 Main results
Several estimations of the model are provided. While controlling for individual de-
terminants, we first include the generosity of the financing of demand (Estimation 1) or
the regulation of the supply (Estimation 2). Then, we include both types of indicators
(Estimation 3). Standard errors are systematically clustered at the department level.31
The coefficients of the Logit estimations for departmental practices are provided in
Table 3.3. To ease the reading, the odds-ratios derived for departmental variables in
Estimations 1 to 3 are presented in Figures 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4.
Without controlling for the supply characteristics, using a classical or generous com-
putation rule for the APA program does not affect the probability to use formal care
(Figure 3.2, or Column (1) in Table 3.3). Compared to those living in a department with
a classical policy, an individual living in a department with a generous APA computation
formula does not have a higher probability to consume formal care. Quite unexpectedly,
individuals living in a department that did not respond to the Territoire survey have a
higher probability to consume formal care.
Turning to the regulation of the supply (Figure 3.3, or Column (2) in Table 3.3), we
observe that individuals living in a department with the dominance of non-regulated pro-
viders have a significantly lower probability to consume formal care, compared to those
living in a department with a dominance of regulated providers. The magnitude of the
29One could want to additionally control for the importance of bed blockers in the department. This
phenomenon refers to the situation when individuals stay in short-term care units because a lack of appro-
priate available infrastructures outside. It is correlated to the long-term care supply in the area (Gaughan
et al., 2017) and could give information on the potential saturation of the home care market. Gansel
et al. (2010) present the construction of this notion in the French context, underlying the coordination
issues resulting from the medical specialization and segmentation; but to the best of our knowledge, there
is no data available at the national level that would permit to control for this phenomenon in our study.
30The policy regarding institutional care is mainly decided at the regional level by specific health
authorities (Agences régionales de santé). Departmental councils, however, may negotiate and have a
latitude in the implementation regarding this domain. This is all the more so likely that they are also
financing the part of the APA scheme devoted to elderly living in nursing homes. However, they are not
influencing the allocation of elderly across care settings: individuals apply to the APA program for a
given part of the scheme (in the community or in nursing homes).
31We have 93 clusters, corresponding to the 96 metropolitan departments minus the three departments
that are not represented in our sample.
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impact, given by the marginal effect for the average individual of our sample32 derived
from the observed coefficient, is -0.062. This effect is robust when controlling for both
departmental generosity, despite a small loss of precision (statistical significance at the
10% level). Column 3 (and Figure 3.4) suggests that the dominance of non-regulated
providers lowers formal care use, whatever the demand side practices. It could reveal
that a low level of regulation decreases the incentives to consume formal care, potentially
through a price effet: when non-regulated dominate the market, the expected OOP pay-
ment is higher. It could also be through a quality effect: when non-regulated dominate
the market, the quality is more uncertain. It could also reveal that these departments
are less involved into the long term care policy: the low regulation level would signal li-
mited information processes and restrictive practices at the extensive margin of the APA
program. Finally, the geographical coverage within the department could be deteriorated
when non-regulated dominate the market, as they have no universal coverage obligation.
All these interpretations, however, needs to be cautious. Indeed, we additionnaly observe
that the absence of any regulated providers does not correlate with low use.
Table 3.4 presents the effects of individual determinants in Estimation 3.33 They are
consistent with previous findings of the literature. The probability to consume formal
care is higher for women, when individuals are older, severely disabled (as captured by
the Katz Index) or when they live without a spouse. A lower income and a higher level
of education also increase the probability to use formal care. Regarding informal care, we
find a negative effect of the number of daughters but no significant effect for the number
of sons. Living in a rural area increases formal care use. This interesting result could be
explained by the lower availability of substitutes to formal care in rural areas (informal
care or other type of formal services) compared to urban areas.
We now want to compare the quality of our models to estimations that do not include
departmental information, or that use departmental fixed-effects only. Table 3.5 compares
the information criteria obtained on several estimations. The first estimation includes in-
dividual determinants only, the second estimation adds departmental fixed-effects and the
last three estimations correspond to the estimations with departmental indicators presen-
ted in Table 3.3. The Akaike’s and Bayesian information criteria (AIC and BIC) make it
possible to compare models when they are not nested. They measure the loss of informa-
tion coming from the model: the lower the indicator, the better the model. As is shown in
Table 3.3, the AIC indicates that the loss of information is the lowest with Estimation (4)
and (5) — including only supply indicators or both types - followed by Estimation (3) —
32A woman aged between 70 and 80, living alone, not in a rural area, who did not get a diploma, has
a monthly income of at least e2,000, is independent in the Katz Index sense, not using a proxy, having
a daughter and a son, living in group D.
33Their sign and magnitude are stable across the three estimations.
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with demand indicators. The BIC more severely sanctions additional explaining variables:
thus, its lower value is observed for the first model (without departmental variables), just
before models (3), (4) and (5). This comparison shows that including the departmental
indicators rather than departmental fixed effects makes it possible to increase the quality
of the estimations.
Table 3.3 – Departmental determinants of formal care use
Consumes formal care
(1) (2) (3)
Departmental characteristics
Non respondent 0.200∗ 0.278∗∗ 0.269∗
(0.115) (0.140) (0.145)
No regulated providers 0.137 0.205 0.199
(0.262) (0.257) (0.258)
Ref: classical
Generous -0.243 -0.058
(0.177) (0.157)
Ref: dominance of regulated providers
Competition 0.166 0.166
(0.152) (0.153)
Dominance of non regulated providers -0.320∗∗ -0.288∗
(0.152) (0.164)
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes
Department socio–demographic group Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4395 4395 4395
Number of clusters 93 93 93
Log-likelihood -2644.983 -2640.987 -2640.919
AIC 5343.965 5337.974 5339.839
BIC 5516.447 5516.844 5525.097
Sample: 4,395 individuals aged 60 or more, having at least one ADL or IADL
limitations.
Sources: HSM survey (DREES and INSEE, 2008); Territoire survey (LEDa-
LEGOS and CES, 2012).
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis, clustered at the department level.
∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05 ∗∗∗p < 0.01. Estimation of a Logit model explaining the
probability to consume formal care. Controls for individual characteristics and
the sociodemographic group of the department.
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Figure 3.2 – Odds-ratios for the effect of public generosity on formal care use (Estimation
1)
Sample: 4,395 individuals aged 60 or more, having at least one ADL
or IADL limitations.
Source: HSM survey (DREES and INSEE, 2008); Territoire survey
(LEDa-LEGOS and CES, 2012)
Notes: odds-ratio derived from the estimation of a Logit model
explaining the probability to consume formal care and controlling
for individual characteristics and the sociodemographic group of the
department (Estimation 1 in Table 3.3).
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Figure 3.3 – Odds-ratios for the effect of supply regulation on formal care use (Estimation
2)
Sample: 4,395 individuals aged 60 or more, having at least one ADL
or IADL limitations.
Source: HSM survey (DREES and INSEE, 2008); Territoire survey
(LEDa-LEGOS and CES, 2012)
Notes: odds-ratio derived from the estimation of a Logit model
explaining the probability to consume formal care and controlling
for individual characteristics and the sociodemographic group of the
department (Estimation 2 in Table 3.3).
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Figure 3.4 – Odds-ratios for the effect of public generosity and supply regulation on formal
care use (Estimation 3)
Sample: 4,395 individuals aged 60 or more, having at least one ADL
or IADL limitations.
Source: HSM survey (DREES and INSEE, 2008); Territoire survey
(LEDa-LEGOS and CES, 2012)
Notes: odds-ratio derived from the estimation of a Logit model
explaining the probability to consume formal care and controlling
for individual characteristics and the sociodemographic group of the
department (Estimation 3 in Table 3.3).
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Table 3.4 – Individual determinants of formal care use
Consumes formal care
Individual characteristics
Woman 0.633∗∗∗
(0.070)
Age: 60-70 -0.821∗∗∗
(0.103)
Ref: age 70-80
Age: 80-90 0.432∗∗∗
(0.079)
Age: older than 90 0.644∗∗∗
(0.183)
Does not live with a spouse 0.480∗∗∗
(0.092)
Ref: lives in an urban municipality
Lives in a rural municipality 0.268∗
(0.109)
Ref: no diploma
Diploma of primary studies 0.183∗
(0.072)
Diploma of secondary school 0.463∗∗
(0.160)
Diploma: baccalauréat (high school) 0.655∗∗∗
(0.120)
Monthly income < e1,000 0.256∗
(0.101)
Ref: e1,000 ≤ monthly income < e1,500
e1,500 ≤ monthly income < e2,000 0.023
(0.107)
Monthly income ≥ e2,000 -0.351∗∗∗
(0.100)
Income missing -0.373∗∗
(0.133)
Number of daughters -0.102∗∗
(0.032)
Number of sons -0.023
(0.023)
Ref: Katz Index: A
Continued on next page
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Table 3.4 - Continued from previous page
Consumes formal care
Katz Index: moderatly disabled 0.744∗∗∗
(0.092)
Katz Index: highly disabled 0.915∗∗∗
(0.211)
Katz Index: severely disabled 1.065∗∗∗
(0.164)
Use of a proxy -0.288∗
(0.133)
Observations 4395
Number of clusters 93
Log-likelihood -2640.919
AIC 5339.839
BIC 5525.097
Sample: 4,395 individuals aged 60 or more, having at least
one ADL or IADL limitations.
Sources: HSM survey (DREES and INSEE, 2008); Territoire survey
(LEDa-LEGOS and CES, 2012).
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the department level. ∗p < 0.10,
∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. Estimation of a Logit model explaining the
probability to consume formal care. Departmental controls include
response to the Territoire survey, demand and supply indicators and the
socio-demographic group of the department.
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Table 3.5 – Information criteria
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Estimation characteristics
Departmental indicators None Fixed effects Demand (D) Supply (S) D+S
Clusters No No Yes Yes Yes
Department socio–demographic
group
No No Yes Yes Yes
Information criteria
AIC 5357.394 5342.640 5343.965 5337.974 5339.839
BIC 5485.159 6045.344 5516.447 5516.844 5525.097
Sample: 4,395 individuals aged 60 or more, having at least one ADL or IADL limitations.
Sources: HSM survey (DREES and INSEE, 2008); Territoire survey (LEDa-LEGOS and CES, 2012).
Notes: Estimations of Logit models explaining the probability to consume formal care. Additional
controls for individual characteristics and response to the Territoire survey.
Coefficients obtained from Estimations (1) and (2) are available upon request. Estimations (3) to (5)
are presented in Table 3.3.
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4.2 Extensions and robustness checks
We have tested the sensitivity of our results to the form of control for departmental
characteristics. Instead of the groups mentioned here-before, we directly include the
variables that have been used to construct the classification: the share of individuals aged
75 or more in the population, their poverty rate and the rate of individuals living alone in
the community,34 and the equipment rate in institutions. Our results are robust to this
change.35
The organization of long-term care is likely to be specific in French metropolis. In Paris,
for instance, the department actually corresponds to the capital. As a robustness check,
we estimate the models without the departments including the three biggest metropolis:
Paris (75), Marseille (13) and Lyon (69). Our results are robust to this exclusion only if
we do not control for the departmental sociodemographic group. With the group effect,
we considerably loose precision and it prevents us from identifying any significant effect.
5 Discussion
We use the inter-departmental variations to study the effect of public financing and
regulation of the supply on formal care use. To treat these variations as exogenous, we
assume that the disabled elderly did not choose their department of residence according to
their willingness to consume formal care or not. This is a usual hypothesis when focusing
on the disabled elderly (see, for instance, Stabile et al. (2006)). Indeed, the residential
mobility of the elderly is very low and when moves occur, they are mainly explained by
family motives or the need for adapted residences (Laferrère and Angelini, 2010). We
thus consider that the departmental practices are exogenous to the location choice of
individuals.
To be exogenous to formal care use, departmental practices should not be correlated
with unobserved variables that would also affect the individual formal care use (omitted
variable bias) nor by the actual demand in the department (reverse causality issue). We
control for the sociodemographic group of the department and we are thus comparing
departments that are supposedly similar regarding the level of the demand for home care.
Indeed, the classification we use specifically builds on the characteristics of the elderly
population and the equipment rate in institutions. It does not prevent departmental
unobserved heterogeneity from biasing our estimation but it should substantially limit it.
34We use the rate of individuals living alone in the community for the year 2014 as previous rates are
not available as open data. Other indicators are from 2012.
35We have not been able, though, to reconstruct and include the variables relating to the share of
individuals living in rural areas or the socio-professional characteristics of the population.
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Moreover, the criteria we study are little-known by departmental councils and citizens.
Field studies have shown that the rules used on the demand side are not identified as key
points of the APA policy, nor as a political issue (Billaud et al., 2012) and they essentially
results from decisions of the technical desk in charge of the APA program. In parallel, the
disabled elderly and their family are poorly rallied around collective action (Weber et al.,
2013), such that they are not likely to influence these technical decisions.
Though these reasons support the hypothesis of the exogeneity of departmental practi-
ces, in the absence of an alternative empirical strategy confirming it, we will remain cau-
tious and interpret our results in terms of association rather than causal impact. The
link between our indicator of departmental generosity and the demand for home care is
limited. This is not what we expected, as the literature has shown that the consumption
of formal home care is sensitive to its price (Fontaine, 2012; Bourreau-Dubois et al., 2014;
Arnault, 2015; Hege, 2016; Roquebert and Tenand, 2017). However, we are focusing on
the extensive margin. The variations we study might be negligible for the decision to
consume care but more important regarding the volume of care consumed within the
program. The next step of research is thus to examine the volume of care consumed, con-
ditional on positive use.36 Moreover, we are studying both publicly and privately funded
care, such that our results might be blurred by exclusively privately funded care. Finally,
the absence of correlation between the computation formula and the decision to consume
care could also reveal that the parameters of importance are those related to the opening
of rights (care plan volume), or the other parameters of the OOP payment (provider price
and/or lump sum price).
This work interestingly sheds light on the previous results of the literature. Arrighi
et al. (2015) and Barnay and Juin (2016) find that the rate of APA beneficiaries in the
elderly population (above 60 or 75) increases the take-up of the APA program and formal
care use. The descriptive part of our work shows that a lower rate of APA beneficiaries
among the elderly population correlates with the dominance of non-regulated providers
on the supply side. However, we find no effect of departmental generosity regarding com-
putation formal on formal care use, probably because we focus on a very tiny aspect of the
long-term care policy compared to the more aggregated indicator used in the literature.37
Finally, on the technical side, we use two surveys that have not been collected the same
year. The HSM was collected in 2008 while the Territoire survey was implemented in 2012.
We thus implicitly assume that the departmental practices observed in 2012 are correlated
with those of 2008: either they have not changed, or they have evolved in a way that is
36It could be done using a two-part model, with the first step corresponding to the decision of using
formal care and the second step the volume of the formal care consumed.
37Appendix 7.7 provides details on the differences between Arrighi et al. (2015)’s approach - which is
close to our study - and our work.
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consistent with the preceding practices. This assumption could be threatened by the fact
that departmental elections occurred between 2008 and 2012.38 However, the points we
study are far from being central in the political debate, or even identified as a political
issue. Thus, they are likely not to be affected by the departmental elections. To shed
some light on the persistence of departmental practices, we use the survey implemented
in 2015 by the Ministry of Health (Drees), which collected a survey called SolvAPA
focusing on the departmental practices regarding the APA program (DREES, 2015a).
Its questionnaire was close to the questionnaire of the Territoire survey and offers the
opportunity to compare departmental practices in 2012 and 2015 - though, unfortunately,
the question on the regulation of the supply was not included -. It is done in Appendix
7.8. It shows that among departments respondent to both surveys, 4 departments over
5 use the same rule in 2012 and 2015. For those who changed, they systematically use
a less generous rule in 2015: some were classical department and turned to use rule 2
for regulated providers; other were generous and turned to be classical. This could be
explained by the increasing constraints weighting on departmental finances. If we assume
that the same trend was ongoing between 2008 and 2012, it means that the departmental
practices we observed in 2012 are either the same than those of 2008, or they are less
generous. In this last case, the estimates of each category would under estimate the effect
of departmental practices.
6 Conclusion
This paper estimates, at the extensive margin, the link between formal care use and
two parameters that depend on departmental decisions: the generosity of the hourly
APA subsidy and the importance in the regulation of providers. It finds no effect of the
generosity of the APA policy while, on the supply side, the dominance of non-regulated
providers — whose quality is uncertain and price is little regulated — decreases the
probability to consume formal care, potentially due to a price effect or a quality effect.
Such an interpretation should be taken cautiously, however, since we additionnaly observe
that the absence of any regulated providers does not correlate with low use.
These results first contribute to the debate on the difference of treatment that can
result from the decentralization of a national policy (see for instance Argoud (2007);
Chevreul and Berg Brigham (2013); Maarse and Jeurissen (2016)). Indeed, we highlight
a little-known latitude of departmental councils in the generosity of the APA program. It
does not correlate, however, with the demand for formal care at the extensive margin. We
also underline the variety of situations regarding the regulation of the home care providers
38In 2008 for half of the departments, in 2011 for others.
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and implications in terms of price and quality for the elderly.
Our results are also of interest for discussing the recent reform of the home care sector,
requiring all providers to be regulated. According to our results, it could help increasing
formal care use in departments where the regulation level was initially low. This reform,
though, did not impose the pricing by the departmental councils to all providers. Then,
it could be expected to increase overall quality in the home care sector, while the effect on
prices is rather uncertain. If the low level of regulation correlates to a low level of demand
because of a low quality, we could expect this reform to increase the demand and have
beneficial effects for the health of the elderly.
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7 Appendices
7.1 Additional information on the institutional context
7.1.A Financing of the APA allowance
Along with the creation of the APA program in 2002 was organized the financial
support from the central government to departmental councils (Concours APA I ). The
central French government is represented by a specific central agency, the Caisse Nationale
de Solidarité pour l’Autonomie (CNSA). Each year, it allocates to departmental councils
resources coming from social contributions and some consumption taxes.
The sharing of these resources proceeds as follows. The characteristics of departments
are used to construct a weighted coefficient representing the share of the total of resources
the department will get. This coefficient depends on the number of individuals aged
75 or more living in the department compared to the national 75+ population (weight:
50%), the APA spending (weight: 20%), the fiscal capacity39 of the department (weight:
-25%) and the number of recipients of unemployment benefits (Revenu de solidarité active
(RSA)) (weight: 5%). The coefficient affected to department D, cD, is thus:
cD =
�
(
N75D
�
d N75d
) ∗ 0, 5 + (
SPENDD
�
d SPENDd
) ∗ 0, 2
− (
FCD
�
d FCd
) ∗ 0, 25 + (
RSAD
�
d RSAd
) ∗ 0, 05
�
∗ 2
Where N75D is the number of individuals aged 75 or more in department D, SPENDD
is the amount of APA spending, FCD is the fiscal capacity and RSAd is the number of
RSA beneficiaries.
The central resources devoted to the financing of the APA have not notably increased
since the creation the program, while the expenditure of the departments have risen.
Consequently, the cost of the APA program for the departmental finances is increasing:
Figure 3.5 shows that the coverage rate of the APA spendings of departmental councils
by central government contributions has fallen from 43% in 2002 to approximately 30%
in 2009; it has then slightly increased to 32 % in 2014 and 2015.40
In this context, departmental councils have incentives to use the latitude they have
in the implementation of the APA program to adjust their expenditures; it can be done
39It corresponds to the expected amount of tax that would be obtained when implementing average
tax rates in the department.
40Data are available on the following link: https://www.cnsa.fr/
compensation-de-la-perte-dautonomie/financement-des-prestations-concours-aux-departements/
le-concours-allocation-personnalisee-dautonomie.
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with the reduction of the number of hours open to subsidies, with potential restrictions of
the number of APA beneficiaries at the extensive margin or through variations in the way
the care plan volume is translated into a subsidy (Haut conseil de la famille de l’enfance
et de l’âge, 2017). This last point may include both the way the monetary equivalent of
care plan volume is computed and the way the hourly subsidy is computed.
With the 2016 reform of the APA program, a second part of the central contribution
was created (Concours APA II ) to take into account the additional spending generated by
the reform (increases in legal thresholds for care plan volumes, changes in the copayment
scheme, financing of the right to respite for caregivers and increase of the professional ca-
regivers’ wages). It explains why, on Figure 3.5, the central contribution and the coverage
rate are expected to increase in 2016.
Figure 3.5 – Contribution of the central government to the APA spending of departmental
councils between 2002 and 2016
Source: Direction des affaires générales et financières (DAGF), CNSA.
198
Decentralized policies and formal care use
7.1.B Variation in the generosity of the APA subsidy: an example
We illustrate the variation in the generosity of the APA subsidy due to the computation
formula used by the departmental council. We consider the sample of APA beneficiaries
used in Chapter 2. In this sample, the average provider price is e22, the average copay-
ment rate is 22% and the tarriff used with rule 241 is e17.6. As shown in Figure 3.6, if the
department council chooses rule 3, the hourly OOP payment of the individual is e3.9 per
hour of formal care (rule 3). It increases to e8.3 if it chooses rule 2, while rule 1 yields
an OOP payment of e4.8 per hour. The maximum difference (between rule 2 and rule 3)
is thus of e4.4 per hour of care. This is far from being negligible: with an average care
plan volume of 22 hours, it results in a monthly difference of e97, or 8% of the month
average net income.42 The difference between rule 1 and rule 2, with the average care
plan volume, yields a monthly gap of e75 (or 6% of average income). Between rule 1 and
rule 3, the monthly gap is of e22 (2% of average income).
41It corresponds to the rule used to compute the allowance of beneficaries served by non-regulated
providers.
42As underlined by Billaud et al. (2012), the choice of the departmental council also has implication
regarding the redistributive property of the APA program. Indeed, the rule changes the effective copay-
ment rate of the beneficiary. With rule 2 for instance, the effective copayment rate of the beneficiary
equals
�
ci.t + (pi − t)
�
/pi, which is higher than the APA copayment rate ci.
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Figure 3.6 – Example of the effect of computation formulas
Notes: example of the effect of variation in computation for-
mulas resulting in different hourly OOP payment, with a pro-
vider price at e22, a copayment rate at 22% and a tariff at
e17.6. Rule 1 yields an OOP payment of e4.8 (0.22*22); rule
2 yields an OOP payment of e8,3 (0.22*17.6 + (22-17.6); rule
3 yields an OOP payment of e3.6 (0.22*17.6).
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7.2 Descriptive statistics on departments...
7.2.A ...According to response to the Territoire survey
Table 3.6 compares the characteristics of departments according to their (non) response
to the Territoire survey. We distinguish between two types of characteristics: the sociode-
mographic characteristics of the department (age distribution of the population, share of
households subject to income tax, interdecile range) and indicators more directly related
to the needs in terms of social policies in the department (poverty rates, share of APA
beneficiaries among the elderly population, rate of recipients of unemployment benefits
RSA) or disability benefits (ACTP or Prestation compensatoire du handicap (PCH)43).
The equipment rate in institutions is also included. Apart from a slightly younger popu-
lation on average in non respondent departments, no remarkable differences are observed:
there are no statistically significant differences at the 10% level.
Table 3.6 – Departmental characteristics and response to the Territoire survey
NR Respondent Total Sources Difference
(p-
value)
60+ population/total population (%) 25.27 26.05 25.85
[A]
0.42
75+ population/total population (%) 9.88 10.23 10.14 0.47
Households subject to income tax (%) 62.64 61.54 61.83
[B]
0.38
Interdecile range 3.31 3.29 3.30 0.88
Poverty rate (%) 14.43 14.32 14.35
[B]
0.88
Poverty rate in 75+ population (%) 10.62 11.13 11.00 0.52
Rate of APA beneficiaries (%) 8.14 8.32 8.27
[C]
0.63
Mean spending per APA beneficiary (e) 4479.38 4528.12 4515.43 0.67
ACTP-PCH coverage ratea 4.48 4.96 4.83 [C] 0.12
RSA coverage rateb 6129.52 5984.82 6022.50 [D] 0.75
Equipment ratec 128.72 123.23 124.66 [E] 0.31
Sample: 96 metropolitan departments, with 71 respondents to the Territoire survey (LEDa-
LEGOS and CES, 2012).
Sources: [A]: INSEE (2012); [B]: INSEE-DGFiP-CNAF-CNAV-CCMSA (2012); [C]: DREES
(2012); [D]: (CNAF, 2012); [E]: DREES and INSEE (2012).
Notes: P-values from Student test.
“NR” stands for non-respondent. a: number of beneficiaries of the ACTP or PCH for 1,000
individuals in the department.
b: number of beneficiaries of the RSA for 100,000 individuals in the department.
c: number of accommodation places for 1,000 individuals aged 75 or more.
43The PCH is an allowance targeted to the disabled individuals younger than 60. It has replaced the
ACTP in 2006 but previous beneficiaries of the ACTP can continue to receive the allowance.
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7.2.B ...According to the generosity of financing and the regulation of the
supply
Tables 3.7 and 3.8 describe the characteristics of the departments according to their
practices regarding the financing of the demand and their regulation of the supply. As we
did for the comparison of respondent and non-respondent departments, we distinguish be-
tween two types of characteristics: the sociodemographic characteristics of the department
and indicators relating to the needs in terms of social policies in the department. These
tables additionally present the mean of the equipment rate in institution as it is used in
the estimations. We perform an analysis of variance (Anova) tests to study whether the
difference between group means is significant.
Table 3.7 shows that the population in departments with a generous policy is, on
average, significantly younger than those of other departments. The rate of APA bene-
ficiaries, however, is not significantly different, nor is the average level of spending per
APA beneficiary. The departments with a generous policy are also significantly wealthier
on average, with a higher share of households subject to the income tax and a lower po-
verty rate in the 75+ population. No significant differences are observed regarding the
importance of other social policies.
According to Table 3.8, when non-regulated providers dominate the market, the popu-
lation is, on average younger and the rate APA beneficiaries among the elderly population
is lower, but there is no significant difference in the average expense per APA benefici-
ary. Although the share of households subject to the income tax is significantly higher in
these departments, there is no significant difference in the poverty rates. No significant
differences is observed regarding the importance of other social policies.
Overall, there is one atypical category both on the demand side (generous computation
formula) and on the supply side (dominance of non-regulated providers). These two
categories, however, do not correspond one to each other: there is only one department
belonging to these two categories.
The computation formula and the provider mix are potentially influenced by the likely
demand in the department. Departments could be incentivized to be more generous when
taxes are more important (demand side). When the rate of APA beneficiaries is low
compared to the elderly population, they might not be eager to enter into a relatively-
costly regulation process. In this context, the causal interpretation of our results will
remain cautious.
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Table 3.7 – Departmental characteristics and generosity of the APA policy
No
regulated
providers
Classical Generous Total Source
Difference
(p-
value)
60+ population/total population
(%)
25.97 26.74 20.55 26.05
[A]
0.00
75+ population/total population
(%)
10.23 10.57 7.52 10.23 0.00
Households subject to income tax
(%)
62.38 60.45 69.57 61.54
[B]
0.00
Interdecile range 3.15 3.21 4.11 3.29 0.00
Poverty rate (%) 13.50 14.60 12.79 14.32
[B]
0.22
Poverty rate in 75+ population (%) 10.10 11.60 8.37 11.13 0.05
Rate of APA beneficiaries (%) 8.40 8.45 7.17 8.32
[C]
0.11
Mean spending per APA
beneficiary (e)
4255.59 4571.83 4444.78 4528.12 0.22
ACTP-PCH coverage ratea 5.04 5.05 4.16 4.96 [C] 0.32
RSA coverage rateb 5255.00 6147.88 5386.86 5984.82 [D] 0.36
Equipment ratec 127.66 123.89 113.49 123.23 [E] 0.50
Sample: 71 metropolitan departments respondents to the Territoire survey (LEDa-LEGOS and CES,
2012).
Sources: [A]: INSEE (2012); [B]: INSEE-DGFiP-CNAF-CNAV-CCMSA (2012); [C]: DREES (2012);
[D]: (CNAF, 2012); [E]: DREES and INSEE (2012).
Notes: P-values from Anova test. If it is inferior to 0.10, we indicate in italics the mean(s) that is/are
significantly different to the mean of classical departments.
a: number of beneficiaries of the ACTP or PCH for 1,000 individuals in the department.
b: number of beneficiaries of the RSA for 100,000 individuals in the department.
c: number of accommodation places for 1,000 individuals aged 75 or more.
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Table 3.8 – Departmental characteristics and regulation of the supply
No
regulated
providers
Dominance
non-
regulated
Competition Dominance
regulated
Total Source Difference
(p-
value)
60+ population/total population (%) 25.97 19.07 26.88 26.00 26.05
[A]
0.01
75+ population/total population (%) 10.23 6.79 10.66 10.19 10.23 0.02
Households subject to income tax (%) 62.38 72.88 61.40 60.45 61.54
[B]
0.00
Interdecile range 3.15 3.82 3.34 3.24 3.29 0.23
Poverty rate (%) 13.50 12.76 14.08 14.83 14.32
[B]
0.39
Poverty rate in 75+ population (%) 10.10 7.07 11.52 11.38 11.13 0.14
Rate of APA beneficiaries (%) 8.40 6.06 8.50 8.38 8.32
[C]
0.08
Mean spending per APA beneficiary (
euro)
4255.59 4428.63 4564.97 4563.71 4528.12 0.33
ACTP-PCH coverage ratea 5.04 4.44 5.04 4.92 4.96 [C] 0.92
RSA coverage rateb 5255.00 5334.33 5646.71 6485.64 5984.82 [D] 0.17
Equipment ratec 127.66 128.87 121.15 123.55 123.23 [E] 0.81
Sample: 71 metropolitan departments respondents to the Territoire survey (LEDa-LEGOS and CES, 2012).
Sources: [A]: INSEE (2012); [B]: INSEE-DGFiP-CNAF-CNAV-CCMSA (2012); [C]: DREES (2012); [D]: CNAF (2012);
[E]: DREES and INSEE (2012).
Notes: P-values from Anova test. If it is inferior to 0.10, we indicate in italics the mean(s) that is/are significantly different
to the mean of departments with dominance of regulated providers.
a: number of beneficiaries of the ACTP or PCH for 1,000 individuals in the department.
b: number of beneficiaries of the RSA for 100,000 individuals in the department.
c: number of accommodation places for 1,000 individuals aged 75 or more.
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7.2.C Sample distribution in departmental categories
Table 3.9 – Distribution of the sample in the departmental categories
Non No regulated Classical Generous Total
respondent providers (rule 1) (rule 3)
Non respondent 1214 - - - 1214
27.62% 27.62%
No regulated providers - 156 - - 156
3.55% 3.55%
Dominance of non-regulated - - 79 377 456
providers 1.80% 8.58% 10.38%
Competition - - 1144 97 1241
26.03% 2.21% 28.24%
Dominance of regulated - - 1225 103 1328
providers 27.87% 2.34% 30.22%
Total 1214 156 2448 577 4395
27.62% 3.55% 55.70% 13.13% 100%
Sample: 4,395 individuals aged 60 or more, having at least one ADL or IADL limitations.
Sources: HSM survey (DREES and INSEE, 2008); Territoire survey (LEDa-LEGOS and
CES, 2012).
Notes: the table shows the number of observations in each category and the percentage of
the sample they represent (in italics).
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7.3 Disability measures
We refer to several measures for the disability levels: ADL and IADL, GIR and Katz
Index. We recapitulate here their definitions and we compare the Katz Index to the GIR
available in the HSM.
ADL or IADL refers to activities of daily living, either essential or instrumental. The
following activities are included in the ADL group: bathing and showering, personal hy-
giene and grooming, dressing, toilet hygiene, functional mobility and self-feeding. The
following activities are included in the IADL: cleaning and maintaining the house, mana-
ging money, moving within the community, preparing meals, shopping for groceries and
necessities, taking prescribed medications, using the telephone or other form of commu-
nication.
The Katz Index proposes eight categories that are constructed to take into account
both the number and the type of ADL restrictions. In group A, the person is completely
independent and can perform the six following activities: bathing, dressing and undres-
sing, toileting, transferring, eating and drinking once the food is ready, controlling bowel
movements and urination. In group B, she can perform independently five over the six
activities. In group C, she needs assistance to perform two activities including bathing.
In group D, she needs assistance for three activities, including bathing and dressing or
undressing. In group E, she needs assistance for four activities, including bathing, dressing
or undressing and toileting. In group F, she needs assistance for five activities, including
the previous ones and transferring. In group G, the person requires assistance for the
six activities. Finally, in Group H, persons requiring assistance for at least two activities
but not meeting previous criteria are to be found. Table 3.10 summarizes the definitions.
Note that as our sample is restricted to individuals facing limitations in ADL or IADL,
those who belong to the group A of the Katz Index have at least IADL limitations.
The GIR corresponds to the disability group (“Groupe Iso-Ressources”, or GIR) of
the individual in the APA program, assessed by the evaluation team with a national
tool, the AGGIR (Gerontological Independence Iso-Resource Group) classification. In
the survey, we don’t know directly the GIR of APA beneficiaries, but we have a simulated
GIR (“pseudo-GIR”), computed with an algorithm approaching the logic of the AGGIR
classification. It was estimated on the basis of the activity restrictions declared by the
individual. This pseudo-GIR indicator suffers from several limitations and, in particular,
it cannot be regarded as the official disability group an individual would be assigned to
during the APA evaluation (Eghbal-Téhérani and Makdessi, 2011). Thus, in our sample
definition and estimations, we prefer using the measures of disability resting on the ADL
and IADL.
Nevertheless, we compare in Table 3.10 the consistency of the Katz Index and the
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pseudo-GIR. The comparison shows that both indicators are overall consistent, with an
increasing share of GIR 1-2 (higher disability level) when going to the high disability level
in the Katz Index sense. The highest disability level in the Katz Index (Group G) counts
100% of GIR 1-2. Though, some marginal cases indicate a discrepancy: 1% of individuals
regarded as independent with the Katz Index are associated with GIR 1-2.
Table 3.10 – Katz Index: definition and comparison with the GIR indicator
Category Number of activities
Including
Share of GIR
requiring assistance 1-2 3-4 5-6
A 0 - 0.9 17.6 81.5
B 1 - 5.9 76.6 17.5
C 2 bathing 16.6 83.4 0
D 3 bathing & (un)dressing 17.7 82.3 0
E 4 bathing & (un)dressing & toileting 55.6 44.4 0
F 5 previous ones and transferring 91.6 8.4 0
G 6 100 0 0
H 2 and is not included in other categories 57 43 0
Sample: 4,395 individuals aged 60 or more, having at least one ADL or IADL limitations.
Source: HSM survey (DREES and INSEE, 2008).
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7.4 Details on the Logit estimation
We have assumed that the utility of formal care depends additively on individual
characteristics Xi and on the departmental practices observed where the individual lives,
denoted Dd(i).
y∗i = β0 + Xiβ + Dd(i)α + ui (3.4)
We express the conditional probability function as follows:
P (y = 1|X, D) = P (y∗ > 0|X, D) (3.5)
= P (−u < X.β + D.α|X, D) (3.6)
(3.7)
With the assumption that u ⊥ X, D, Equation 3.5 is written:
P (y = 1|X, D) = G(X.β + D.α) (3.8)
With G the cumulative distribution function of u.
We use the logistic function as cumulative distribution function of u. We test, in
Appendix 7.5.A, the sensitivity of our results to this choice by estimating Probit and
linear probability models.
Then, Equation 7.4 becomes:
P (y = 1|X, D) = G(X.β + D.α) (3.9)
=
1
1 + exp−X.β−D.α
(3.10)
And the probability of not consuming is expressed as follows:
P (y = 0|X, D) = 1 − P (y = 1|X, D) (3.11)
=
1 + exp−X.β−D.α
1 + exp−X.β−D.α
−
1
1 + exp−X.β−D.α
(3.12)
=
exp−X.β−D.α
1 + exp−X.β−D.α
(3.13)
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As y is binary, the conditional likelihood of the sample can be written as follows:
L(y1, ..., yn|X, D, β, α) = Π
n
i=1
�
1
1 + exp−X.β−D.α
�yi
×
�
exp−X.β−D.α
1 + exp−X.β−D.α
�1−yi
(3.14)
The log-likelihood function writes:
lnL(y1, ..., yn|X, D, β, α) =
n
�
i=1
yi.ln
1
1 + exp−X.β−D.α
+ (1 − yi).ln
exp−X.β−D.α
1 + exp−X.β−D.α
(3.15)
Consistent estimators of β and α can be derived as arguments of the maximization of
the log-likehood function which can be proved to be concave.
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7.5 Robustness checks
7.5.A Functional forms
Table 3.11 presents estimations of our binary models with different functional forms:
linear probability models (Columns 1 to 3) and Probit models (Columns 4 to 6), to be
compared to the Logit estimations used as main functional form (Table 3.3 in the main
body). Our results are little sensitive to the choice of the functional form, though the
linear probability model is associated with a loss of precision when both demand and
supply side indicators are included.
Table 3.11 – Determinants of formal care use - functional forms
Consumes formal care
LPM Probit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
No regulated providers 0.030 0.044 0.042 0.086 0.124 0.121
(0.055) (0.053) (0.053) (0.158) (0.152) (0.153)
Ref: classical
Generous -0.047 -0.011 -0.139 -0.019
(0.037) (0.035) (0.110) (0.101)
Ref: dominance of regulated pro-
viders
Competition 0.032 0.032 0.094 0.094
(0.030) (0.030) (0.086) (0.087)
Dominance of non regulated providers
-0.062∗ -0.056 -0.204∗∗ -0.193∗
(0.031) (0.035) (0.088) (0.101)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4,395 4,395 4395 4395 4395 4395
Number of clusters 93 93 93 93 93 93
Log-likelihood -2785.317 -2781.648 -2781.587 -2644.378 -2640.118 -2640.097
Sample: 4,395 individuals aged 60 or more, having at least one ADL or IADL limitations.
Sources: HSM survey (DREES and INSEE, 2008); Territoire survey (LEDa-LEGOS and CES, 2012).
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis, clustered at the departmental level. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05
∗∗∗p < 0.01. Estimations of linear probability models (LPM) and Probit models explaining the probability
to consume formal care. Controls for individual characteristics and the sociodemographic group of the
department.
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7.5.B Random intercept model
We test an alternative specification using a multilevel modeling. With cross-sectional
data, we are only able to estimate the random intercept extension of the Logit model.
Ideally, with panel data and provided that departmental practices vary over time, we
would have wanted to estimate a fixed-effect model to deal with the omitted variable bias.
The random intercept model interestingly makes it possible to take into account an
unobserved effect of each department on the outcome of individuals living there. This
effect, however, should be regarded as random and must not be correlated with our de-
partmental variables of interest. This is a strong assumption in our case, where non-
observed departmental variables affecting the formal care use could correlate with depart-
mental long-term care practices. Thus, one should remain cautious when interpreting our
random-effect coefficients as it is inconsistent when the fixed-effect model is appropriate
(Cameron and Trivedi, 2009).
Estimation results obtained with the random intercept model are provided in Table
3.12. As the model directly takes into account the mixed-level nature of the data, we
do not cluster standard errors. The sign and magnitude of coefficients are unchanged
compared to those of Table 3.3, but using a random model specification generates a loss
of precision.
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Table 3.12 – Random intercept model
Consumes formal care
(1) (2) (3)
Departmental characteristics
No regulated providers 0.091 0.138 0.131
(0.242) (0.243) (0.245)
Ref: classical
Generous -0.148 -0.093
(0.216) (0.214)
Ref: dominance of regulated provi-
ders
Competition 0.121 0.121
(0.135) (0.135)
Dominance of non regulated provi-
ders
-0.311 -0.294
(0.271) (0.276)
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4395 4395 4395
Log-likelihood -2633 -2632 -2632
Sample: 4,395 individuals aged 60 or more, having at least one ADL
or IADL limitations.
Sources: HSM survey (DREES and INSEE, 2008); Territoire sur-
vey (LEDa-LEGOS and CES, 2012).
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05
∗∗∗p < 0.01. Estimations of a random intercept Logit model ex-
plaining the probability to consume formal care. Controls for in-
dividual characteristics and and the sociodemographic group of the
department.
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7.6 Departmental sociodemographic groups
In order to control for the sociodemographic characteristics of the departments, we use
a classification proposed by the Ministry of Health (DREES, 2014; Fizzala, 2016). It offers
the interesting opportunity to control for sociodemographic characteristics of departments.
It is based on a principle component analysis (PCA), which takes into account variables
related to the elderly population in the department: their importance (share of individuals
aged 75 or more in the population), their health status (life expectancy for men at 60,
share of APA beneficiaries in the 75+ population), their wealth (poverty rate and average
standards of living for the 75+ population), their socio-professional characteristics (share
of previously farmers among retired) and living arrangements (share of 75+ living alone).
It additionally uses the equipment rate in institutions in the department. In the PCA,
the more determining variables are the standards of living, life expectancy and equipment
rate.
The five groups proposed by the classification are the following (presented by decrea-
sing standards of living):
• Group A is composed of departments with very high living standards, a high urba-
nization rate and a low equipment rate in institutions. Individuals aged 75 or more
are relatively less numerous, they live more frequently alone in in the community.
• Group B, as in the previous group, has high living standards and urbanization rate.
The proportion of the 75+ in the population is even lower. The equipment rate is
higher and the elderly less frequently live alone at home compared to group A.
• In Group C, the standards of living are closer (but still higher) than the median
value. The share of 75+ is higher compared to Group A and Group B, but still
lower than the median rate.
• In Group D, departmental sociodemographic variables are close to the median va-
lues.
• Group E is constituted of departments with an aging population, poorer and more
rural than in other groups. Equipment rates are slightly higher than in other de-
partments.
Figure 3.7 presents the corresponding departments. It shows the relative heteroge-
neity in the geographical distribution of groups. Table 3.13 presents the distribution of
departments according the sociodemographic group and the demand indicator, while Ta-
ble 3.14 does the same for the supply indicator. Each computation rule is represented
in every sociodemographic group, except for the generous one which is never used in the
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older and poorer departments (Group E). Similarly, different level of the regulation of
the supply are found in each group. No wealthier departments (Group A) are found with
the dominance of regulated providers, nor the absence of regulated providers. In median
departments (Group D) and older poorer departments (Group E), the dominance of non
regulated providers is never observed. Overall, there is a partial correspondence between
the sociodemographic group and the departmental practices: when the demand is likely
to be higher (Group E), we do observe a high generosity on the demand side, nor the
absence of supply regulation.
Figure 3.7 – Five sociodemographic groups
Source: Sociodemographic classification constructed in DREES (2014).
Notes: Realization: Roquebert, 2018.
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Table 3.13 – Sociodemographic groups and departmental practices (demand side)
Non No regulated Classical Generous Total
respondents providers (rule 1) (rule 3)
Group A 1 0 1 1 3
Group B 1 1 2 2 6
Group C 6 1 4 3 14
Group D 10 2 23 1 36
Group E 7 3 27 0 37
Total 25 7 57 7 96
Sample: 96 metropolitan departments.
Source: Territoire survey (LEDa-LEGOS and CES, 2012); sociode-
mographic classification by DREES (2014).
Notes: Columns correspond to the generosity of the hourly APA sub-
sidies. Lines correspond to the sociodemographic group of the depart-
ment.
Table 3.14 – Sociodemographic group and departmental practices (supply side)
Non No regulated Dominance
Competition
Dominance Total
respondents providers non regulated regulated
Group A 1 0 1 1 0 3
Group B 1 1 2 1 1 6
Group C 6 1 1 2 4 14
Group D 10 2 0 11 13 36
Group E 7 3 0 12 15 37
Total 25 7 3 28 33 96
Sample: 96 metropolitan departments.
Source: Territoire survey (LEDa-LEGOS and CES, 2012); sociodemographic classification
by DREES (2014).
Notes: Columns correspond to the level of regulation of the supply. Lines correspond to the
sociodemographic group of the department.
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7.7 Comparison with results on the take-up of the APA program
Our work is close to the study by Arrighi et al. (2015). This appendix aims at showing
the common points and differences in the two approaches. Arrighi et al. (2015) focus on
the take-up of the APA program. Their dichotomous dependent variable is equal to one
for individuals having applied to the APA program. They find that the generosity of the
departmental increases the probability to apply to the program. We focus on the effective
consumption of formal care for the disabled elderly (both publicly and privately funded).
One complementary study to Arrighi et al. (2015) would have focused on the effect of
departmental indicators on the probability to be APA beneficiary (which depends on
both individual application and departmental decisions). However, the variable in which
individuals declare they are APA beneficiaries has been shown to suffer from important
shortcomings, and we are studying, more broadly, the determinants of formal care use.
The sample used by Arrighi et al. (2015) comprises all individuals aged 60 or more
who are not APA beneficiaries.44 Among the individuals aged 60 or more, we restrict our
sample to individuals who declare they have at least one activity limitation. Our idea is
to focus on the determinants of formal care use from individuals needing concrete help
and thus some form of care — either formal or informal — or technical help.
The most important difference probably lies in the indicator of departmental gen-
erosity used.45 The indicator used by Arrighi et al. (2015)46 is the mean subsidy rate,
corresponding to the ratio of per capita subsidized amount of APA to per capita total
amount of APA. This aggregated indicator depends on the practices of the department
(care plan volumes, computation formulas, regulation of the supply), as well as on the
characteristics of the consumption of the APA beneficiaries in the department (average
copayment rate, subsidized consumption). They control for a large set of departmental so-
ciodemographic characteristics, which is likely to neutralize the effects of the consumption
characteristics of APA beneficiaries. Thus, their indicator captures additional dimensions
of departmental generosity compared to our indicator of the computation formula, and
these dimensions positively affect the take-up of the APA program.
44They exclude individuals who declare they are already APA beneficiaries, because they could have
applied to the program earlier, in other departmental conditions.
45We have replicated our analysis using Arrighi et al. (2015)’s sample or/and dependent variable and
our results are robust.
46They also test the effect of the generosity at the extensive margin, using the rate of APA beneficiaries
among the 60+ population.
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7.8 Comparison of SolvAPA survey and Territoire
The French Ministry of Health has recently conducted a survey on departmental practi-
ces regarding the APA program, the “SolvAPA” survey (DREES, 2015a), using a questi-
onnaire close to the one of the Territoire survey. It makes it possible to compare the rule
implemented by department councils in 2012 and in 2015. Unfortunately, the question
regarding the share of APA hours provided by regulated providers was not included.
82 metropolitan departments (over 96) responded to the SolvAPA survey (compared
to 71 for the Territoire survey). Among the 11 departments that did not answer Territoire
but did return the questionnaire SolvAPA, 8 are regarded as limited in 2015, 15 as classical
and 1 as generous. We observe in 2015 a situation that is new compared to 2012: some
departments have regulated providers but they treat them as non-regulated by using rule 2
to compute the APA subsidy. They mostly correspond to previous classical departments.
As they treat their regulated providers as non-regulated with respect to the computation
of the allowance, we include them in the group of “no regulated providers”. Among
departments that have responded to both surveys, 80% (51 over 64 departments) use the
same rule for the computation of APA benefit in 2012 and 2015. For those who have
changed the rule, 13 classical departments have turned to have no regulated providers
and 2 generous departments have turned classical. Interestingly, departmental councils
never have increased their generosity level (measured by the computation formula used)
between 2012 and 2015. It could reflect decisions following increased financial constraints
with the increase in APA spending without augmented participation from the central
government.
Table 3.15 – Description of departments according to demand side indicators
Survey SolvAPA (2015)
NR No regulated Classical Generous Total
providers
Survey Territoire (2012)
NR 4 5 15 1 25
No regulated providers 1 6 0 0 7
Classical 6 11 40 0 57
Generous 0 0 2 5 7
Total 11 22 57 6 96
Sample: 96 metropolitan departments.
Sources:Territoire survey LEDa-LEGOS and CES (2012); SolvAPA survey DREES (2015a).
Notes: “NR” stands for non respondent. Classical: rule 1 for regulated providers. Generous: rule 3 for
regulated providers.
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Moving to the consumer:
importance and variations of travel costs in
home care provision
Summary of the chapter
Providing care at home generates specific constraints, particularly the travel of caregivers
to the consumers’ location. This paper analyzes the empirical significance of travel costs
in the context of home care provision in France. It makes use of original data obtained
from a large home care provider. Travel time and distance generated by caregiver rounds
are computed from geographical information in the data, to retrieve the travel costs borne
by the provider. They are found to be higher in rural municipalities and to decrease with
the size of urban units. This is due to physical constraints in these areas, especially higher
travel distances, but also to the characteristics of the demand living there. Indeed, severely
disabled individuals are over-represented in costly areas. Their consumption is fragmented
and thus generates higher travel costs. In this context, the unique price charged to all
consumers entails a redistribution towards rural areas and disabled individuals. I finally
test if travel costs affect the length of interventions and find no evidence of such an effect.
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1 Introduction
When living at home, disabled elderly require the provision of basic domestic help,
such as meal preparation, assistance with personal hygiene or house chores. Long-term
care policies encourage the use of professional services: in France, the APA policy par-
tially finances the professional support for the activities of daily living for the disabled
elderly. While the scheme is opened to individuals living in the community and those in
institutions, 60% of the beneficiaries were community-dwellers in 2016.1
Providing care at home implies a specific constraint: the provider bears the costs
generated by the travels of caregivers to the consumers’ location. This feature of the
provision influences the costs and the organization of home care providers. The constraint
might be unequally binding to providers, depending on the spatial distribution of their
consumers. It is expected to depend on the size of the area served, its geographical
characteristics and the density of consumers. Several public or research reports have
underlined existing differences for consumers, according to where they live, in the number
and the type of providers available for care provision and in the price individuals pay for
professional home care (Aube-Martin et al., 2010; Blondel et al., 2013; Garabige et al.,
2015; Branchu et al., 2015).
This work aims at documenting the importance and the variations of travel costs for
home care providers, and their effect on home care provision. Are travel costs negligible?
How do they vary? How they influence the organization of the home care provision?
The issue of travel costs has been widely addressed in the logistic literature: many works
aims at optimizing caregiver rounds in order to reduce costs. In economics, travel costs
are often considered from the consumer point of view, in transport economics (Button,
1993). In health economics, travel costs are often studied when looking at the distance
necessary to access health services (Lucas-Gabrielli et al., 2016). The economic questions
raised by the provision of a service at home are rather close to those of the distribution
networks (water, gas or electricity). In both cases, providers serve different points in
space; it raises efficiency issues, regarding the optimal size of the network, and equity
issues, with respect to the optimal pricing in particular (Fleurbaey and Trannoy, 1998;
Crampes and Laffont, 2014). In the provision of services, however, demand points are
not only connected once, but repeatedly, and serving one consumer excludes the others.
It is also the case for postal services, whose cost function has received specific attention
in the literature (Cazals, Duchemin, Florens, Roy and Vialaneix, 2004; Cazals, de Rycke,
Florens and Rouzaud, 2004). The provision of care is additionally relatively constrained
by the demand regarding the day and hours of intervention, while rounds are not similar
1Source: DREES (2016).
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from one day to the other. This paper brings new evidence on the specificity of travel
cost in the context of home care provision.
I use original data obtained from a large home care provider serving thousands of
consumers spread over a French department. Using geographical tools, rounds of care-
givers are reconstituted and travel costs are computed. They are found to be higher in
rural municipalities and decreasing with the size of urban units. This is due to geographi-
cal constraints, especially higher travel distances, in these areas. It also comes from the
characteristics of the demand living there. Indeed, severly disabled individuals are over-
represented in rural municipalities and small urban units. Their consumption is more
fragmented than those of other consumers, and they receive care from highly qualified
caregivers whose wage rate is higher. Overall, serving severely disabled individuals gene-
rates higher travel costs. I finally test if travel costs affect the length of interventions and
find no evidence of such an effect.
The existence and the variations of travel costs have direct implications for public
policies. With a unique price being charged to the consumers of a given service, they
organize a redistribution from the consumers who are the less costly to serve to the
others. Given our results, the unique price charged to all consumers entails a redistribution
towards rural areas and disabled individuals.
2 Context
2.1 Existing evidence on travel costs
The issue of travel costs has been widely addressed in the logistic literature. Many
studies use logistic tools to optimize the scheduling and routing of home care nurses in
order to reduce costs (see for instance, Begur et al. (1997); Bertels and Fahle (2006);
Eveborn et al. (2006); Bachouch et al. (2009)). In economics, spatial constraints of home
care providers are sometimes alluded to2 but, to the best of my knowledge, there are few
works directly dealing with the travel costs of providers serving consumers at home. Hege
and Cassou (Cassou, 2017; Hege, 2018)3 have provided a theoretical model analyzing
the effects of travel costs on the geographic coverage of firms, in a context of a mixed
market with asymmetric universal service obligations. They find that the coverage by the
2“Constraints in this market tend to be associated with rural residence, since it is more difficult for
a home care agency to serve patients who are located in remote places” (Ettner, 1994); “The difficulty
in accessing isolated areas in mountainous districts, for example, may imply higher costs of production
and higher prices of regulated formal care providers.” (Arnault, 2015) “Provider costs may differ due to
differences in travel costs to reach clients (e.g, higher travel costs in rural areas where clients may be
more disperse)” (Mosca et al., 2010).
3See Cassou (2017) for the English version and Hege (2018) for the French version.
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unconstrained firm will be excessive, since its expected surplus from serving an area is
often larger than the associate gain in welfare.
Empirically, travel costs represents a non-negligible provision constraint for professio-
nal home care providers.4 Chevreul (2009) finds that travel costs represent about 21% of
total costs in a sample of 36 nursing providers serving consumers at home. In a case study
led by Aube-Martin et al. (2010), the unproductive hours spent travelling represent 5% of
the paid work time. Travel costs are found to vary with the characteristics of the served
areas. In Aube-Martin et al. (2010), the compensation of employees for travel costs repre-
sents 5% of total costs for providers serving rural areas, while it falls to 1% for providers
focusing on urban areas. Such a relationship, however, is not systematically observed.
Serving urban areas can be associated with costly traffic jam or parking impediments, as
is reported by the interviews led by Ramos-Gorand (2015).
Travel costs could then lower the incentives for home care providers to serve consumers
in costly areas. According to Branchu et al. (2015) and Blondel et al. (2013), consumers
living in costly areas have a reduced choice of providers, and some have even no provider
serving their municipality. Roquebert and Tenand (2017) (Chapter 2 of this thesis) ob-
serve, in a French department, that 35% of the APA beneficiaries have only one provider
operating in their municipality. These municipalities mostly correspond to small and rural
areas.
Travel costs have been found to entail higher prices, either directly or through a pricing
process. At this point, it is important to stress the importance of the regulation of the
sector. In France, most home care providers serving the disabled elderly are regulated
by local authorities, the departmental councils (Hege et al., 2014). For each regulated
provider, the departmental council fixes the price charged by the provider to its consumers,
on the basis of average provision cost (Gramain and Xing, 2012). With such a rule for
the pricing process, a higher hourly provision costs (due, for instance, to higher travel
costs) should result in a higher price. Garabige et al. (2015) find that providers serving
costly areas have higher prices because of a higher hourly costs. Roquebert and Tenand
(2017) find that providers serving more municipalities, including the remote ones, have a
higher price. Consequently, individuals living in remote municipalities have little choice
regarding their provider, and they face a higher price on average.5 Despite this higher
price, providers serving costly areas face more difficulties to balance their budget than
other providers (Branchu et al., 2015).
To sum up, there is empirical evidence that travel costs are a substantial dimension
of the care provision, and that it affects the area of intervention of services and their
4See Appendix 7.6.A in Chapter 2 for the general decomposition of provision costs in the home care
sector.
5See Appendix 7.7.C in Chapter 2.
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price. This case study aims at measuring the travel costs and highlighting their sources of
variations. It builds on a micro-economic approach which precisely reconstitutes caregiver
rounds thanks to the rich and original data obtained from a large home care provider.
2.2 Composition of travel costs
Travel costs are borne by the provider when caregivers move from one intervention’s
location to another. One travel is costly for two reasons. First, the time spent travelling
is paid to the caregiver, corresponding to what will be called the transportation wage.
In most cases, it does not correspond to the time elapsed between two successive inter-
ventions of one caregiver in the same day, called the inter-vacation time. Indeed, the
inter-vacation period comprises both travel time and waiting time. According to French
collective agreements, travel time is part of the effective work and has to be paid as such.
Waiting time, however, is not systematically regarded as effective work. It depends on
the agreements regulating the provider, on the duration of the break and possibly on the
specific rule of the provider.6
The second component of travel costs is the compensation cost : this is the money paid
to the employee to cover, partly at least, the travelling expenses (car gaz, for instance).
It should depend on the distance driven by the employee and her means of transport.
Collective agreements propose a simplied formula to compensate the caregivers for their
distance, in which the compensation costs is a linear function7 of the distance driven.8
A third component could be added to costs generated by travels, namely the foregone
revenue. Indeed, travel time corresponds to time that could have generated profit by
treating another patient. In this work, however, I am focusing on the monetary costs paid
out-of-pocket by the provider; thus, I won’t take this foregone earnings into account.
3 Data
3.1 General presentation
I collected data from a home care provider serving a whole French department.9 It
counts more than 10,000 consumers spread all over the department. The provider is a
6See Appendix 9.1 for more details on French collective agreements.
7This rule might not fit the real fees paid by the caregiver. It is relevant when caregivers use a car
and there is no congestion. But with public transport or congested areas, the compensation costs might
differ from the effective travelling expenses of employees.
8The minimum compensation per kilometer is of e0.20 in for-profit enterprises and e0.35 in non-profit
structures.
9For confidentiality matters, the provider will remain anonymous.
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non-profit organization, regulated10 and priced by the departmental council. I have three
databases, presenting information on interventions, consumers and employees. Data are
cross-sectional, collected for the month of October 2015.
Our key database presents the recording of the remote management system (data on
interventions). For the 88,910 interventions provided during the month of October are ob-
served the starting and ending hours, an identification number for the employee providing
home care and an identification number for the consumer receiving care. With these data,
caregiver rounds can be reconstructed. Interestingly, the data also give the characteris-
tics of the care that has been provided for each intervention (body care, housekeeping,
shopping, meals). One intervention can be spent providing several types of care.
This database can be supplemented with information on consumers and employees,
from the billing and pay files. There is substantial heterogeneity in the consumers served
by the provider. Half of the consumers served during the month are APA beneficiaries,
whose consumption is partially publicly financed. Others are not benefiting from any
subsidy and are consuming comfort services that are privately funded.
The pay file provides the wage rate of the employee, her qualification category,11 her
experience and her location. It also shows the number of kilometers compensated for du-
ring the month. By construction, following the requirements on the collective agreements
in the home care sector, the hourly wage rate directly depends on qualification and expe-
rience, as illustrated in Figure 4.1. Caregivers are paid according to the time they work,
regardless of the type of care they provided, the type of consumers they serve or the area
they go to.
The three databases are matched on the basis of consumers and employees identifica-
tion numbers.12
3.2 Descriptive statistics on travels
Travel time and distance are the key elements when investigating travel costs. Both
are not directly observed in the data, which only shows the inter-vacation period and the
total number of kilometers that is compensated for in the whole month. The information
provided on the consumers’ location13 makes it possible to reconstruct the distance, by
10The regulated status applies to the structure employing the caregivers, not the caregivers themselves.
11In the French system, the qualification of caregivers is described with three categories. Caregivers
belonging to the A-category are the low-skilled one (no specific diploma). The B-category refers to the
middle-skilled caregivers (BAP, BEP, CAP) and the C-category to the high-skilled caregivers (CAFAD,
DEAVS, BEP mention Aide à domicile, TISF ).
12See Appendix 9.2 for details on the cleaning and the matching of databases.
13428 consumers (5% of consumers for the week of observation) receives intervention but are not in
the consumer file. According to the provider, they are under the billing process. For them, geographical
information is missing and I am not able to reconstruct the time or the distance. 3 other individuals have
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Figure 4.1 – Hourly wage depending on years of experience and qualification
Sample: 1,209 caregivers working during the week of observation.
Source: data from one home care provider.
Notes: Category A is the lowest level of qualification; category B is the inter-
mediate level; category C is the highest level of qualification.
the roads, from one location to the other and the associated travel time (in normal traffic
conditions).14
Table 4.1 presents the distribution these variables for one day. As the rounds are
organized on a weekly basis,15 these statistics are provided over one week. For instance,
the first column presents the mean of the daily values over the week. I select the second
week of October 2015, which is completely observed and not affected by holidays. On
average, a caregiver spends a little more than 5 hours and a half in intervention during
a day (or 70% of a daily full-time). 0.33 hour (20 minutes) over the inter-vacation time,
which is on average of 2 hours and 12 minutes, is devoted to traveling. On average,
the travel time represents 5% of the daily working time of caregivers (including both
travel and interventions), with a maximum at 30%. There is a considerable variability in
kilometers driven across caregivers, with a daily average of 12.9 kilometers, a standard
deviation almost as large and a maximum of more than 80.5 kilometers for one day. A
caregiver drives 2.2 kilometers per intervention hour, still with substantial variations. This
short description of variables relative to the travels of caregivers shows the importance of
caregiver travels as a provision constraint for the provider.
inadequate geographical information (located outside of the department). In these cases, the distance
and travel time from the preceding intervention or to the next were set to zero. The statistics provided
are slightly underestimating actual distance and travel time.
14I use the Stata command georoute, which makes it possible to compute travel distance and time
between two points using the geographical information in the data, namely the latitude and longitude of
consumers (Weber and Péclat, 2017).
15See Appendix 9.3 for more details.
227
Chapter 4
Table 4.1 – Distribution of travel variables for one day
Mean Standard deviation Median Min Max
Intervention hours [A] 5.59 1.64 5.63 1.38 12.08
Intervacation hours [B] 2.24 0.64 2.25 1.03 4.93
Travel hours [C] 0.33 0.25 0.28 0.00 1.84
Kilometers driven [D] 12.89 12.21 9.14 0.00 80.49
C over (A+C) 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.29
D over A 2.24 2.00 1.75 0.00 17.20
Sample: 1,209 caregivers working during the week of observation.
Source: data from one home care provider.
4 Cost computations
4.1 A micro-economic approach of travel costs
My approach builds on the micro-costing methodology (Guerre et al., 2018). The cost
components are observed at a very detailed level. It makes it possible to identify resource
inputs necessary to reach each consumer and their monetary equivalent can be computed.
Micro-costing is particularly relevant when it comes to compare costs across consumers
and providers. It is generally used to reconstruct costs in order to explain their variations
across subgroups of consumers or providers. It considers overall costs tied to the care
provision, comprising both fixed costs and variable costs.
I only focus on travel costs. Fixed costs are negligible in the home care provision and
they are not varying within one provider. Variable costs comprise intervention costs and
travel costs. Intervention costs mechanically correspond to the time spent in intervention,
monetary valuated by the wage rate of caregivers. Contrary to the health care sector,
there is no technological or drug-related costs in the care provision. Thus, costs related to
interventions could be appropriately studied by showing the link between the characteris-
tics of consumers, the volume consumed and the characteristics of the caregivers, which
is rather straightforward. This will be partly done in this study but the main focus lies
in the more ambiguous variations of travel costs according to consumer characteristics.
The micro-costing approach used in this chapter could theoretically be “bottom-up”:
we could compute the monetary equivalent of the resource input for each consumer. But
there is here a methodological issue tied to the object of study. I am interested in the
travel costs generated by the rounds of caregivers. It is methodologically hard to attribute
to each consumer a given share of the costs generated by the travels necessary to reach
her home and then to go to the next consumer. I will thus consider the daily round
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each consumer is part of, and compute a mean cost per intervention over the round. The
approach thus lies between the bottom-up approach and the top-down one, which consists
in computing of an average cost per patient rather than individually evaluating the costs
generated by each consumer.
4.2 Framework
Denote k a professional caregiver employed by the provider. Ik is the set of interven-
tions of caregiver k for a given day. jki,i� is the journey through which the professional
caregiver k goes from intervention i’s location to intervention i�’s location. J(Ik) is the
set of journeys needed to provide all interventions in Ik.
The transportation wage for the journey jki,i� can be written:
w(jki,i�) = t
∗
i,i� .w
0
k (4.1)
Where t∗i,i� is the travel time to go from i to i
� and w0k is the hourly wage of the caregiver k in
travel.16 The form of Equation (4.1) implies that the travel time between two interventions
does not depend on the caregiver k while the wage rate does.
The compensation costs for the journey jki,i� , corresponding to the money paid to the
employee to cover, partly at least, the travelling expenses (car gaz, for instance), are
written:
c(jki,i�) = di,i� .r (4.2)
Where di,i� is the distance between i and i
�, and r is the fixed compensation rate per
distance unit. The form of Equation (4.2), consistently with collective agreements, implies
that compensation costs are linearly increasing with distance.
Travel costs for jki,i� are expressed as the sum of the compensation costs and the trans-
portation wage:
C(jki,i�) = c(j
k
i,i�) + w(j
k
i,i�) (4.3)
= di,i� .r + t
∗
i,i� .w
0
k (4.4)
For each duos of interventions {i, i�}, I can thus compute the travel costs between the
first and the second intervention. In order to compare costs across caregiver rounds, the
travel costs created by a round can be compared either to the total number of intervention
16I could have differentiated between the effective travel time needed to go from i to i�, t∗i,i� , and the
time paid by the provider to the caregiver for this journey, ti,i� , as these two values do not necessarily
equal. I also could have defined w1k the wage in intervention and let the possibility that w
1
k �= w
0
k. But I
stick for the moment to a simple framework.
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provided during this round, or to the total number of hours provided. The first estimate
is the “unitary” travel cost while the second is the “hourly travel costs”.
The unitary travel costs for a caregiver k denoted uk, is:
uk =
�
i,i�∈J(Ik) C(j
k
i,i�)
NIk
=
�
i,i�∈J(Ik) di,i� .r + t
∗
i,i� .w
0
k
NIk
(4.5)
Where NIk is the number of interventions provided by caregiver k during the day (Ik).
The hourly travel costs for a caregiver k denoted hk, is:
hk =
�
i,i�∈J(Ik) C(J
k
i,i�)
�
i∈Ik
hi
=
�
i,i�∈J(Ik) di,i� .r + t
∗
i,i� .w
0
k
�
i∈Ik
hi
(4.6)
Where hi is the duration of intervention i.
The hourly wage rate w0k is directly observed in the data and di,i� and t
∗
i,i� are recon-
structed. The compensation rate r used is the minimum rate of e0.35 per kilometer that
is set by the collective agreement for non-profit home care providers.17
The distance and time driven from the caregiver home to the first location (and the
return from her last intervention to her home) are not taken into account. According to
the labour law, employees are not paid or compensated for these trips.18 Consequently,
isolated interventions, defined as the single intervention of the day for the caregiver, do
not generate travel costs. These interventions, though, are quite rare (2.5% of interven-
tions in the week of observation). When she serves several interventions during the day,
the caregiver is not supposed to choose the order in which she sees consumers, as it is
determined by the provider with the consumer. She is not able to serve the consumers
closest to her home at the beginning and at the end, so as to externalize travel costs to
the provider.
4.3 Results on costs
Table 4.2 presents the travel costs generated by a daily round and the associated
unitary and hourly travel costs, computed with the formula given in Equations (4.4),
(4.5) and (4.6). During the week of observation, a caregiver round generates on average
a daily cost of approximately e8, with a large dispersion. Comparing this cost to the
number of interventions provided during the round, we get the unitary travel cost which
is, on average, of about e2.07 per intervention, with a minimum of zero and a maximum
17This choice is made to grant the anonimity of the provider. This rate is lower than the rate actually
used by the provider I study. Then, for a given distance, the cost computation would provided a lower
bound for the travel cost borne by the provider I study.
18They can be compensated for kilometers if the distance is really high. I do not take this case into
account.
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of e6.7. As interventions are, on average, longer than one hour, the average hourly travel
cost falls to e1.4. We compare it to the price range provided by Hege et al. (2014) for one
hour of care: in 2012, the provider prices of the largest home care providers declared by
departmental councils were between e17.1 and e23.19 The price charged by our provider
belongs to this range. Then, the hourly travel costs represent between 6% and 8% of the
provider price.20 The maximum value of the hourly travel cost is much higher than the
maximum unitary travel cost (e10.6 versus e6.7), revealing rounds with important travel
time and distance to provide relatively short interventions.
Table 4.2 – Travel costs over daily rounds
Mean Standard deviation Median Min Max
Cost of one daily round 7.95 6.83 6.14 0.00 47.40
Travel cost per intervention 2.07 1.40 1.83 0.00 6.72
Travel cost per hour of intervention 1.39 1.10 1.16 0.00 10.62
Sample: 1,209 caregivers working during the week of observation.
Source: data from one home care provider.
5 Determinants of travel costs
5.1 Spatial distribution of consumers
Travel costs are expected to depend on the spatial distribution of consumers. Several
public reports have underlined that serving rural areas is more costly than serving urban
areas because of travel costs. In this section, I evaluate how this assessment holds in this
case study.
To characterize the place where consumers live, I choose as a spatial unit the “urban
unit” (unité urbaine).21 It is defined by the INSEE as: “a municipality or a group of
municipalities which includes a continuously built up zone (no cut of more than 200
meters between two constructions) and at least 2,000 inhabitants.”22 This definition rests
mostly on morphological conditions (neighbouring municipalities) and size. The INSEE
classification isolates municipalities that are outside an urban unit (rural municipalities)
19In departments fixing one price per provider (46/67). See Hege et al. (2014) for more details.
20I do not compare the unitary cost to the provider price, as it is less meaningful. Indeed, serving one
hour of care generates a revenue equal to the hourly price, while it is not necessary the case when serving
one consumer.
21See Appendix 9.4 for the discussion of the observation unit.
22Reference: https://www.insee.fr/en/metadonnees/definition/c1501
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and the others that are differentiated according to their size: less than 10,000 inhabitants
(that we will call small urban unit), between 10,000 and 50,000 inhabitants (intermediate
urban unit), 50,000 to 1,000,000 (upper-intermediate urban unit) and between 1,000,000
and 2,000,000 (large urban unit). 26.5% of consumers served by the provider live in a
rural municipality (Table 4.3). More than one third of consumers live in a urban unit with
more than 1,000,000 inhabitants. 21% live in small urban units (with less than 10,000
inhabitants) and the last 15% live in intermediate urban units. For the provider, the
heterogeneity of areas to serve is thus remarkably high.
I compute travel distance, time and costs at the urban unit level. For each journey I
observe, I attribute the travel distance, time and costs to the urban unit where consumers
both live. When the journey connects two consumers who do not live in the same urban
unit (40% of travels), I attribute half of the distance, time and costs to each area. The
travel distance, time and costs per intervention served are the highest in rural munici-
palities and they decreases with the size of urban units (Table 4.4). One intervention is
associated to 5.36 kilometers on average in rural municipalities, while it falls to 2.60 in
large urban units. The difference in unitary times is smaller, though significant. One
intervention is associated to 0.12 hours of travel (7 minutes) in rural areas while it is 0.08
in large urban units. Even though the difference is significant, its magnitude is much
lower than the difference in the distance. It probably reflects differences in travel speed
in the different areas. Hourly variables, when travel distance, time and costs are compa-
red to the number of hours provided, reveals the same trend. Yet, the difference is not
significant for the travel time, meaning that the difference in the unitary travel time are
compensated by difference in the length of interventions. The difference in travel costs is
close to be significant (p-value at 0.13).
Overall, the travel costs are varying according to the area served, especially because
of longer distances to drive in rural areas. There is, however, another potential source of
variation. Consumers living in each area do not have the same characteristics, as shown in
Table 4.4. APA beneficiaries are over-represented in rural municipalities. Among them,
severly disabled individuals are also over-represented in rural municipalities and small
urban units. Low-income APA beneficiaries are also to be found in rural municipalities, as
shown by the increase in the average copayment rate, which is a linear increasing function
of income (from 16% in rural municipalities to 23% in the large urban units). Regarding
consumption profiles (Table 4.3), the main differences are observed for large urban units,
where the average duration of interventions is higher and the number of interventions
provided during the week is lower. There is no significant difference between the average
volume received by consumers according to the area of residence. One could have expected
important gaps in the consumption given the significant differences in the disability status.
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The next section focuses more specifically on the link between the disability level and the
consumption profile.
Table 4.3 – APA status, consumption profile and area of residence of consumers
Rural Small Intermediate Large
Total
Difference
municipalities UU UU UU (p-value)
Consumers 26.5% 21.2 14.8% 37.5%
Characteristics
APA beneficiaries 57.48% 51.81% 51.81% 48.51% 51.51% 0.00
Among APA beneficiaries:
Co-payment rate 0.16 0.20 0.23 0.23 0.20 0.00
Disability group 1-2 (most
severe)
22% 21% 16% 18% 20%
0.02
Disability group 3 24% 23% 26% 27% 25%
Disability group 4
(moderate)
53% 56% 57% 55% 55%
Consumption
Weekly volume (hours) 3.61 3.63 3.62 3.57 3.60 0.91
Length of interventions
(hours)
1.79 1.80 1.74 1.87 1.81 0.00
Number of interventions 2.45 2.44 2.54 2.29 2.40 0.04
Sample: 8,078 consumers served during the week of observation.
Source: data from one home care provider.
Notes: 428 consumers served during this week but with missing geographic information were excluded
from the sample. “UU”stands for urban unit. P-values from Anova (resp. Pearson χ2) test for continuous
(resp. categorical) variables.
5.2 Demand and organization of rounds
This section underlines another determinant of travel costs: the organization of rounds
depends on the characteristics of the demand and it impacts on travel costs. Indeed,
the more severely disabled individuals are, the higher the travel costs of the associated
rounds. The consumption of highly disabled individuals is indeed more fragmented than
the consumption of others. The volume they consume is higher (Figure 4.2) and they
receive interventions more frequently: over the week of observations, GIR 1-2 individuals
receive on average 6 interventions, while it falls to 3.6 for GIR 3 individuals, 2 for GIR
4 individuals and less than 1.5 on average for non-APA beneficiaries. The interventions
for highly disabled individuals are also shorter than individuals with a lower disability
level (Figure 4.3). This is tied to the type of care being provided: interventions including
personal care are shorter than the others, like house chores. They are more frequently
provided to disabled individuals: 51% of interventions provided to GIR 1-2 individuals
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Table 4.4 – Travel costs and area of residence of consumers
Rural Small Intermediate Large
Total
Difference
municipalities UU UU UU (p-value)
Unitary
Distance (km) 5.36 4.94 3.84 2.60 4.72 0.01
Time (hours) 0.12 0.12 0.10 0.08 0.11 0.05
Cost 3.09 2.92 2.38 1.75 2.82 0.02
Hourly
Distance (km) 3.66 3.27 2.74 1.69 3.16 0.07
Time (hours) 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.24
Cost 2.11 1.94 1.69 1.14 1.88 0.11
Sample: 65 areas with consumers served during the week of observation.
Source: data from one home care provider.
Notes: “UU” stands for urban unit. P-values from Anova tests. “unit” variables corre-
spond to the variables (distance, time and cost) divided by the number of interventions
provided in the urban unit; “hourly” correspond to the variables (distance, time and cost)
divided by the number of hours of intervention provided during the day.
Reading: in rural municipalities, the average distance driven per intervention is 5.36
kilometers. The average travel time per intervention is 0.12 hours (7 minutes). The travel
cost is at e3.09 per intervention.
include personal care, while this percentage is of 37% and 20% for GIR 3 and GIR 4
individuals, and it falls to 20% for non-APA individuals. These differences in the structure
of the consumption according to the disability level has also been observed in the study
of nursing providers serving consumers at home (Chevreul, 2009). It could be reinforced
by the prescription of the socio-medical team in the APA program: in some departments,
the care plan volume is set up such that the provider has to give frequent and repeated
interventions (Ministère des affaires sociales et la santé, 2016). I don’t know, however, if
it is the case in the department I study.
A specific matching between the consumer characteristics and the caregiver qualifi-
cation is additionnally observed. When consumers are severely disabled, they are more
frequently provided care by a qualified caregiver. 40% of interventions provided to GIR 1
and 2 are served by caregivers with high qualification level (C category), while it is 30%
for disability group 3 and 25% for disability group 4 and non-APA consumers. This dis-
tribution echoes the specialization according to qualification: when a caregiver is highly
qualified, 48% of her interventions on average include personal care whereas this percen-
tage falls to 37% and 14% for middle- and low-qualified caregivers respectively. Conversely,
interventions for household chores are more systematically provided by low- and middle-
qualified caregivers: when the caregiver belongs to the A or B category, 84% and 67% of
interventions include household chores, while it falls to 61.5% when the caregiver is C.
Consequently, the more skilled the caregivers, the shorter their interventions (Figure 4.4).
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It thus increases the time spent travelling, which is also paid at a higher wage rate.
Overall, rounds including severely disabled individuals tend to be more fragmented
than the others. Thus, they generate high travel time and distance. As the caregivers
serving disabled individuals are more qualified, this travel time is mechanically paid at
a higher wage rate. Rounds serving highly disabled individuals are expected to be more
costly for the provider.
Figure 4.2 – Weekly volume consumed, by disability group
Sample: 8,506 consumers served during the week of observation, among
which 85 consumers having the 1% highest volumes have been excluded
to ease the reading of the graph.
Source: data from one home care provider.
Notes: disability group 1-2 corresponds to the more severe disability
group in the APA program, while disability group 4 corresponds to a
moderate disability level.
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Figure 4.3 – Average length of interventions, by disability group
Sample: 8,506 consumers served during the week of observation, among
which 76 consumers having the 1% highest duration have been excluded
to ease the reading of the graph.
Source: data from one home care provider.
Notes: disability group 1-2 corresponds to the more severe disability
group in the APA program, while disability group 4 corresponds to a
moderate disability level.
Figure 4.4 – Duration of interventions depending on qualification
Sample: 20,061 interventions provided during the week of observation, among
which 195 interventions having the 1% highest duration have been excluded to
ease the reading of the graph.
Source: data from one home care provider.
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6 The effect of travel costs on the length of interven-
tions
I am interested in the effect of travel costs on the organization of the home care
provision. As the provider I study is a regulated (and non-profit) organization, it is
supposed to accept serving any consumer asking for its services, wherever she lives. With
our data, we cannot test this hypothesis as we only observe the effective consumers of
the provider. Empirically, consumers are highly dispersed on the departmental territory,
suggesting there is no ex-ante selection by the provider.
Travel costs could influence other dimensions of the organization of rounds. While
the provider is not allowed to select consumers, it could adapt the caregiver’s rounds to
lower its costs and influence, at least marginally, the length of visits. I study econometri-
cally study this link, while controlling for consumer and caregiver characteristics. If the
provider is able to manipulate the duration of interventions, it could try to increase the
duration of interventions for costly to serve consumers, in order to diminish the number
of interventions served during the week. Conversely, the provider might face an important
demand and choose to limit the duration of interventions when travel time is important
in order to be able to serve an important number of consumers in the area during the day.
I use the unitary travel cost, resting on the number of consumers served during the day,
rather than the hourly travel costs, which takes into account the duration of intervention
in its construction. The estimated model is the following:
log(yi) = β0 + β1Xc(i) + β2Xk(i) + β3Xi + β4log(uk + 1) + �i (4.7)
Where yi is the duration of intervention i provided to consumer c(i) by caregiver k(i)
on the day of observation. Xc(i) is a set of characteristics for the consumer receiving the
intervention i (APA status, APA disability group, APA participation rate, consumption
on Sunday), Xk(i) controls for caregiver’s characteristics (qualification, experience, con-
tractual working time) and Xi corresponds to the characteristics of the intervention (tasks
performed, day of intervention). log(uk + 1) is the logarithm of the unitary cost for the
round of caregiver k during that day. �i is the error term. As our variable of interest,
uk, is at the level of one day for one caregiver, standard errors are clustered at the care-
giver level, assuming there might be a correlation of disturbances in the measurement of
intervention lenght at the caregiver level.
Table 4.5 presents the estimation of the linear model, with the duration of intervention
and the unitary travel cost with a logarithm transformation. Other things being equal,
an increase in the unitary travel cost significantly shortens the intervention. The effect,
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though, has a very limited magnitude: when the travel cost of the round is increasing by
1% by per intervention served during the day, the duration decreases by 6%, on average.
The decrease is potentially driven by marginal adjustments of caregivers more than by the
organization of rounds by the providers. Caregivers may leave consumers more rapidly,
or arrive a bit latter, when the relative travel distance and time are important in the day
compared to the number of consumers served.
Turning to consumer characteristics, the length of interventions decreases with the di-
sability level: non-APA beneficiaries have longer interventions than APA beneficiaries and
in within this group, moderately disabled individuals have longer interventions (GIR-4)
than the others. There is no effect of the copayment rate. Individuals having interventions
recorded on Sunday have much shorter interventions, suggesting that they need shorter
but potentially more frequent interventions. At the caregiver level, a low qualification en-
tails slightly longer interventions, potentially reflecting that productivity correlates with
qualification.
Compared to interventions devoted to personal care, interventions for housekeeping
or activities like gardening, manual work and shopping are much longer, while there is
no difference compared to interventions related to meals (preparation or administration).
When several types of tasks are performed, the intervention is also longer. Finally, in-
terventions are shorter during the week-end than during the week. It potentially reveals
that interventions are shorter during days when informal care or visits from relatives are
more likely.
Other indicators reflecting the organization of rounds would deserve attention, in par-
ticular, the number of visits received each week or the total volume consumed. The
methodological issue would then be to impute to each consumer a given travel costs. It
has not been adressed yet in this work and could be a future developement.
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Table 4.5 – Travel costs and lengths of interventions
Log-duration of the intervention
Travel cost per intervention (log) -0.064∗∗∗
(0.010)
Consumer characteristics
Not APA beneficiary 0.053∗∗∗
(0.012)
APA disability level 1-2 (severe) -0.004
(0.012)
Ref: APA disability level 3
APA disability level 4 (moderate) 0.037∗∗∗
(0.010)
APA copayment = 0% -0.017
(0.014)
Ref: 0 < APA copayment < 90%
APA copayment ≥ 90% 0.052
(0.033)
Consumes on Sunday -0.252∗∗∗
(0.013)
Not in the billing file 0.059∗∗
(0.024)
Caregiver characteristics
Qualification A (low) 0.053∗∗∗
(0.013)
Ref: Qualification B
Qualification C (high) 0.009
(0.015)
Experience (years) 0.001
(0.001)
Intervention characteristics
Only housekeeping 0.528∗∗∗
(0.017)
Ref: Only personal care
Only meals 0.021
(0.019)
Only gardening, manual work, shopping 0.342∗∗∗
(0.044)
Several tasks performed 0.264∗∗∗
(0.015)
Ref: Monday, Tuesday, Thursday, Friday
Wednesday -0.006
Continued on next page
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Table 4.5 - Continued from previous page
Log-duration of the intervention
(minutes)
(0.006)
Week-end -0.106∗∗∗
(0.015)
Constant 4.147∗∗∗
(0.023)
Observations 20,061
Number of clusters 1,233
R–squared 0.437
Sample: 20,061 interventions provided during the week of observation.
Source: remote management system recordings and pay file of a French
home care provider.
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the provider level;
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Estimation of a linear model.
7 Discussion
The precise information obtained on the rounds is at the price of limited external
validity. The results obtained on the travel costs, their sources of variation and their
effect on the home care provision are obtained for a given provider, observed during a
given week. Nonetheless, the structure of the consumption (with more fragmented for
severe disability levels) should not be specific to the provider. Indeed, this organization
tends to be structural to the demand of severly disabled individuals, who need short and
frequent interventions (Chevreul, 2009). The spatial distribution of the consumers, with
APA beneficiaries — and especially those severely disabled — living in rural municipalities
or in small urban units, is similar to the general trend observed in France, with the elderly
representing a higher share of the population in rural areas (Albertini, 2018). Overall, the
evidence of a distorsion of travel costs induced by the service of highly disabled individuals
could be regarded as a contribution going beyond the case study.
We have limited information on the consumers’ sociodemographic characteristics, as
well as on the other professional providers serving the department. It is problematic since
informal care and potential consumption from other professional providers are likely to be
unequally distributed according to the area of residence. Important travel costs for infor-
mal caregivers are associated with higher costs for informal care and a higher willingness
to pay for formal care (Fevang et al., 2008; Davin et al., 2015). Thus, differences in the
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consumption profil according to the area of residence are potentially reflecting differences
in informal care provision and availability of other professional services.
The travel costs computed are additionnaly widely depending on the methodological
choice I made, especially regarding the computation of the travel time and the monetary
valuation of the distance. In general, providers do not observe the exact travel time spent
between two interventions and they compute the travel cost rather using flat period of
time for each travel. Further developments could compare the travel costs computed with
the reconstituted time and the travel costs effectively borne by the provider.
Given our results, the pricing process of providers and its implication for consumers
deserves attention. Imposing a uniform price to all the consumers of one provider, as
is done in the home care sector, organizes a transfer from less costly to serve to more
costly to serve providers. In general, it is economically inefficient as it is similar to a
targeted subsidy. This cost balancing, though, has spatial equity purposes (Fleurbaey
and Trannoy, 1998). In our case, we are considering a service that is provided both to a
fragile population, whose consumption is partially publicly financed (APA beneficiaries),
and to “classical” consumers, who receive privately funded comfort services. Thus, the
relevance of the cost balancing organized by the uniform pricing should be assessed with
an insight on which group belong the costly to serve consumers. In this case study, the
APA beneficiaries are found to be over-represented in costly to serve areas, because of
geographical constraints as well as because the characteristics of their demand. Hence, on
average, severly disabled individuals — and especially those living in rural areas or small
urban units — benefits from the redistribution organized by the uniform price.
8 Conclusion
This paper studies the importance of travel costs borne by a professional home care
provider due to the travels of caregivers, and their effect of the organization of the care
provision. Travel costs are higher in rural municipalities and small urban units. This is
due to geographical constraints, but also to the characteristics of the demand in these
areas. Indeed, severely disabled individuals are over-represented in these areas and they
generate more costly rounds, due to fragmentation of the interventions they receive and
the higher wage rate of caregivers they receive care from. Finally, testing if travel costs
affect the length of interventions, I find no strong effect on travel costs on the duration of
interventions.
These results are very descriptive and they are obtained on a given home care pro-
vider, with its specific organization and a given week of observation. They can hardly
be extended beyond this case study but they give an insight of the importance of travel
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costs and their consequences for consumers. More work is needed on this topic, regarding
the modeling of travel costs in the care provision function and their effect on both the
organization of providers and the delivery of care to consumers.
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9 Appendices
9.1 Travel and waiting times in collective agreements
In for-profit enterprises, waiting time is paid up to 15 minutes. When the waiting time
is higher than 15 minutes, the employee is regarded as free to go on with her own activities.
In non-profit providers, the collective agreement does not give a common direction for all
providers: it only states that any work break with the employee remaining at the disposal
of the employer is regarded as effective paid work.
This section presents extracts from the collective agreements dealing with waiting
and travel time, both for the employees of for-profit home care providers (“Convention
collective nationale des entreprises de services à la personne du 20 septembre 2012”) and
for the employees of non-profit home care providers (“Convention collective nationale de
la branche de l’aide, de l’accompagnement, des soins et des services à domicile du 21 mai
2010”).
Extracts from the collective agreement for for-profit home care enterprises, “Conven-
tion collective nationale des entreprises de services à la personne du 20 septembre 2012”
:
“Le temps de déplacement professionnel pour se rendre d’un lieu d’intervention
à un autre lieu d’intervention constitue du temps de travail effectif lorsque le
salarié ne peut retrouver son autonomie.” (Section 2, chapitre I)
“Les temps entre deux interventions sont pris en compte comme suit :
- en cas d’interruption d’une durée inférieure à 15 minutes, le temps d’attente
est payé comme du temps de travail effectif ;
- en cas d’interruption d’une durée supérieure à 15 minutes (hors trajet sé-
parant deux lieux d’interventions), le salarié reprend sa liberté pouvant ainsi
vaquer librement à des occupations personnelles sans consignes particulières
de son employeur n’étant plus à sa disposition, le temps entre deux interventi-
ons n’est alors ni décompté comme du temps de travail effectif, ni rémunéré.”
(Section 2, chapitre I)
Extracts from the collective agreement of non-profit home care providers, “Convention
collective nationale de la branche de l’aide, de l’accompagnement, des soins et des services
à domicile du 21 mai 2010” :
“Le temps de travail effectif est le temps pendant lequel le salarié est à la
disposition de l’employeur et doit se conformer à ses directives sans pouvoir
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vaquer librement à des occupations personnelles. Sont donc notamment des
temps de travail effectif : [...]
– les temps de déplacement entre deux séquences consécutives de travail effectif
;” (Titre V, chapitre I, A, Article 1er)
“Sont comptabilisés comme du temps de travail effectif les temps de pause
pendant lesquels les salariés restent en permanence à la disposition de
l’employeur.” (Titre V, chapitre I, A, Article 14)
“Les temps de déplacement entre deux séquences consécutives de travail effectif
sont considérés comme du temps de travail effectif et rémunérés comme tel.”
(Titre V, chapitre I, A, Article 14)
Table 4.6 summarizes the wage for travel time and waiting time according to the status
of the home care provider.
Table 4.6 – Travel and waiting time in French collective agreements
For-profit providers Non-profit providers
Travel time Paid as working time Paid as working time
Waiting time Paid as working time if inferior
to 15 minutes
Paid as working time if the em-
ployee remains at the disposal of
her employer
Sources: collective agreement enforced in for-profit home care enterprises (2012) and
collective agreement in non-profit home care providers (2010).
To allow comparisons, I detail how travel time is taken into account in the home care
sector in the United-States and in the United-Kingdom.
In the United-States, regulation is closed to what is proposed in France for non-profit
providers. According to the Department of labor, travel time from job site to job site
must be paid whatever its duration. Travel from worker’s home to work are not paid.23
“A worker who travels from home to work and returns to his or her home at the end
of the workday is engaged in ordinary home-to-work travel which is a normal incident of
employment. Normal travel from home to work and return at the end of the workday
is not work time. This is true whether the employee works at a fixed location or at a
different location each day. [...]
Travel that is all in a day’s work, however, is considered hours worked and must be
paid.
23Source: https://www.dol.gov/whd/homecare/travel_time.htm
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Example: Barbara is a personal care aide providing assistance to Mr. Jones. Barbara
drives him to the Post Office and grocery store during the workday. Barbara is working
and the travel time must be paid.
Travel away from the home is clearly work time when it cuts across the employee’s
workday. The employee is merely substituting travel for other duties. Thus, if an em-
ployee hired to provide home care services to an individual (consumer) accompanies that
consumer on travel away from home, the employee must be paid for all time spent tra-
veling during the employee’s regular working hours. [...] However, periods where the
employee is completely relieved from duty, which are long enough to enable him or her to
use the time effectively for his or her own purposes, are not hours worked and need not
be compensated.”
In the United-Kingdom, a range of types of working time is provided, including time
spent “at work and required to be working, or on standby near the workplace”and“travel-
ling in connection with work, including travelling from one work assignment to another”.
It excludes explicitly “travelling between home and work”, “away from work on rest bre-
aks”.24
The following examples, based on the home care sector, are provided:
“Example 1
A care worker has 2 appointments in the morning and doesn’t take any breaks. The
worker must be paid at least the minimum wage for the time hespends at the appoint-
ments, plus the travel time between appointments.
Example 2
A care worker has 2 appointments, one in the morning and one in the afternoon.
After the first appointment he goes home to have a break before he goes to his afternoon
appointment. The time spent travelling from the first appointment to his home and from
his home to the second appointment doesn’t count towards the minimum wage. If the
care worker didn’t go home but took a break on the way to his next appointment, he
would be paid for any travel time but not for the break.”
24Source: https://www.gov.uk/minimum-wage-different-types-work/overview
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9.2 Data cleaning and matching
The initial billing file counts 18,105 lines, corresponding to 10,234 consumers. The
monthly consumption of one consumer was associated with several billing lines when it
corresponded to several administrative operations. Administrative lines can be due to
cancellations or adjustments (i.e. previous excess payment); other administrative lines
are due to a shared financing: when the financing of an intervention is shared between the
consumer and an external subsidizing institution (the departmental council for instance),
two lines are observed, one for each source of funding. Several lines for the same consumer
can also be due to the consumption of different types of hours: the billing file differentiates
between week hours, week-end hours or delayed hours.
I reshaped the data to get one line per consumer. I dropped the administrative lines
when they were not associated with a consumption line in the month of observation (i.e.
adjustment of anterior consumption). Doing so, I loose 7 consumers. I also dropped 9
consumers presenting strong inconsistencies in their consumption. I suppressed consu-
mers when they do not have any consumption billed for the month of observation (18
consumers). I end up with a database of 10,200 lines corresponding to 10,200 individuals.
The pay file initially counted 1,522 lines, corresponding to 1,517 employees. 5 em-
ployees have 10 lines, because their work contract changed during the period. I sum the
hours they provided and the wage they get in the two lines. I retain the latest value of
contractual work hours and the higher level of qualification and years of experience. For
one employee, the second line of observation is inconsistent and I drop the line without
changing the other line. I end up with a database of 1,517 employees.
The database on interventions (remote management system recordings) initially coun-
ted 134,112 interventions, corresponding to 88,929 interventions provided by 1,332 em-
ployees to 10,310 consumers.25 One intervention is associated with several lines when
several tasks are done during this intervention (body care, housekeeping, shopping, me-
als). I simply reshaped the database to get one line per intervention, with several variables
indicating the type of tasks that have been performed during the intervention. The main
cleaning I had to do is related to the starting and ending hours registered in the data: I
observe some juxtaposition of interventions the same day for the same caregiver. Some
juxtapositions are due to duplication (same hours, same employee, same consumer for the
two interventions). I choose to drop one line over the two (19 lines are dropped). The
other case is when the starting hour of an intervention is anterior to the end hour of the
previous (283 interventions). I assume that the employee forgot to signal the end of the
first intervention and I set the end hour of the first intervention at the starting hour of
25The numbers of employees and consumers do not exactly correspond to the billing and pay databases.
See below the paragraph on the matching.
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the second one (no inter-vacation periods will be observed between these interventions).
I end up with a database of 88,910 interventions.
In the database on interventions, I observe the identifying number of the employee
and the consumer. I am thus able to matching it with the pay database and the billing
database. The matching, however, is not perfect. I detail here the (partial) correspon-
dence between the three database. In the database on interventions, 1,332 employees are
providing care. Compared to the pay database, 185 employees are missing. 158 have no
working hours registered in the pay database, meaning they are in vacation or previous
employees not yet erased from the file. The other 27 employees have working hours re-
gistered. It should correspond to the employees providing care to consumers without the
remote management system recordings. In the database on interventions, 10,310 consu-
mers are provided care. Compared to the billing database, some consumers are missing:
461 consumers are in the billing database without being in the intervention database. It
probably corresponds to the consumers that do not use the remote management system
recordings. Other consumers are observed in the intervention database whereas they are
not in the billing database: it is the case for 2,933 interventions, corresponding to 570
consumers. According to the provider, there are consumers who were not charged for care
yet. Overall, 9,740 consumers are found both the remote management system recordings
and in the billing file.
9.3 A weekly schedule
Our data show strong regularities in home care consumption for individuals from one
week to another: I observe that individuals most often receive care the same day(s) each
week and they consume the same volume of care, at the same hour.
I first describe the distribution of interventions over days in the week, during the
month (Figure 4.5). A week correspond to the days between Monday and Sunday. The
first and the last weeks are then truncated: the first starts at Thursday and the last ends
at Saturday. The number of interventions for each day of the week is stable, with a slightly
lower number of interventions during Wednesday and a consequential drop in the number
of interventions provided during the week-end. The Figure shows that the daily number
of interventions is relatively stable from one week to another. At the individual level, I
define individuals as “regular” if they have the same day(s) of consumption each week. For
instance, Mister B. will consume every Monday and Wednesday, but will never consume
on Tuesday, on Thursday or during the week-end. It is the case for 62% of the 10,310
consumers over the month of October 2015. Overall, the probability of consuming one
given day of the week is of 85% when an individual has consumed that day the preceding
week, while it falls to 6% when she did not consumed that day the preceding week.
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If I add a condition on the beginning hours of the interventions, I see that 81% of
interventions occurring during the second week have at least one “twin” intervention, that
is to say one intervention occurring the same day of the week, at the same time window
(same beginning and ending hours, plus or minus one hour). The volume consumed one
given day of the week is also very similar from one week to another. The correlation
coefficient between the volume consumed a given day in different weeks is at minimum of
0.74 (week 2 to week 5) and at maximum of 0.82 (week 2 to week 4).26
Figure 4.5 – Distribution of interventions over days of the weeks during the month
Sample: 88,910 interventions recorded in the remote management system du-
ring October 2015.
Notes: the first and the last week are truncated: the first starts at Thursday
1st and the last ends at Saturday 31st.
Another empirical evidence regarding the weekly organization of formal comes from
the HSM survey. Individuals who declare they consume formal care are invited to declare
the number of hours they receive, either by day, by week or by month. 60% of individuals
aged 60 and more have given the weekly volume, whereas it was 33% by day and 7% by
month.
The organization of home care provision on a weekly basis deserves emphasis, as the
APA program is organized on a monthly basis in France. The maximum number of hours
that can be subsided is set at the monthly level. If consumption depends on the day of
the week, individuals could consume more than what they are entitled to during some
months because of the size of the month (28 days versus 31) or because of the distribution
of days in the month.
26I exclude here the first week which started on Tuesday.
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9.4 Observation unit at the geographical level
I choose to observe costs at level of the “urban unit” as it is defined by the INSEE. The
units of observation used for the geographical analysis are more frequently employment
areas (bassins d’emploi), urban area (aires urbaines), urban unit (unités urbaines) and
living zone (bassins de vie). Here are the definitions proposed by the INSEE.
An employment area is “a geographical area within which most of the labour force
lives and works, and in which establishments can find the main part of the labour force
necessary to occupy the offered jobs.” This unit is particularly relevant for studies on
employment.
An urban area is “a group of touching municipalities, without pockets of clear land,
encompassing an urban centre (urban unit) providing at least 10,000 jobs, and by rural
districts or an urban units (urban periphery) among which at least 40% of employed
resident population works in the centre or in the municipalities attracted by this centre.”
A urban unit is “a municipality or a group of municipalities which includes a continu-
ously built up zone (no cut of more than 200 meters between two constructions) and at
least 2,000 inhabitants.”
The living zone is “the smallest territory on which residents have access to facilities
and the everyday services. The everyday services and facilities used to define these living
zones include six categories : personal services; commerce; education; health ; sports,
recreation and culture; transport.”
The urban unit has the advantage to be directly characterized by the INSEE according
to the size of the area (Tranches d’unité urbaine). Thus, it is a good starting point
that avoids making strong assumptions on the characterization of the different territories.
Using employment zones or living zones would have make necessary to select the relevant
information to characterize the area. Moreover, urban unit is more precise level than the
employment areas or urban areas, while remaining relevant for the different existing types
of areas in the department; living zones, conversely, are not optimal to analyze dense
urban spaces, as they frequently overlap in these spaces (Chevillard et al., 2015). Overall,
the choice of the unit of analysis was pragmatic but it could be interesting to reproduce
the analysis using other geographical levels of analysis.
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This thesis aims at improving the understanding of home care arrangements for the
disabled elderly in France. It specifically highlights the determinants of the demand for
formal care and the organization of the provision, both formal and informal. Addressing
long-term care issues, it also contributes to adjacent fields of the economic literature, in
particular economics of the family, public economics and health services management.
The present conclusion proposes an overview of the main results and contributions, as
well as future areas of research.
1 Main results and contributions
1.1 Sources of variations of the costs of care provision, formal
or informal
Chapter 1 and Chapter 4 offer new contributions on the organization of the provision
of both formal and informal care. Chapter 1 focuses on the informal care arrangements
in the context of France. It focuses on a sample of elderly declaring they need human
assistance for the activities of daily living and highlights the determinants of care provision
from their children. Doing so, it helps identifying the variables increasing the utility of
being caregiver (thus, relating to the benefits from the care provision) and those decreasing
this utility (thus, relating to the costs of care provision). These variables are identified
separately for children according to their rank in the sibling, with two definitions of
caregiving (broad and restricted definitions). Results show that costs and benefits vary
with respect to the rank in the sibling and the definition of caregiving. With a broad
definition of care, including domestic care, financial help and moral support, the younger
children is more sensitive to her own opportunity costs than the elder child. With the
definition restricted to domestic care, behaviors are more convergent. Whatever the care
definition and the rank, daughters with a brother are found to be more frequently assigned
to care provision compared to other sex compositions. Interactions of care behavior are
also found to be asymmetric, meaning that the care behavior of one child differently
affects the net utility of the other according to the rank. In this context, a public policy
that would build on a substantial informal care provision could potentially increase the
inequalities within sibling with respect to the sex and the rank.
Chapter 4 documents the organization of a formal care provider and analyzes the
sources of costs variations tied to the specific nature of home delivery. Beyond the phy-
sical constraints encountered in rural and small urban municipalities (important travel
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distances), it shows that travel costs also generated by the characteristics of the demand
living there. Indeed, severly disabled individuals are over-represented in these areas, and
their consumption is more fragmented (i.e shorter and more frequent interventions) than
others, thus generating more travel costs and distance.
Both chapters thus highlight the sources of variations in the costs of care provision,
with a specific focus on one little explored dimension of the care provision: endogenous
interactions for informal care, travel costs for formal care. In both cases, predictably, the
characteristics of the person receiving care importantly weight on the organization of the
care provision: regarding informal care, they influence the care behavior of children and
the type of care they provide; regarding formal care, they weight on the organization of
the round.
1.2 A limited price sensitivity of the demand for formal care
The two other chapters provide evidence on the price sensitivity of the demand for
formal care, both at the intensive (Chapter 2) and extensive margins (Chapter 3). At the
extensive margin, the demand is found not to be affected by the generosity of the public
financing, measured by the departmental formula used to compute the APA subsidy. At
the intensive margin, the sensitivity to the OOP price is significantly different from zero,
meaning that long-term care programs financing formal care raise efficiency issues. This
price elasticity is also found to be inferior to 1 in absolute value, thus revealing a fairly
weak price sensitivity of the demand.
Overall, the price sensitivity of the demand for formal care is thus found to be limited,
both at the extensive and intensive margins. In both chapters, however, the demand
is substantially affected by the limitations met by the individual and the presence of
potential informal care (spouse and children). At the extensive and intensive margins,
health status and informal care availability are thus the major explaining factors. Price
variations would only conduct to small adjustements at the intensive margin. Such a
result echoes the literature on the determinants of nursing home entry presented in the
general introduction. It has shown that a deteriorated health status and limited resources
in informal care predict nursing home entry while the demand is fairly little sensitive to
the price.
1.3 Implications for the regulation of the home care sector
The thesis also contributes to analyze the importance of the regulation of the home
care sector. Its results make it possible to conclude on the implications of the supply side
regulation for consumers. The first implication relates to spatial equity issues. Chapter
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4 reveals differences in travel costs according to the demand and the area served. It
shows the costs supported by the provider for the service of rural or small urban unit,
generating important travel distances, while residents have a more fragmented demand
that is costly to serve. In this context, the non-regulation of providers would be expected
to result in an unequal spatial coverage and restricted access to home care for costly to
serve areas. The regulation, by departmental councils, of the area served thus ensures a
form a spatial equity in the availability of home care, within the department. In addition,
the unique price fixed to each structure organizes a redistribution from the less costly
to serve to the others. According to Chapter 4, this redistribution benefits to the most
disabled individuals. This redistribution, however, is only effective among the consumers
of the same provider. Indeed, the pricing of each structure results in potential variations
of provider price according to the type and the importance of area they serve. These
variations are documented and used as a source of identification in Chapter 2. Individuals
served by a provider covering a large number of municipalities are found to be charged a
higher price than those served by a provider covering a lower number of municipalities.
A second aspect of the formal care regulation adressed in the thesis is the impact of
having a mixed market on the demand for formal care. Chapter 3 shows a correlation
between a low level of regulation and a low demand for formal care. If this link is thought
to be causal, it would reveal that a low level of regulation decreases the incentives to con-
sume formal care, potentially through a price or quality effect. If the reverse relationship
is rather suspected, meaning that departments with a low demand do not get involved
into regulation, elderly requiring formal care living in departments where demand is low
would have a limited access to providers with regulated price and quality.
A broader implicitation relates to the transparency of the home care sector regulation.
Given the complexity of the French institutional context, understanding and forecasting
one’s OOP payments requires to have a considerable insight of the supply and demand
side of the long-term care scheme. In particular, it implies to be aware of the difference
between providers, to understand the associated variations in computation formulas and
to observe their price. As of today, these three elements are far from being granted for
APA beneficiaries. The 2016 reform has targeted the transparency in the nursing homes
sector: the same trend could be applied to the professional care provided at home.
1.4 Expectations for the 2016 reform
Holding together these results makes it possible to provide some forcasting about the
effects of the 2016 reform of the French long-term care scheme presented in the general
introduction. On the demand side, the reform has modified the copayment rate formula
to take into account the disability levels of beneficiaries. It has also raised the level of
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the legal thresholds binding the care plan volume for each disability level. Overall, these
measures are expected to decrease the OOP payments of APA beneficiaries, by diminishing
the hourly OOP payments on subsidized hours and increasing the number of hours that
can be subsidized. According to the limited demand sensitivity, this decrease in the OOP
payment for formal care should have limited volume effects.
On the supply side, all structures are expected to turn to the regulated regime. It
could help increasing formal care use in departments where the regulation level was low;
it will depend, however, on the mecanisms driving our results (price or quality effect) and
on the effect of the reform on the distribution of care hours between (regulated) structures
and over-the-counter workers.
These two parts of the reform are going to affect the volume and the structure of
APA spending. The central contribution to the financing of the program has increased
to take into account additional expenses mainly due to the demand side part of the
reform. The effects of the supply part are more indirect and uncertain. In the absence
of pricing, the computation formula used for previously non-regulated providers should
remain unchanged. But expenses will be affected if the consumption of individuals changes
following the change in the supply regulation, as suggested by our results. This potential
increase has not been planned in the compensation scheme of the reform.
2 Discussion and future research
Beyond the points of discussion already raised in the general introduction and the
chapters, this section identifies areas of future research that could help improving the
works presented in the thesis.
2.1 Modeling of the demand for formal care
In the thesis, the modeling of the demand for formal care is relatively rigid and rests
on strong hypothesis on individual behavior. In particular, Chapter 2 implicitly assumes
that the observed level of consumption corresponds to the consumption maximizing the
individual utility, thus resting on a perfect rationality assumption. This assumption is
strong, as some irrationnaly is potentially prevailing and prevents the level of consump-
tion to be equal to the one given by the standard consumer theory. An ongoing work
within the Modapa project realized by Agnès Gramain and Olivier Supplisson challenges
this hypothesis: they find that a model assuming perfect rationality and a model resting
on a gaussian optimization error are equivalently misspecifing the formal care demand.
Another potential biais that would prevent observed consumption to equal the consump-
tion maximizing utility is related to the time schedule of the APA program compared to
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those of the individual consumption. The APA policy is such that care plan volume are
established at the monthly level. Yet, there is empirical evidence that the consumption is
organized at the weekly level (remember, for instance, Appendix 9.3 of Chapter 4). The
existence of such a temporal discrepancy and its implications for the elderly should be
further explored.
2.2 Exploiting new databases to update and deepen the analysis
A national survey, the CARE survey, was conducted in France, in 2015, on the French
population aged 60 and more. The section devoted to individuals living in the community
has included around 15,000 individuals, representative of the 60+ population. It covers
health and disability issues, gives information on informal and formal care provision and
includes a large set of socio-economic and family information. It will additionally be linked
with administrative micro-data from the APA program and the fiscal administration.
With precise information on the OOP payments and volume of formal care consumed,
this survey will make it possible to get an alternative estimation of the price elasticity,
controlling for informal care provision and without censoring issues. Moreover, results
are expected to be reliable in terms of external validity. In methodological terms, the
comparison of results obtained with these exhaustive survey data, which are costly to
produce, and the alternative strategies and data used within the Modapa project will
help measuring the costs of using alternative strategies on easy-to-access data.
Simultaneously to the CARE survey, a departmental survey has been implemented, the
SolvAPA survey, which partially builds on the Territoire survey. It offers the opportunity
to compare departmental practices between 2012 and 2015, as is done in Chapter 3. It
could also be used for the identification of the effect of departmental practices on formal
care consumption using the CARE survey.
2.3 Exploring the dynamic of care arrangements
Contributions of the thesis are mostly based on cross-sectional data. Chapter 2 is
the only one using panel data, which mostly contribute to increase the precision of the
estimations rather than bringing evidence on dynamic issues. A dynamic approach would
however be relevant to better understand the mecanisms underlying care arrangements.
How are care arrangements, both formal and informal, evolving with the disability path
of the ederly? A dynamic version of Chapter 1 would be particularly of interest to see
whether the results obtained are homogeneous regarding both the seniority and the se-
verity of disabilities. Care provided by children might obey to different rules depending
on these two dimensions. Typically, it can be expected that having a parent newly and
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sightly disabled differs from the case when she has been highly disabled for years or when
she suddenly turns highly disabled following an health shock. In addition, to the best of
my knowledge, there is a gap in the literature regarding the care arrangements when the
parent is frail (in the sense of Fried et al. (2001)), before the occurence of effective activity
limitations. Informal or formal care at this step could potentially have beneficial effects
on the functional status of the elderly. The longitudinal survey SHARE, covering a re-
presentative sample of non-institutionalised adults between 2004 and 2015 in 22 different
European countries,27 offers rich data to study such dynamic issues.
27The seventh has been released in 2017 and has included additional eight countries.
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Eveborn, P., Flisberg, P. and Rönnqvist, M. (2006), ‘Laps Care: an operational system for staff
planning of home care’, European Journal of Operational Research 171(3), 962–976. 223
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URL: http: // www. modapa. cnrs. fr 29, 60, 111, 144, 156, 178, 180, 186, 187, 188, 189,
191, 192, 201, 203, 204, 205, 210, 212, 215, 217
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des bonnes pratiques, 234
Moffitt, R. (1986), ‘The econometrics of piecewise-linear budget constraints: A survey and
exposition of the maximum likelihood method’, Journal of Business & Economic Statistics
4(3), 317–328. 111, 112, 138, 140
Moffitt, R. (1990), ‘The econometrics of kinked budget constraints’, The Journal of Economic
Perspectives 4(2), 119–139. 113
Mommaerts, C. (2018), ‘Are coresidence and nursing homes substitutes? Evidence from Medi-
caid spend-down provisions’, Journal of Health Economics 59, 125–138. 19, 46
Monnier, A. (2007), ‘Le baby-boom : suite et fin’, Population et sociétés 431. 15, 39
Mosca, I., Pomp, M. and Shestalova, V. (2010), ‘Market Share and Price in Dutch Home Care:
Market Power or Quality?’, De Economist 158(1), 61–79. 223
Motel-Klingebiel, A., Tesch-Roemer, C. and Von Kondratowitz, H.-J. (2005), ‘Welfare states
do not crowd out the family: evidence for mixed responsibility from comparative analyses’,
Ageing and Society 25(6), 863–882. 47
Moulton, B. R. (1990), ‘An illustration of a pitfall in estimating the effects of aggregate variables
on micro units’, The Review of Economics and Statistics 72(2), 334–338. 120, 156, 183
Muir, T. (2017), Measuring social protection for long-term care, OECD Health Working Pa-
pers 93, OECD Publishing. 18, 43, 44, 45, 49
Mulder, C. H. and van der Meer, M. J. (2009), ‘Geographical distances and support from family
members’, Population, Space and Place 15(4), 381–399. 87
Norton, E. (2016), Health and Long-Term Care, in ‘Handbook of the Economics of Population
Aging’, Vol. 1, Elsevier, pp. 951–989. 19, 46
Norton, E. C. (2000), Chapter 17 Long-term care, in ‘Handbook of Health Economics’, Vol. 1,
Elsevier, pp. 955–994. 43
270
Novi, C. D., Jacobs, R. and Migheli, M. (2015), ‘The Quality of Life of Female Informal
Caregivers: From Scandinavia to the Mediterranean Sea’, European Journal of Population
31(3), 309–333. 48
Observatoire National du domicile (2018), Tarif APA. étude des réalités départementales, 174
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: quels effets sur les aides reçues à domicile par les populations handicapée et dépendante ?’,
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Les configurations d’aides formelles et informelles autour des personnes
âgées en incapacité en France
Résumé: Le vieillissement de la population et la forte prévalence des incapacités qui
lui est associée invitent à s’interroger sur les modes d’accompagnement de la perte
d’autonomie. Tandis que l’aide reçue par les personnes âgées dépendantes provient ma-
joritairement de leurs proches, les politiques publiques françaises favorisent le recours à
l’aide professionnelle, dite aide formelle, pour les personnes résidant à domicile. Cette
thèse se propose d’étudier les configurations d’aides formelles et informelles pour les per-
sonnes âgées en perte d’autonomie. Sous quelles conditions les individus ont-ils recours
à l’aide professionnelle, et comment se détermine leur niveau de consommation ? Com-
ment les producteurs d’aide familiale et professionnelle s’adaptent-t-ils aux contraintes de
production qui leur sont propres ? Les quatre chapitres de cette thèse étudient empirique-
ment ces questions dans le contexte français. Mobilisant le cadre micro-économique et les
outils économétriques, ils s’appuient sur des données d’enquête, des données administrati-
ves et des fichiers de gestion d’un service d’aide à domicile. Le premier Chapitre porte sur
l’aide apportée par les enfants à un parent âgé dépendant. Le deuxième Chapitre étudie
l’élasticité-prix de la demande d’aide formelle. Le troisième Chapitre analyse comment
le financement public de la demande et la régulation de l’offre affectent la décision de
consommer de l’aide professionnelle. Le quatrième Chapitre s’intéresse enfin aux coûts de
transport des services d’aide professionnelle, comme contrainte de production pesant sur
l’organisation de l’offre. Les résultats montrent que la demande d’aide est relativement
peu sensible au prix de l’aide professionnelle, tandis que la régulation de l’offre affecte
plus notablement les configurations d’aide.
Mots-clefs: vieillissement; dépendance; aide à domicile; politiques publiques.
Formal and informal care arrangements for the disabled elderly in France
Abstract: In a context of population ageing, the demand for long-term care is rising.
While relatives remain the major source of care provision for disabled elderly, most OECD
countries tend to foster the use of professional care, also called formal care, when individu-
als live at home. This thesis studies the determinants of home care arrangements for the
disabled elderly in the context of France. What are the determinants of formal care con-
sumption, at both the extensive and intensive margins? How do formal and informal care
providers adjust to their provision constraints? The four chapters present original empi-
rical evidence on these questions in the French context. They build on micro-econometric
frameworks and use national survey data, administrative data or management files from
a professional provider. The first Chapter studies the care provided by children to a di-
sabled elderly parent. The second Chapter estimates the price-elasticity of the demand
for formal care. The third Chapter analyzes how the decision to consume formal care is
affected by the generosity of the public financing and the regulation of home care provi-
ders. The fourth Chapter focuses on the travel costs borne by home-care providers and
their effect on the home care provision. The demand for formal care is found to be fairly
little sensitive to its price, while the regulation of the supply is more likely to affect care
arrangements.
Keywords: long-term care; disability; home care; public policies.
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